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SUMMARY
Common control channels in cognitive radio (CR) ad hoc networks are spec-
trum resources temporarily allocated and commonly available to CR users for control
message exchange. With no presumably available network infrastructure, CR users
rely on cooperation to perform spectrum management functions. On the one hand,
CR users need to cooperate to establish the common control channels, but on the
other hand, they need to have common control channels to facilitate such coopera-
tion. This chicken-and-egg problem, known as the control channel problem, is further
complicated by the impacts of primary user activities, channel impairments, and in-
telligent attackers. Therefore, how to reliably and securely establish control links
in cognitive radio ad hoc networks is a challenging problem. In this work, a frame-
work for common control channel design and analysis is proposed to address control
channel reliability and security challenges for seamless communication and spectral
efficiency in CR ad hoc networks. Specifically, the framework tackles the problem
from three perspectives: (i) responsiveness to primary user activities: an efficient
recovery control channel (ERCC) method is devised to efficiently establish control
links and extend control channel coverage upon primary user’s return while mitigat-
ing the interference with primary users, (ii) robustness to channel impairments: a
reinforcement learning-based cooperative sensing (RLCS) method is introduced to
improve cooperative gain and mitigate cooperation overhead such as the effect of
control channel fading, and (iii) resilience to jamming attacks: a jamming-resilient
control channel (JRCC) method is developed to combat jamming under the impacts
of primary user activities and spectrum sensing errors by leveraging cooperative in-
trusion defense strategies. This research is particularly attractive to emergency relief,
public safety, military, and commercial applications where self-organizing CR users




1.1 Control Channel Challenges
People today enjoy using broadband wireless devices anytime anywhere for business,
entertainment, and social networking, to name a few, in unprecedented ways. The
exponential growth of such a strong demand for seamless and reliable wireless services
requires more spectrum for new wireless broadband services in the future. Neverthe-
less, like other natural resources, spectrum is limited in nature. One the one hand, the
unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) bands are crowded with mutual-
interfering wireless devices and services. On the other hand, as reported by FCC
Spectrum Policy Task Force [28], unoccupied or frequently idle licensed spectrum,
known as spectrum holes or white spaces, can be observed at various locations and
time periods. These white spaces are unavailable for spectrum-demanding unlicensed
services due to the fixed spectrum assignment policy enforced by the government,
which results in inefficient utilization of licensed spectrum. Thus, how to efficiently
utilize the spectrum resources becomes an important and imminent issue that moti-
vates the research on cognitive radio (CR) networks [1, 2, 37].
As an enabling technology and the promising solution to resolve the spectrum
utilization issue, CR networks enable unlicensed users to access idle licensed bands
by opportunistic spectrum access [102]. To realize this, unlicensed users equipped
with CRs, known as CR users or secondary users (SUs), are capable of detecting
the presence of licensed users, also known as primary users (PUs), in licensed bands,
and utilizing those spectrum opportunities for their transmission when PUs are not
present. To detect PUs or spectrum holes, CR users observe primary transmission,
1
known as radio-frequency (RF) stimuli from the radio environment, by spectrum sens-
ing. Upon the detection of PUs’ presence, CR users either adapt themselves to limit
their interference with PUs to a tolerable level, or vacate the channel to protect PUs
from harmful interference. In the latter, CR users need to determine an appropriate
frequency band for transmission based on spectrum characteristics by spectrum de-
cision and resume their transmission in a new band by spectrum mobility. In either
case, CR users utilize the spectrum efficiently to improve system performance by spec-
trum sharing. These four spectrum management functions form a cognitive cycle [1].
To facilitate these spectrum management functions, CR users usually coordinate with
each other by using a common medium for control message exchange. This common
medium is known as a common control channel (CCC) [1, 2, 57].
A CCC in CR networks is an indispensable medium allocated in a portion of
spectrum commonly available to two or more CR users for control message exchange.
The CCC allocation can be temporary or permanent in a licensed or unlicensed band
to facilitate various CR network operations such as transmitter-receiver handshake,
neighbor discovery, channel access negotiation, topology change and routing informa-
tion updates, and cooperation among CR users [1,2,57]. Specifically, CR users show
their existence by broadcasting control messages on the CCC for neighboring users
in the proximity to maintain the contact and network connectivity [57]. Moreover,
CR users can cooperate and share their spectrum sensing data with each other by
using the CCC to improve the detection of PUs [3]. More importantly, CR users need
to inform each other about PU activity changes, spectrum availability, and network
topology in order to improve the CR throughput and spectrum efficiency. However,
despite their ubiquitous use, the existence of reliable CCCs are assumed to be con-
stantly available in a significant amount of CR solutions in the literature [5]. In many
existing solutions, however, the issues of how CCCs are reliably established and ef-
ficiently maintained in the dynamic environment affected by PU activity are often
2
ignored. Thus, it is essential to investigate the CCC reliability issues and provide
novel CCC solutions to address these new challenges in CR networks.
The CCC design in CR networks faces several new challenges. These challenges
arise from unique characteristics in CR networks such as PU activity, spectrum het-
erogeneity, and intelligence of CR users. First, unless allocated in the frequency band
free from PUs, a CCC is susceptible to PU activity and can be occupied by PUs at
any given time. In this case, the control channel problem in CR ad hoc networks is
referred to as a chicken-and-egg problem [5]: CR users need to cooperate with each
other to find a PU-free CCC to avoid the interference with PUs. However, they also
need to have a PU-free CCC in the first place to facilitate their cooperation and
control message exchange. Thus, upon PU’s return, CR users face the difficulty in
establishing a new CCC without a CCC because they are unable to use the original
CCC to negotiate a new one. How to efficiently respond to PU activity and recover
the CCC becomes the most important challenge in CCC design. Second, unlike legacy
multi-channel wireless networks where all channels are at the disposal of all users, CR
users usually observe different channel availability that only a subset of all licensed
channels are available. Due to this spectrum heterogeneity in CR networks, it is
unlikely to find a channel commonly available to all users as the CCC. As a result,
the area where CR users share the same CCC, called CCC coverage, is limited to a
neighborhood in CR ad hoc networks. Since broadcasting on CCCs of small cover-
age in the network increases channel switching delay and control signaling overheads,
another design challenge is to improve CCC coverage for control message broadcasts
under spectrum heterogeneity.
In addition to PU activity and CCC coverage challenges, unreliable control chan-
nel conditions can have the great impact on the performance of CR networks. This
is a critical issue for cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) [3] in CR networks. In co-
operative sensing, CR users rely on a reliable CCC to report local spectrum sensing
3
data to a data fusion center or share the data among themselves. However, channel
impairments such as multipath fading and shadowing in control channels cause er-
rors in the reported sensing data, which can significantly compromise the detection
performance. Moreover, unreliable control channels can result in long reporting delay
due to packet loss and retransmission. The increased sensing time due to these delays
results in reduced transmission time, which degrades the system performance. Thus,
channel impairment is a critical issue of CCC reliability in CR networks. Furthermore,
control channels, considered as a single point of failure when statically allocated, are
susceptible to security attacks such as control channel jamming. Jamming attacks
are launched by malicious users (MUs) to deliberately disrupt the communications of
CR users, resulting in denial of service (DoS). It is reported in [15] that control chan-
nel jamming can be more effective than jamming the entire band by several orders
of magnitude. For this reason, attackers may prefer control channel jamming than
other jamming methods due to its effectiveness of resulting in DoS. The jamming
issues in CR networks are further complicated by the intelligence of the attackers.
Equipped with CRs, these malicious attackers are capable of learning channel allo-
cation strategies of normal CR users and adapting to the behavior of CR users for
effective jamming. Thus, as in any wireless network, control channel jamming is a
severe CCC reliability issue in CR networks.
In this research, we focus on the CCC reliability issues in CR ad hoc networks.
CR ad hoc networks [1] are distributed CR networks formed by a group of CR users
connected in an ad hoc fashion without network infrastructure and centralized con-
trol entity such as base stations (BS). The reasons of tackling CCC issues in CR ad
hoc networks are threefold: (i) CCCs are so crucial in CR ad hoc networks because
CR users totally rely on CCCs to cooperate with each other in order to perform
all spectrum management functions, (ii) the CCC issues in distributed networks are
4
more challenging than those in centralized ones simply due to the lack of a central-
ized control entity for coordination, and (iii) many important commercial, military,
emergency relief, and strategic situation applications, which either do not have net-
work infrastructure available or prefer self-organizing networks, strongly demand dis-
tributed CCC solutions. Therefore, motivated by the aforementioned CCC issues and
challenges in CR ad hoc networks, we present the research objectives and solutions
of the research in the next section.
1.2 Research Objectives and Solutions
The objectives of this research are to address three main CCC reliability issues: (i)
responsiveness to PU activities, (ii) robustness to channel impairments, and (iii) re-
silience to jamming attacks. A framework for CCC design and analysis is constructed
to address these CCC challenges for seamless communication and spectral efficiency
in CR ad hoc networks. As shown in Figure 1.1, the framework consists of three
CCC design and analysis methods, each of which aims at tackling a specific CCC
reliability issue: (i) Efficient Recovery Control Channel (ERCC) method [54] for re-
sponsiveness to PU activities, (ii) Reinforcement Learning-based Cooperative Sensing
(RLCS) method [53, 58] for robustness to channel impairments, and (iii) Jamming-
Resilient Control Channel (JRCC) method [55,56] for resilience to jamming attacks.
These control channel solutions are discussed as follows.
1.2.1 Responsiveness to Primary User Activities
The first objective of this research is to address the issue of responsiveness to PU
activities. This objective aims to efficiently recover CCCs among a large group of
CR users upon the return of PUs. This will facilitate virtually “always-on” CCCs
in the highly dynamic RF environment to ensure network connectivity and seamless
operations, which is especially important for CR ad hoc networks. While the CCC













Figure 1.1: Framework of Common Control Channel Design and Analysis.
PUs may be deteriorated due to spectrum heterogeneity. Therefore, the key challenge
to achieve the responsiveness of CCCs lies in the tradeoff between maximizing the
CCC coverage and minimizing the interference with PUs.
To achieve this objective, we devise an efficient recovery control channel (ERCC)
method to efficiently recover CCCs by dynamic control channel allocations while max-
imizing the CCC coverage for reduced control signaling efforts. Specifically, ERCC
enables CR users to prioritize available channels based on local spectrum sensing
data and neighbors’ preference for finding the best CCC candidate that is the most
preferable by the majority of CR users in the neighborhood in preparation for instant
recovery of CCCs upon PU’s return. As a result, this method effectively recovers lost
control channel links caused by PU activity changes and maintains a high degree of
network connectivity. Furthermore, ERCC is capable of extending the coverage of a
CCC while allocating a control channel of high quality to minimize the interference
with PUs. Therefore, ERCC balances the tradeoff between coverage and interfer-
ence, which facilitates broadcasts with reduced control signaling efforts and increased
broadcast throughput.
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1.2.2 Robustness to Channel Impairments
The second objective of this research is to provide robustness to control channel
impairments in the context of cooperative spectrum sensing. Cooperative sensing is
an effective method to combat multipath and shadow fading, and improve spectrum
sensing performance by exploiting the spatial diversity of spatially distributed CR
users [3]. However, spatially correlated shadowing in sensing channels or reporting
channels can limit the achievable cooperative gain [26, 32]. Moreover, the reporting
delays incurred by uncorrectable errors in control packets and retransmission need to
be minimized to reduce the total sensing time and increase CR throughput. Thus, a
new method to select uncorrelated CR users for cooperation and minimize the impact
of cooperation overhead is desired.
To achieve this objective, we introduce a reinforcement learning-based cooperative
sensing (RLCS) method to provide robustness to channel impairments and improve
the detection performance under correlated shadowing and control channel fading.
In RLCS, the CR user acting as the fusion center (FC) is the decision-making agent
interacting with the environment that consists of its cooperating neighbors and their
observations of PU activity. By using proposed reinforcement learning algorithms, the
FC learns the behavior of cooperating SUs and takes action to select the optimal set
of spatially uncorrelated users for cooperation with the minimum reporting delays. In
addition, RLCS is able to adapt to environmental change such as CR user movements,
PU activity changes, and varying channel conditions, and mitigate their impact on
the performance of cooperative sensing.
1.2.3 Resilience to Jamming Attacks
The third objective of this research is to provide resilience to control channel jam-
ming attacks and maintain network connectivity in hostile environment. As previously
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mentioned, control channel jamming is a DoS attack that can effectively disrupt nor-
mal network operations. In CR networks, the attackers are also intelligent decision
makers who can observe control channel allocations of CR users and select optimal
jamming strategies to maximize the effects of jamming while minimizing their con-
sumed energy. Since the establishment of control channels relies on the cooperation
of CR users and the availability of control channels for cooperation diminishes under
jamming, a new method to combat control channel jamming attacks while sustaining
network connectivity for cooperation is necessary.
To address this problem, we develop a jamming-resilient control channel (JRCC)
method to provide resilience to jamming attacks launched by intelligent attackers in
hostile environment. By using enhanced multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL)
algorithms with variable learning rates, CR users can make independent decisions to
facilitate future control channel allocations as well as mitigate the effects of jamming
attacks to maintain network connectivity. In addition, JRCC is able to adapt to
PU activity and mitigate the impact of spectrum sensing errors by exploiting CR
user cooperation such as action strategy coordination, best-effort cooperative sensing,
and scalable CR user deployment as intrusion defense strategies, which is shown
to significantly improve jamming resilience of CR users and compromise jamming
strength of attackers.
1.3 Applications of Common Control Channel Solutions
Our CCC solutions are particularly attractive to emergency relief, military, and com-
mercial applications where CR users are self-organized and connected in an ad hoc
fashion with no presumably available network infrastructure, and are highly likely to
operate in spectrum-scarce or hostile environment. As an example, our CCC design
framework can be utilized to manage the coexistence of heterogeneous networks and
enhance spectral efficiency in TV white space (TVWS).
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TV white spaces are unutilized spectrum resources or frequencies not operated by
the licensed devices in the TV bands [30]. To improve spectrum utilization, Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) adopts rules to allow unlicensed access in the TV
bands [29]. Many standardization activities either finalize new TVWS standards such
as IEEE 802.22 [38] and ECMA 392 [27] to enable new TV band devices (TVBD),
or extend existing wireless standards such as IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.15.4 to
enable existing wireless devices for TV band access. However, these emerging TV
band devices from heterogeneous networks can result in severe interference with each
other due to propagation characteristics of transmissions in the TV bands and the
lack of inter-network communication or cross-network coordination. Therefore, the
coexistence of heterogeneous networks is envisaged to be a challenging issue in TVWS,
and common control channel access has been identified as an open problem and
potential solution for TVWS standards [33].
To address the heterogeneous coexistence problem, we consider a CR ad hoc net-
work formed by base stations (BS), access points (APs), personal area network (PAN)
coordinators, known as fixed or Mode II devices, and the associated personal/mobile
devices in TVWS. These TVBDs (CR users) are able to find neighbors and commu-
nicate with each other by using self-organizing ERCCs dynamically allocated in TV
channels. For coexistence, each CR user performs RLCS to detect the presence of
other TVBDs and estimate channel conditions and interference in the neighborhood.
By communicating on the established CCCs, these TVBDs of different networks are
able to directly share the environment information such as spectrum sensing data,
channel allocation, and transmission power from neighboring heterogeneous CR users
and from the TVWS database. As a result, these CR users can iteratively keep track
of the environmental change and adaptively adjust their channel and power allocation
to mitigate the interference in TVWS. When these TVBDs are at risk of jamming



















Figure 1.2: Organization of the Thesis.
jamming resilience in TVWS.
1.4 Thesis Outline
In Figure 1.2, the thesis outline and the suggested reading sequences are illustrated.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the classification
of CCC design methods, major CCC design methods, and their design challenges are
discussed. In Chapter 3, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) and the design chal-
lenges of CCC as reporting channels in cooperative spectrum sensing are introduced.
In Chapter 4, the ERCC method is devised for responsiveness to PU activities and
the balance of increasing CCC coverage and reducing interference. In Chapter 5, the
RLCS method is introduced for robustness to channel impairments and efficient use
of CCC bandwidth in cooperative spectrum sensing. In Chapter 6, the JRCC method
is presented for resilience to jamming attacks, and the large-scale jamming-resilient
control channels under the effects of primary user activity and sensing errors are an-
alyzed. In Chapter 7, the conclusions and contributions of this work and directions
for future research are summarized.
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CHAPTER II
COMMON CONTROL CHANNEL DESIGN
2.1 Origins of Common Control Channel Design
The CCC design in CR networks is originated from the medium access control (MAC)
protocols in multi-channel wireless networks. In multi-channel environment, one chan-
nel available to all nodes in the network is commonly used for control message ex-
change to facilitate negotiations for channel access, handshaking between transmitters
and receivers, and other network operations. However, such a single and dedicated
control channel allocation may suffer from control channel saturation [81] when a large
number of nodes access the control channel and cause throughput degradation due
to control packet collisions. To address this problem, more flexible control channel
allocation schemes were proposed for MAC protocols in multi-channel wireless net-
works [64]. These early control channel studies for MAC protocols in legacy wireless
networks pave the way for the CCC design in CR networks.
In the early studies of MAC protocols for CR networks, control channel solutions
remain part of MAC protocols. In fact, a significant amount of CR MAC proto-
cols [36, 39, 48, 65, 83] continue to assume that a dedicated control channel free from
PU activity is available to all CR users. This assumption, though simplifying these
MAC problems, requires the allocation of control channels either in bands licensed by
CR network operators or in unlicensed bands. On the one hand, the control channel,
when allocated in licensed bands, incurs undesirable operating cost on the CR net-
work operators. On the other hand, control channels, when allocated in unlicensed
bands, can be unreliable due to the interference with other devices of any wireless
networks operating in the overcrowded unlicensed bands. More importantly, such
11
static control channel allocations can result in inefficient spectrum utilization, which
contradicts the objective of improving spectral efficiency in CR networks. Thus, it
is necessary to devise novel CCC solutions to address new design challenges in CR
networks.
In this chapter, we introduce the definition of a CCC and the classification of CCC
design methods in CR networks in Section 2.2. Based on the classification, we then
discuss major CCC design methods, their pros and cons, and exemplary solutions
in Section 2.3. Lastly, we discuss CCC design issues from control channel security
perspectives in Section 2.4. Interested readers may refer to [57] for comprehensive
surveys of CCC design methods and the extensive discussions of their advantages,
disadvantages, and design challenges.
2.2 Definition and Classification
The unique characteristics of spectrum heterogeneity and challenges of resource man-
agement in CR networks call for a new definition of CCCs different from the conven-
tional view of control channels. A CCC in CR networks is a medium allocated in a
portion of spectrum commonly available to two or more CR users for control message
exchange. Based on this definition, a CCC can be allocated in a licensed or unlicensed
band, and the allocation can be temporary or permanent. Mathematically, we have
the following:
Definition 2.1 (Common Control Channel). A common control channel (CCC) cv ∈
C is a channel allocated in a portion of spectrum [f1, f2] with channel bandwidth Bc =
f2−f1 during the time period [t1, t2] for control message exchange, where C is a set of
available channels for allocations, f1 and f2 are RF frequencies that satisfy 3 kHz ≤
f1 < f2 ≤ 300GHz, and t1 and t2 are time instants that satisfy 0 < t1 < t2 <∞.
Based on this definition, a CCC in CR networks may not be always available or
unique, and it can be allocated in either licensed or unlicensed frequency bands. In
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this research, we focus on common control channels dynamically allocated in licensed
spectrum where PUs are likely to occupy the allocated control channels anytime,
which makes it more challenging to tackle the control channel problem. Several
existing CR MAC solutions [44, 45, 98] claim that no CCC is required or needed
in their schemes. However, what is not required in those solutions, according to
our definition, is a statically allocated CCC, or to be more appropriately termed, a
dedicated CCC. Thus, by our definition, at least one CCC is always utilized by any
MAC or channel allocation schemes in CR networks.
The classification of CCC design is the best place to understand the CCC design in
CR networks from the bird’s-eye view. The CCC design schemes have been classified
in several ways in the literature [1, 57, 69, 70]. As shown in Fig. 2.1, the CCC design
classification is first divided into overlay and underlay CCC schemes. This first-level
categorization reflects two primary spectrum sharing approaches in the CR paradigm.
Overlay approaches are classified as in-band and out-of-band schemes as in [1]. In
terms of CCC coverage, in-band approaches are local while the out-of-band schemes
are mainly global. The in-band schemes are further classified as sequence-based and
group-based CCC designs. The out-of-band schemes are primarily dedicated CCC
solutions. Underlay approaches, on the other hand, are composed of ultra wideband
(UWB) and multicarrier spread spectrum (MC-SS) underlay control channel designs.
2.2.1 Overlay vs. Underlay
Overlay and underlay approaches are distinguished by how CR users share the spec-
trum with PUs. In overlay approaches, CCCs are allocated to the spectrum not used
by PUs. When the allocated CCCs are occupied by returning PUs, CR users must
vacate the CCCs and reestablish new CCCs in other available spectrum. However,















Figure 2.1: Classification of Common Control Channel Design Methods.
PUs are detected and the agility of CCC migration upon PU’s return. In underlay
approaches, CCCs can be allocated to the same band used by PUs. By utilizing
spread spectrum techniques, control messages are transmitted in low power by using
short pulses, which are spread over a large bandwidth such that control transmissions
appear to PUs as noise. However, PU transmissions can still be affected by underlay
CCCs if the number of CR users is large due to the increase of the noise floor.
2.2.2 In-Band vs. Out-of-Band
In-band and out-of-band approaches are determined by whether or not the spectrum
for CCC allocations is used by PUs. As a result, the CCCs allocated to licensed chan-
nels used by PU transmissions are called in-band CCCs while the CCCs allocated in
dedicated spectrum such as unlicensed bands or the spectrum licensed to CR network
operators are called out-of-band CCCs. In-band CCCs generally improve spectrum ef-
ficiency and control channel security at the cost of establishment overhead and higher
complexity. Moreover, the coverage of in-band CCCs is limited to local areas due to
the spectrum heterogeneity caused by PU activities. On the contrary, out-of-band
CCCs are always available and can be globally available, but they incur extra cost
for CR network operators if allocated in licensed bands, suffer from interference if
allocated in unlicensed bands, and are susceptible to security attacks.
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2.3 Control Channel Design Methods
Based on the CCC classification, we now discuss the following four major control
channel design methods: sequence-based [6, 8, 9, 22, 23, 88], group-based [18, 19, 46, 52,
54, 101], dedicated [21, 36, 39, 83], and underlay [14, 61, 62, 71, 77, 96].
2.3.1 Sequence-Based Control Channel Design
In sequence-based CCC approaches, control channels are allocated according to a
random or predetermined channel hopping sequence. The primary goal of this design
is to diversify the control channel allocation over time and frequency spaces in order
to minimize the impact of PU activities. Since CR users may use different hopping
sequences, different neighboring pairs in a neighborhood communicate on different
control channels. As a result, this approach reduces the number of control channels
affected by PU’s return at a given time. However, such link-based rendezvous mostly
between a pair of CR users does not provide large CCC coverage. Thus, sequence-
based approaches incur high signaling overhead during control message broadcasts.
Figure 2.2 illustrates sequence-based CCCs in spatial and temporal-frequency do-
mains. Figure 2.2(a) is a spatial-domain snapshot taken between time instant t1 and
t2 in Figure 2.2(b) that shows PU activities and CCC allocations over time and fre-
quencies. The control links are established in pairs when two CR users rendezvous
on the same channel such as CR user I and J communicating on Channel (Ch) 3.
Since the CCC coverage is limited to one neighbor at a time, it takes time to meet
all neighbors one by one on different channels for a single broadcast message. The
blue arrows indicate channel switches following a possible channel hopping sequence
{3, 2, 5, 6, 4} adopted by CR user I. Note that CR user G and H tuned to Channel
1 cannot communicate with each other due to PU activities on that channel.
In the sequence-based CCC design, the channel hopping sequence is the key ele-
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Figure 2.2: Sequence-Based Common Control Channels in (a) Spatial Domain and
(b) Temporal-Frequency Domain.
the construction of hopping sequences can be pseudo random [6, 88], permutation-
based [23, 88], adaptive frequency hopping [22, 54], or quorum-based [8, 9]. Since the
time for two CR users to meet on a channel, known as time to rendezvous (TTR), can
be unlimited for random channel hopping, the permutation-based sequence [23, 88]
provides the bound on TTR by utilizing certain ordering of the selected channels.
The adaptive channel hopping [22,54] further increases the probability of rendezvous
by allocating longer slots to the channels of higher quality. Alternatively, the quorum-
based sequence [8, 9] increases the overlapping of multiple sequences to facilitate the
rendezvous of two or more CR users with reduced and bounded average TTR by ex-
ploiting the nonempty intersection property of quorum systems. Although sequence-
based approaches, compared to other approaches, reduce the impact of PU activity on
control channels, they are not immune to PU’s return. In fact, the TTR is consider-
ably compromised when some channels in the sequence are occupied by PUs because
the sequences are constructed with no consideration of PU activities. Thus, the de-
sign of channel hopping sequences is essential to the performance of sequence-based
control channel approaches.
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2.3.2 Group-Based Control Channel Design
In group-based CCC approaches, control channels are the channels commonly avail-
able to a group of CR users in proximity. This can be achieved because CR users
usually observe similar spectrum availability in a neighborhood. By grouping CR
users that use a common channel as the CCC in a local area, group-based CCC de-
signs facilitate control message broadcasts within the group. As a result, the group-
based schemes, compared to sequence-based schemes, can generally achieve better
CCC coverage. However, how efficient the group responds to PU activities and secu-
rity attacks depends on the grouping schemes and algorithms. Moreover, inter-group
communication between two groups using different control channels can also be a
challenge.
Figure 2.3 illustrates group-based CCCs in spatial and temporal-frequency do-
mains. In Figure 2.3(a), two groups are illustrated: one centered at CR user I on
Channel 2 and the other centered at CR user J on Channel 5. CR users I and J can
reach all their neighbors simultaneously with a single control broadcast message. CR
users such as C and G can be tuned to either channel and be part of either group or
both groups depending on their hardware and channel selection capabilities. How-
ever, the inter-group communications can be a problem if these CR users and their
neighbors in the other group are tuned to different channels. In Figure 2.3(b), CCC
allocations over time and frequencies of these two groups are illustrated. The blue
arrows also indicate CCC changes of the entire group due to PU’s return. It is evident
that CCC coverage can be increased and the difficulties in inter-group communica-
tions can be eliminated if these two groups are merged on a single control channel.
The groups are commonly formed by either neighbor coordination [18, 54, 101] or
clustering schemes [20, 46, 52]. In neighbor coordination approaches [18, 54, 101], CR
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Figure 2.3: Group-Based Common Control Channels in (a) Spatial Domain and (b)
Temporal-Frequency Domain.
of neighbors and exchange the voting information by broadcast. This distributed
voting mechanism enables the largest connectivity in the neighborhood via proper
CCC selections. In clustering methods, CR users are divided into clusters based on
cluster formation and optimization algorithms by using graph theory techniques such
as finding the minimal dominating set [20] and finding the maximum edge biclique [46,
52]. These clustering methods aim to increase CCC coverage by selecting CR users
who have the largest number of neighbors to share the largest number of commonly
available channels as clusterheads in their neighborhoods. The neighbors of these
clusterheads are members of the corresponding clusters. Compared to sequence-
based approaches, group-based approaches achieve better CCC coverage with larger
overhead for regrouping or cluster reformation when control channels are affected by
PUs.
2.3.3 Dedicated Control Channel Design
Dedicated CCCs are control channels predetermined in licensed [21, 36, 39, 48, 83] or
unlicensed bands [40,75]. These dedicated approaches are attractive solutions for sev-



























Figure 2.4: Dedicated Common Control Channel in (a) Spatial Domain and (b)
Temporal-Frequency Domain.
available (“always on”), (ii) they are available network-wide with global coverage, and
(iii) they simplify the design of CR MAC protocols or coexistence protocols. However,
dedicated CCCs have disadvantages of possible licensing cost if allocated in licensed
bands or severe interference if allocated in unlicensed bands. More importantly, com-
pared to other approaches, dedicated CCCs are more susceptible to control channel
saturation [81] and security attacks [57]. Figure 2.4 illustrates dedicated CCCs in
spatial and temporal-frequency domains. As shown in Figure 2.4(a) and 2.4(b),
Channel 0, not affected by PU activities, is dedicated to control transmission of all
CR users with the coverage of the entire network. Nevertheless, it is more susceptible
to security attacks due to static allocation and fixed location in the spectrum.
The majority of dedicated CCC solutions in licensed bands are proposed by ex-
isting CR MAC protocols such as OSA-MAC [48], Opportunistic MAC [83], and OS-
MAC [36]. These CCCs are allocated in a band licensed to CR networks, which are
not affected by PU activities at the expense of licensing cost. Alternatively, dedicated
CCCs can be allocated by using OFDM subcarriers in the guard bands of the PU
licensed spectrum [21], which are only affected by possible adjacent channel interfer-
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Figure 2.5: Underlay Common Control Controls in (a) Spatial Domain and (b)
Temporal-Frequency Domain.
in unlicensed bands for CR MAC protocols such as HC-MAC [39] and for coexistence
protocols such as common spectrum coordination channel (CSCC) [40, 75]. Never-
theless, how to coordinate the access in unlicensed bands to avoid the interference
becomes an important issue.
2.3.4 Underlay Control Channel Design
In underlay control channel approaches, spread spectrum techniques such as ultra
wideband (UWB) [13, 61, 62, 71, 77] and multicarrier spread spectrum (MC-SS) [96]
are utilized to establish control channels occupying large bandwidth with power spec-
trum that appears to PUs as noise. Figure 2.5 illustrates underlay CCCs in spatial
and temporal-frequency domains. As shown in Figure 2.5(a) and 2.5(b), the ultra
wideband CCC occupying Channel 1 to Channel 6 is shared by all CR users using
different spreading code. The diagonal stripe pattern in the figure illustrates that
the underlying CCC appears as noise and does not affect PU activities and data
transmission.
In UWB control channel approaches [13, 61, 62, 71, 77], information is modulated
on spreading sequences and transmitted in low power as short pulses to exhibit an
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ultra wide signal bandwidth compared to channel bandwidth. Since the UWB trans-
mission is perceived as the noise in narrowband channels, this transmission scheme
can be utilized to send control traffic in the overlay UWB channel without the harm-
ful interference with the PU traffic in licensed channels. However, the transmission
range is limited due to the strict limitation on UWB transmission power. There-
fore, UWB CCC design must tackle the following two issues: (i) how to increase
the limited transmission range and (ii) how to resolve the range difference between
UWB control radios and other types of data radios. In the MC-SS approach [96], the
filtered multitone spread spectrum (FMT-SS) technique is utilized for control radio
transceiver design. Unlike UWB approaches, FMT-SS control channel design is capa-
ble of dynamically masking out subcarriers that correspond to detected PU activities
for mitigating the interference with PUs.
2.4 Control Channel Security
While control channels facilitate cooperation among CR users and network opera-
tions in CR ad hoc networks, they are exposed to the risks of security attacks. CR
users can be vulnerable to a variety of security attacks such as control channel jam-
ming attacks, PU emulation attacks, and data falsification attacks that can interfere
with control signal transmission, affect control channel allocations, or manipulate the
contents of control messages. Therefore, it is essential that security issues are taken
into consideration in common control channel design. We focus on control channel
jamming attacks, PU emulation attacks, and integrity of control messages next, and
data falsification attacks will be discussed in Chapter 3.4.1.
2.4.1 Control Channel Jamming Attacks
In control channel jamming attacks, strong interference signals are intentionally trans-
mitted by attacks in control channels to interfere the reception and decoding of control
messages. Without receiving these control messages, CR users are unable to exchange
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control messages in control channels to maintain normal network operations in CR
networks such as cooperative spectrum sensing, channel negotiation, and routing in-
formation. As a result, control channel jamming is one of the most effective ways
to disrupt network operations. Compared to other jamming methods, it is more en-
ergy efficient and effective by several orders of magnitude for attackers to cause DoS
by control channel jamming [15, 86]. Therefore, designing a control channel scheme
resilient to such a DoS attack is crucial to CCC reliability.
Traditionally, spread spectrum techniques are utilized to mitigate jamming at-
tacks by introducing the pseudo random channel access unknown to attackers. How-
ever, they become ineffective if any compromised CR user reveals the pseudo-random
number (PN) sequences. Moreover, the compromised users cannot be easily iden-
tified under jamming. To deal with these problems, there are two main jamming
mitigation approaches to combating control channel jamming: (i) dynamic CCC al-
location [47, 60] and (ii) CCC key distribution [15, 86, 87]. Although these schemes
may not be specifically proposed for CR networks, they can be utilized to mitigate
the control channel jamming problem in CR networks.
2.4.1.1 Jamming Mitigation by Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
The dynamic CCC allocation methods combat control channel jamming by dynami-
cally allocating the CCC to maintain the control communication in response to jam-
ming attacks. The dynamic allocation can be achieved by (i) cross-channel commu-
nication [60] and (ii) frequency hopping [47].
The cross-channel communication scheme proposed in [60] utilizes the fact that
successful communication under jamming attack only requires CR users receiving
messages on a channel not affected by the jamming signals. In other words, CR users
can continue to transmit on the jammed channel under interference and notify others
the new CCC for receiving control messages if the receiving nodes are free of jamming.
22
As a result, the channels for transmitting and receiving control messages can be
different to maintain the control message exchange with neighbors under jamming.
Although this scheme provides a mechanism to maintain control communications
under jamming, it incurs high channel switching overhead with a single transceiver.
In addition, any CR user compromised by the jammer will receive the notification of
CCC change and be able to jam the new CCC.
In addition to cross-channel communication, a dynamic control channel allocation
scheme based on hopping sequences is proposed in [47] to mitigate the control channel
jamming attacks in cluster-based ad hoc networks. In this method, the clusterhead
(CH) of each cluster determines the hopping sequences and the operating control
channels within the cluster. The affected area is reduced due to the clustering of
the network. Since the CCCs are inserted in the sequences, CR users hopping on
different sequences in the cluster can rendezvous on the predetermined CCC in the
designated time slots without knowing the hopping sequences of others. In addition,
the compromised cluster members can be identified if they follow their unique hopping
sequences. The hopping sequences are also encrypted by the public key of each
CR user to provide the protection from the intruders. However, when the hopping
sequences are known to malicious users or compromised users through node capture
attack, this method may be ineffective. In this case, all hopping sequences will be
known to the jammer and all CCCs will be jammed if the CH is compromised. It
can only be resolved by rotating CHs so that new sequences including the designated
CCCs are assigned by the new CH. Thus, this method temporarily and intermittently
restores the CCC over time and frequency until the jammer is removed.
2.4.1.2 Jamming Mitigation by Control Channel Key Distribution
The second jamming mitigation approach hides CCC locations from the attackers
by using the key distribution techniques. In this approach, each authorized user
23
with a valid key will be able to locate the allocated CCCs by using keyed hash
functions. Since the control messages are repeatedly transmitted on multiple CCCs,
any compromised nodes having only partial keys in the key space will not be able
to jam all the CCCs. Thus, control information exchange can be maintained by
sufficiently large key distribution and duplicate messages under jamming attacks.
The jamming-resilient key assignment can be polynomial-based [15] or randomly
distributed [86, 87]. In [15], the polynomial-based scheme utilizes the key space con-
sisting of p× q keys and repeated control transmission by simultaneously sending the
control message over q CCCs in each of p time slots in a period. Each user including
the malicious ones can be identified by a unique polynomial over Galois field GF (q)
with degree ≤ c. This scheme guarantees at least one CCC access in a period less
than T logT N time slots with at most (T logT N)
2 duplicate control messages when
T out of N users are compromised and become traitors to jam the CCCs. Since this
scheme utilizes the key space size in terms of sufficiently large number of time slots
(p) and number of CCCs (q) to combat the jamming by T compromised users, it
may incur large control retransmission overhead and delay when T is large. More
importantly, the number of traitors T is unknown in advance. As a result, once the
number of traitors is greater than a threshold guaranteed by the key space size, the
system performance degrades considerably.
To overcome the shortcomings of the polynomial-based scheme, a random key
distribution scheme is proposed in [86,87] for CCC access under node capture jamming
attacks. Similar to [15], this scheme utilizes the CCC keys to mask the CCC allocation
in time slots with duplicate control transmission on multiple CCCs. The random CCC
key assignment reduces the risk of the key assignment structure being learned by the
attackers. That is, by increasing the diversity of keys assigned to users, authorized
users also increase the probability of holding keys unknown to compromised users.
However, this method also increases the communication and storage overhead due to
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the increase of the number of keys. To limit the key space size and the corresponding
storage overhead, the keys are periodic reused in time slots. To prevent the attackers
from knowing CCC locations by finding the correlation in transmission patterns, the
cryptographic hash functions are used to map the CCC keys to the allocated CCC
frequency and time slot for CCC relocation in each key reuse period. Furthermore,
the compromised users can be identified by using statistical estimation based on the
likelihood of users being compromised.
2.4.2 Primary User Emulation Attacks
In PU emulation attack, malicious users transmit signals similar to those of the PUs.
Since these malicious users are mistaken as PUs, legitimate CR users will vacate the
frequency band and the attackers will have the wrongful privilege to access the spec-
trum. Although PU emulation attacks reduce spectrum utilization and the number
of channels available for control channel allocations, these attacks are not considered
as jamming attacks in this work. This is because the attackers behaving like PUs to
preoccupy channels can be detected by CR users just like PU detection and control
transmission of CR users can reamin intact if control channels can be established else-
where. To address PU emulation attacks, a transmitter verification scheme based on
localization is proposed in [17] to counter the attack. In this method, an RSS-based
localization is utilized by collecting the RSS values from cooperating CR users to
estimate the PU transmitter location. The PU identity can be verified by comparing
the estimates with known PU characteristics.
2.4.3 Integrity of Control Messages
In addition to control channel jamming and PU emulation attacks that affect the allo-
cations and availability of common control channels, another level of control channel
security concerns with the authentication of CR users and the integrity of control
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data being transmitted on CCCs. For authentication issues, a CCC security frame-
work is proposed in [76] that includes an authentication phase followed by encrypted
transactions for channel negotiation between the transmitter-receiver pair to ensure
secure communications on CCCs in CR ad hoc networks. Although this security
procedure can prevent eavesdropping and unauthorized access to the CCC, it cannot
exclude the access of the compromised users and the manipulation of the control data.
For example, CR users share their spectrum sensing data on CCCs to improve the
probability of detection in cooperative sensing. The compromised users in this case
can manipulate spectrum sensing data in encrypted control messages after passing
the authentication. As a result, additional security measures are required to detect
these malicious users and their manipulation of control information. Therefore, in
this research, we are particularly interested in data falsification attacks on spectrum
sensing data reported via common control channels in cooperative spectrum sensing,
which will be discussed in Section 3.4.1 of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
CONTROL CHANNELS IN COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM
SENSING
3.1 Control Channels and Cooperation
Common control channels and CR user cooperation are inseparable in CR ad hoc net-
works. As mentioned in Chapter 1, CCCs facilitate CR network operations because
they provide the medium for control message exchange between CR users required
by network operations in different network protocol layers. In physical (PHY) layer,
CCCs are used as reporting channels for CR users to share their local spectrum sensing
results in cooperative spectrum sensing. In MAC layer, CCCs are used for neighbor
discovery, channel negotiation, and transmitter-receiver handshake. In network layer,
CCCs are used for broadcasting route updates and topology changes. These CCC
applications in different network protocol layers assist CR users in making intelli-
gent decisions to improve system performance and spectral efficiency in CR ad hoc
networks.
In this chapter and Chapter 5, we focus on cooperative spectrum sensing perfor-
mance and control channel issues in cooperative spectrum sensing. The reasons for
this focus are twofold: (i) control channels that play an important role as reporting
channels can have significant impact on the performance of cooperative spectrum
sensing and (ii) since cooperative spectrum sensing is an effective and indispensable
way to improve spectrum sensing performance in CR networks, the performance im-
provement can benefit the establishment of reliable common control channels. We first
introduce cooperative spectrum sensing, its elements, cooperative gain and coopera-
tive overhead in Section 3.2, and then discuss the requirements of control channels
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in cooperative sensing in Section 3.3. Lastly, we discuss the security issues in co-
operative spectrum sensing with the focus on data falsification attacks on reported
spectrum sensing data in Section 3.4. A comprehensive survey of CSS can be found
in [3].
3.2 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing is one of the fundamental spectrum management functions in cog-
nitive radio networks. The detection performance of spectrum sensing has significant
impact on the system performance of CR networks. However, as shown in Fig. 3.1,
many factors such as multipath fading, shadowing, and receiver uncertainty may
considerably compromise the detection performance of spectrum sensing performed
individually by each CR user. Fortunately, it is unlikely for all spatially distributed
CR users to concurrently experience the fading or receiver uncertainty problem. If
CR users, most of which observe strong PU signals, can cooperate and share their
local sensing results with each other, the combined cooperative decisions derived from
the spatially collected observations can overcome the deficiency of poor observations
from some CR users. The overall detection performance can be greatly improved
by exploiting the spatial diversity of CR users. This is why cooperative spectrum
sensing (simply called cooperative sensing thereafter) [3, 13, 32, 63] is an attractive
and effective approach to combat multipath fading and shadowing, and mitigate the
receiver uncertainty problem.
Conventional cooperative sensing is considered as a three-step process: local sens-
ing, reporting, and data fusion. As shown in Figure 3.2, a group of spatially dis-
tributed cooperating CR users obtain observations yi of PU signals by individually
sensing the licensed channels. Each cooperating CR user makes local decisions ui
according to binary hypothesis testing (H1 and H0 for the presence and absence of




































Figure 3.2: Process of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing.
data fusion of reported local sensing data and makes cooperative decisions u. The
cooperative decisions, which are generally more accurate than local decisions, are
broadcast to all cooperating CR users. From this cooperative sensing process, we can
identify the elements of cooperative sensing, which is described next.
3.2.1 Elements of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
The fundamental components crucial to cooperative sensing process are called the ele-
ments of cooperative sensing. In our view, the process of cooperative sensing consists
of seven key elements: (i) cooperation models, (ii) sensing techniques, (iii) control
channel for reporting, (iv) data fusion, (v) hypothesis testing, (vi) user selection, and
(vii) knowledge database. These elements are briefly introduced as follows:
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• Cooperation Models consider the modeling of how CR users cooperate to per-
form sensing, which includes the popular parallel fusion network models and
recently developed game theoretical models.
• Sensing Techniques are used to sense the RF environment, take observation
samples, and employ signal processing techniques for detecting the PU signal
or the available spectrum. The choice of the sensing techniques has the effect
on how CR users cooperate with each other.
• Hypothesis Testing is a statistical test to determine the presence or absence of
PUs. This test can be performed individually by each cooperating user for local
decisions or performed by the fusion center for cooperative decision.
• Control Channel for Reporting concerns about how the sensing results obtained
by cooperating CR users can be efficiently and reliably reported to the fusion
center or shared with other CR users via the bandwidth-limited and fading-
susceptible control channel.
• Data Fusion is the process of combining the reported or shared sensing results
for making cooperative decisions. Based on their data type, the sensing results
can be combined by using signal combining techniques or decision fusion rules.
• User Selection deals with how to optimally select the cooperating CR users and
determine the proper cooperation footprint/range to maximize the cooperative
gain and minimize the cooperation overhead.
• Knowledge Database stores the information and facilitates the cooperative sens-
ing process to improve detection performance. The information in the knowl-
edge base is either a priori knowledge or knowledge accumulated through the
experience. The knowledge may include PU and CR user locations, PU activity
models, and received signal strength (RSS) profiles.
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Based on the elements of cooperative sensing, we can construct the framework
of cooperative sensing. The framework consists of the PUs, cooperating CR users
including a FC, all the elements of cooperative sensing, the RF environment including
licensed channels and control channels, and an optional remote database. Figure 3.3
illustrates the framework of cooperative sensing from the perspective of physical layer
(PHY). In this framework, a group of cooperating CR users perform local sensing with
an RF frontend and a local processing unit. The RF frontend can be configured for
data transmission or spectrum sensing. In addition, the RF frontend includes the
down-conversion of RF signals and the sampling at Nyquist rate by an analog-to-
digital converter (ADC). The raw sensing data from the RF frontend can be directly
sent to the FC or be locally processed for local decisions. To minimize the bandwidth
requirement of the control channel, certain local processing is usually required. The
processing includes the calculation of test statistics, and a threshold device for local
decisions. Once the raw sensing data or local decisions are ready, a MAC scheme is
required to access the control channel for reporting the sensing results. The sensing
results may also be used by higher network protocol layers. The FC in the framework
is a powerful CR user who not only has all the capabilities of a regular CR user, but
also the user selection capability with the help of an embedded knowledge database.
If the FC is as powerful as a base station, it may have the connection to the remote
database for PU activity and white space information. In the case of distributed
cooperative sensing in CR ad hoc networks, all CR users individually perform data
fusion as a FC. Therefore, they are essentially the same as the powerful CR user in








































Figure 3.3: Framework of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing.
3.2.2 Cooperative Gain and Cooperation Overhead
The main idea of cooperative sensing is to enhance the sensing performance by ex-
ploiting the spatial diversity in the observations of spatially located CR users. The
improvement of sensing performance due to spatial diversity is called cooperative gain.
In addition, cooperative sensing overcomes performance degradation due to multipath
fading and shadowing leading to relaxed receiver sensitivity requirements. This is be-
cause receiver sensitivity can be approximately set to the same level of nominal path
loss without increasing the implementation cost of CR devices [63]. More impor-
tantly, CR users can improve their throughput because better sensing performance
achieved by cooperative sensing results in less interference and more transmission
opportunities. Thus, a well-designed cooperation mechanism for cooperative sensing
can significantly contribute to a variety of achievable cooperative gain.
Regardless of the benefits of cooperative sensing, cooperative sensing can incur
cooperation overhead. The overhead refers to any extra sensing time, delay, energy,
security measures, and operation cost incurred by cooperative sensing compared to
the individual (non-cooperative) spectrum sensing case. As a result, the achievable
cooperative gain can be limited by cooperation overhead. For example, it is known
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that more spatially correlated CR users participating in cooperation can be detri-
mental to the detection performance [32, 63]. Moreover, unreliable or malicious CR
users may report falsified data to compromise the sensing performance [16]. Hence,
the selection of independent and reliable CR users for cooperation is essentially a
form of cooperation overhead. For these reasons, we consider the issues of achiev-
able cooperative gain and incurred cooperation overhead in cooperative sensing as
dominating factors of the cooperative gain and cooperation overhead, which include
(i) sensing time and delay, (ii) channel impairments, (iii) energy efficiency, (iv) co-
operation efficiency, (v) mobility, (vi) security, and (vii) wideband sensing. In this
research, we focus on tackling CCC-related issues such as sensing time and delay,
channel impairments, and security. The challenges are to devise a novel cooperative
sensing method effectively leveraged to achieve the optimal cooperative gain without
being compromised by the incurred cooperation overhead.
3.3 Control Channel Requirements
In cooperative sensing, control channels, known as reporting channels, are universally
utilized to report local sensing data to the FC or share the sensing results with
other CR users. In this section, we discuss three major control channel requirements:
bandwidth, reliability, and security that need to be satisfied for reporting local sensing
data in cooperative sensing.
3.3.1 Bandwidth Requirement
In cooperative sensing, the control channel bandwidth can limit the amount of lo-
cal sensing data being reported to the FC. Thus, bandwidth requirement determines
the level of cooperation [63]. In general, soft combination of raw or quantized local
sensing data at the FC achieves better sensing performance than hard combination
of binary local decisions at the expense of consuming more control channel band-
width during reporting. To address the bandwidth issues, many bandwidth efficient
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schemes [59, 84, 103] are proposed for cooperative sensing. The bandwidth require-
ments can be satisfied by censoring the local sensing data for reporting [84], quantizing
the local sensing data to fewer bits [59, 84], or superposing local sensing data [103].
The challenges are to achieve satisfactory sensing performance with small required
control channel bandwidth.
3.3.2 Reliability Requirement
In addition to bandwidth requirement, the reliability of the control channel has great
impact on the cooperative sensing performance. Like data channels, control channels
are susceptible to channel impairments such as multipath fading and shadowing.
Hence, the effect of control channel impairments must be considered to meet the
reliability requirement. Many studies investigate the effects of Gaussian noise [74],
multipath fading [100], and correlated shadowing [25, 26] on the control channel and
the sensing performance in cooperative sensing. It is shown that the probability of
false alarm linearly increases with the probability of reporting errors caused by fading
in reporting channels [100]. Moreover, it is found that the performance degradation
caused by shadowing correlation in the reporting channel is similar to that in the
sensing channel [25, 26]. Therefore, it is important to devise a cooperative sensing
scheme to achieve sensing performance as well as mitigating the effect of fading and
correlated shadowing.
3.3.3 Security Requirement
The cooperation among CR users raises new concerns for security risks in cooper-
ative sensing. It is reported that the cooperative gain can be severely affected by
malfunctioning or malicious CR users in cooperative sensing [63]. First, control chan-
nels are subject to jamming attacks. In addition to causing the failure of CR user
cooperation, control channel jamming is a form of DoS attacks, which can result in
the malfunctioning of the entire network. Second, malfunctioning or malicious CR
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users can report unreliable or falsified sensing data to affect or even manipulate the
cooperative decisions at the FC. This security risk known as data falsification attack
can cause false alarm sensing errors and prevent normal CR users from accessing the
available spectrum. To address the security and reliability issues, additional mech-
anisms such as outlier detection [42, 43], reputation-based mechanism [16, 43], and
consensus-based method [99] are required to identify and remove malicious CR users
and reported falsified sensing data from cooperation.
3.4 Cooperative Sensing Security
The cooperation among CR users raises new concerns for the reliability and the
security in cooperative sensing. This is because, when multiple CR users cooperate
in sensing, a few CR users who report unreliable or falsified sensing data can easily
influence the cooperative decision. During cooperation, malfunctioning CR users
may unintentionally send unreliable data to the FC. For example, the report from a
malfunctioning user could deviate from the real value. Moreover, CR users, called
malicious users or Byzantine adversaries in this case, can intentionally manipulate
the sensing data and report the falsified data for their own benefits. For instance,
malicious users may obtain spectrum access by falsely reporting the presence of PUs.
It is reported in [63] that cooperative gain can be severely affected by malfunctioning
or malicious CR users in cooperative sensing.
To address the security and reliability issues, additional mechanisms are required
to identify malicious CR users and manipulated sensing data, and remove them from
cooperation. Although these countermeasures may incur overhead in cooperative
sensing, they are required to ensure secure operations of cooperative sensing and ob-
tain reliable sensing results in hostile environment. Therefore, we consider two main
cooperative sensing security issues: data falsification attacks, where detection perfor-
mance is affected by the falsified sensing data, and DoS attacks, where cooperative
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sensing is disrupted by adversary attacks such as PU emulation and control channel
jamming. Since DoS attacks are discussed in Section 2.4, we discuss data falsification
attacks next.
3.4.1 Data Falsification Attacks
Data falsification attacks in cooperative sensing, known as spectrum sensing data
falsification (SSDF), refer to the attacks of malicious users by reporting falsified spec-
trum sensing data to FC to manipulate the cooperative sensing decisions for their
gain. These are not attacks on common control channel allocations, but on the in-
tegrity of control data used in cooperative sensing. To address the data falsification
problem, existing cooperative sensing schemes [16,42,43,99] aim to detect the anomaly
in the reported sensing data and establish a mechanism to distinguish malicious users
from authentic ones so that malicious users can be excluded from the cooperation to
ensure the integrity of the sensing decisions.
Specifically, a weighted sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) with reputation-
based mechanism is proposed in [16] as the robust cooperative sensing scheme to
address the data falsification problem. As the first step, the reputation ratings of co-
operating CR users are evaluated based upon their sensing accuracy. The reputation
rating is increased whenever the local sensing result matches the final decision, and is
decreased otherwise. The reputation values are converted to the weights to be used
in the modified likelihood ratio of a SPRT for data fusion. In this manner, the impact
of unreliable CR users can be reduced by putting weights on the genuine sensing data
over the falsified ones. In addition, a consensus-based cooperative sensing scheme is
proposed in [99] to address the data falsification problem in CR ad hoc networks.
Each CR user iteratively selects neighbors for cooperation and sensing data exchange
such that the consensus (cooperative decision) is gradually reached in a distributed
manner. When selecting cooperating neighbors, each authentic CR user checks the
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received sensing data by comparing it with the local mean value. The neighbor re-
porting the result with maximum deviation from the local mean will be rejected for
cooperation. With this scheme, the reliability of cooperative sensing can be improved
by excluding malicious users from the cooperation in the neighborhood.
Furthermore, a simple outlier detection is proposed in [42] for the pre-filtering of
the extreme values in sensing data. The trust factor that measures CR user reliability
is then evaluated as the weights in calculating the mean value of received sensing data.
In this way, cooperative sensing can be more reliable by building trust toward CR
users that report a sensing value close to the mean of all collected results at the FC.
The method is extended in [43] to detect malicious users by the outlier factors, which
are calculated based on the weighted sample mean and the standard deviation of the
energy detector outputs. The outlier factors can be adjusted according to the dynamic
PU activities and the observations from the closest neighbors in a neighborhood to
further improve the detection of malicious users.
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CHAPTER IV
EFFICIENT RECOVERY OF CONTROL CHANNELS
4.1 Motivation
The first challenge of common control channel design in CR ad hoc networks is to
address the issue of responsiveness to PU activities. The challenge comes from the
dilemma CR users encounter when PUs return to occupy existing CCCs: CR users
need to cooperate with each other to find a new PU-free CCC without interfering
with PUs, but also need to have a PU-free CCC available to them first to make such
cooperation possible. Thus, the focus to resolve this challenge is twofold. First, how
CR users can efficiently find their neighbors to establish reliable CCCs and network
connectivity when no information about their neighbors and the environment is avail-
able in the first place. Second, how CR users can efficiently recover CCCs when CCCs
are disrupted by PUs to constantly maintain network topology and connectivity.
Motivated by the design challenges, we introduce efficient recovery control channel
(ERCC) method in this chapter to achieve these goals: (i) Responsiveness to PU
Activities: a new control channel must be immediately established among CR users
with no harmful interference with PUs when a PU is present in a control channel, and
(ii) Extended CCC Coverage: the coverage of a control channel needs to be extended
to the largest degree for reducing control signaling overhead and improving broadcast
efficiency. ERCC is a heuristic solution that utilizes the spectrum heterogeneity in
the environment to improve spectrum efficiency as well as spectrum homogeneity in
the neighborhood to facilitate control channel establishment. By prioritizing available
channels based on local spectrum sensing data and neighbors’ preference, CR users
with ERCC are able to find the best CCC candidate that is the most preferable by the
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majority of CR users in the neighborhood to establish the connections with neighbors
initially and to achieve instant recovery of CCCs among a large group of neighbors
in the event of PU’s return.
In Section 4.2, we first describe the system model for ERCC design. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we introduce the proposed ERCC algorithm and show how efficient recovery
of CCCs can be achieved by ERCC. In Section 4.4, we establish a theoretical model for
performance analysis, analyze CCC recovery and allocation time, and discuss delay,
interference, overhead, and other issues. In Section 4.5, we define four CCC metrics
for performance evaluation. Finally, in Section 4.6, we evaluate ERCC performance
in a variety of test scenarios. The variables and notations used in this Chapter are
tabulated in Table A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A for reference. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
• We propose ERCC method that enables efficient recovery of CCCs upon PU’s
return to CCCs and achieves responsiveness to PU activities. The proposed
method effectively recovers lost control links caused by PU activity changes
and maintains high degree of network connectivity while achieving the balance
of extending CCC coverage and mitigating the interference with PUs.
• We establish the theoretical model for analyzing delay, control throughput, ac-
cumulated interference, establishment overhead, and CCC allocation and recov-
ery in which the distributions of CCC recover and allocation time are derived.
Moreover, we devise CCC metrics for evaluating ERCC performance in recovery
efficiency, CCC coverage, channel quality and PU interference.
4.2 ERCC System Model
For opportunistic spectrum access, a CR ad hoc network is overlaid with a primary
network where PUs operate in a set of licensed channels. The number of licensed
channels is denoted by Nc. The channels available to each CR user in the CR ad hoc
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network may only be a subset of all licensed channels due to PU activities. Thus,
CR users rely on local spectrum sensing to observe channel conditions and identify
spectrum opportunities.
For spectrum sensing and data transmission, each CR user is equipped with two
half-duplex transceivers that can be tuned to any licensed channel. One radio, called
control radio, is dedicated to allocated control channels, and the other, called data
radio, is used for data transmission. Each radio can transmit data, receive data, or
sense a channel, but cannot perform more than one of these operations simultaneously.
The PU or CR user transmit power decays with distance based on the free-space
path loss model. When the shadow fading is considered, the combined path loss
and shadowing model is used [34]. For correlated shadowing, we use the exponential
correlation model [35] and the correlation function is given by ρij = e
−adij [32], where
a is the exponential decaying coefficient and dij is the distance between CR users
i and j. To determine the presence of PUs and neighboring CR users within the
transmission range, CR users compare sensing thresholds γpu and γsu with the receive
power of PU and CR user signals, respectively. In addition, given the accumulated
PU interference level γi on channel Ci, i ∈ Nc, the channel quality of Ci is better than
that of Cj if γi < γj. As a result, the channel Ci is defined as the best channel or the
channel of the best quality if i = argminj γj, j ∈ Nc. For simplicity, other types of
fading and interference are not considered in this model.
When a PU returns to a control channel, the control radio ensures the detection
of PU signals in a timely manner and switches to a new CCC based on the proposed
control channel allocation method. Without the dedicated control radio, a CR user
with single radio may be unaware of the control channel change because of using the
only radio for data transmission. In addition, the synchronization of quiet periods
for spectrum sensing is negotiated among neighboring nodes in the control channel.
Thus, energy detection of PU transmit signals can be enforced at the link layer and
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performed by the data radio in quiet periods.
PU activities are modeled as a two-state birth-death process [49], an ON-OFF
model in which an ON-state represents the appearance of any PU, while an OFF-
state represents the absence of all PUs. If the ON state switches to the OFF state
with the probability α and the OFF state switches back with the probability β, the





the state transition is a Poisson process while PU interarrivals are exponentially
distributed.
In the next section, we introduce our proposed efficient recovery common control
channel design.
4.3 Efficient Recovery Control Channel Algorithms
The efficient recovery control channel (ERCC) design consists of three major compo-
nents: (i) neighbor discovery, (ii) common channel list update, and (iii) efficient PU
activity recovery. The neighbor discovery process aims at increasing the probability
of locating neighbors on common channels for the establishment of initial network
topology. The common channel list update focuses on maintaining a robust list of
common channels by using local sensing and neighbor information on a regular basis.
The efforts of common channel list updates facilitate the efficient recovery from PU
activities in the event of PU’s return to the CCC. These components are described
in details in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Neighbor Discovery
The system starts with a neighbor discovery process to establish initial network con-
nectivity. During this process, all CR users, initially distributed in a set of predefined
licensed channels, locate neighboring nodes within their transmission range. To locate
neighbors in the network, each CR user obtains a list of available channels from local
observations, follows a channel hopping sequence, and hops over available channels.
41
A neighboring pair discovers each other and establishes a link when they hop to the
same channel and exchange beacon messages. Thus, the initial network topology is
formed after all links are established among neighboring nodes. Next, we describe
the construction of channel hopping sequence, handshaking procedure, and neighbor
list update in the neighbor discovery process.
4.3.1.1 Channel Hopping Sequence
The channel hopping sequence is a pseudo-random sequence of available channels
for frequency hopping during neighbor discovery. To construct such a sequence, a
CR user starts with a channel list based on local observations of channel availability.
The channels in the list are initially of order in decreasing channel quality (known
as a preferred channel list in Section 4.3.2). To maximize the chance of locating
neighbors in preferred common channels, the control radio is tuned to channels with
the preference according to the channel order. For a common channel list LC of
length n (also defined in Section 4.3.2), the probability of selecting Ci ∈ LC , with








, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (4.1)
Since Pr(Ci) can be considered as the probability mass function (PMF) of a discrete
random variable C = Ci, a discrete cumulative distribution function (CDF), denoted






Pr(Cj), 0 ≤ i ≤ n, (4.2)
where FC(C0) = 0 and FC(Cn) = 1. These values in (4.2) are used as thresholds in
the mapping from the sequence of random numbers rm ∈ (0, 1] to the selected channel
Ci. Thus, the channel hopping sequence Sm, m = 1, 2, . . ., is generated as follows:
Sm = Ci for FC(Ci−1) < rm ≤ FC(Ci), m = 1, 2, . . . . (4.3)
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Since channels with higher preference in the common channel list appear more often in
the channel hopping sequence, CR users locate their neighbors in a channel common
to more neighbors with higher probability.
4.3.1.2 Handshaking Procedure
In the neighbor discovery process, each CR user follows its hopping pattern and tunes
to one channel at a time. During the time interval, the CR user broadcasts a beacon
with random backoff and listens to the channel for any beacon broadcast. If the CR
user receives a beacon from a neighbor, it replies with an Ack message. Similarly,
the CR user receives an Ack if its neighbor receives the beacon. The beacon notifies
neighbors of the CR user’s ID and its common channel list while the Ack message
ensures that the neighbor discovery between a neighboring pair is mutually recognized.
Therefore, a link is established in a common channel between the neighboring pair
after the beacon and Ack exchanges.
4.3.1.3 Neighbor List Update
After the neighboring pair completes the handshaking procedure, each CR user’s
neighbor list is updated accordingly. The neighbor k is added to the neighbor list if it
is new to the list. The control channel associated with this neighbor, denoted by Chk,
is updated with the allocated control channel. The allocated CCC may be different
from the channel the neighboring pair meets because a channel that can reach more
neighbors or has higher quality is preferred.
Since each end of the link obtains its own and neighbor’s broadcast common
channel lists after beacon exchange, the neighboring pair can individually generate
a set of channels, denoted by LCC , from the intersection of those two broadcast
common channel lists. The best channel of LCC is allocated as the CCC to the link.
Thus, identical decision of this CCC allocation can be individually determined by the
neighboring pair based on the same LCC . No further control message exchange is
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required.
The neighbor discovery process is highlighted in Algorithm 1. In line 4, tdisc is the
maximum duration for initial neighbor discovery. Line 7 to 9 outline the handshaking
procedure while line 10 to 15 show the neighbor list update and initial control channel
assignment. The OrderChannel function in line 13 reorders the channels based on
the ordering rules, which will be described in next section.
Algorithm 4.1 : Neighbor Discovery
1: Preferred Channel List LPi ← LocalSensing(γpu)
2: Common Channel List LCi ← LPi
3: {Sm} ← SequenceGenerator(LCi)
4: while NbrDiscoverTimer ≤ tdisc do
5: SwitchChannelTo(Sm)
6: RandomBackoff and SendBeacon(i, LCi)
7: if ReceiveBeacon(k, LCk) from neighbor k then
8: SendAck(i, LCi, k)
9: end if
10: if ReceiveBeaconOrAck(k, LCk , i) then
11: LNBi ← LNBi ∪ {k}
12: LCC ← LCi ∩ LCk
13: LCi ← OrderChannel(LCi, LCC , γj)
14: Chk ← argminj{Cj|Cj ∈ LCC}
15: end if
16: end while
4.3.2 Common Channel List Update
Since neighboring CR users usually observe homogeneous channel availability in CR
ad hoc networks, each CR user can individually obtain a similar list of available
channels. Intuitively, channels in those lists common to a large number of neighboring
nodes are the candidates for CCC allocations. Thus, the advantages of maintaining an
ordered list of common channels are twofold: (i) selecting the channel common to the
largest number of neighbors as the control channel increases the coverage of the CCC
and, more importantly, (ii) when a PU occupies the control channel, the common
channel with the highest preference from the list can be immediately allocated as
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the new control channel. With such an allocation, most neighbors can immediately
locate each other in the new control channel. Therefore, efficient recovery from PU
activities can be achieved by common channel list updates.
Each CR user constructs and maintains a common channel list (CCL) for periodic
broadcast to neighbors and dynamic CCC allocations. In general, a CCL is a list
of channels commonly available to at least one neighbor. The order of the list is
determined by the weight and the quality of the channels. The weight of a channel
Ci, denoted by Wi, is the number of neighbors having Ci in their CCL. It indicates
the number of neighbors a CR user could reach if the channel is allocated as the
CCC. Equivalently, it represents the preference of choosing the channel as a CCC in
the neighborhood. Therefore, the channel order of a CCL follows two rules: (i) all
channels in the CCL are of monotonically decreasing order according to Wi and (ii) if
two channels have the same weight, their order is determined by the PU interference
level γi. In other words, Ci is preferred to Cj, i 6= j, if (i) Wi > Wj or (ii) Wi = Wj
and γi ≤ γj.
To construct a list of channels commonly available to neighbors, a CR user requires
its own observations of channel availability, a list called preferred channel list (PCL),
and neighbors’ preference of available channels. Therefore, CR users update their
CCL when they obtain a new PCL from local sensing or receive a CCL from neighbor’s
broadcast.
4.3.2.1 CCL Update with Local Sensing Information
To obtain a PCL, a CR user senses each licensed channel, determines PU-occupied
ones, and returns with a list of available channels in the order of observed channel
quality. A PCL, denoted by LP , is a channel list of observed quality in monotonically
decreasing order. Since the channel quality in channel Ci is inversely proportional to
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total receive power of PU transmit signals γi, a PCL of length n is defined as:
LP = {Ci|1 ≤ i ≤ n for γ1 ≤ . . . ≤ γn ≤ γpu} (4.4)
where γpu is the PU interference threshold that determines PU’s presence in a chan-
nel. Since PU-occupied channels are excluded from the PCL, all channels in LP are
presumably available unless PUs change their operating location or channel.
After obtaining a PCL from local sensing, a CR user updates its CCL with the
PCL. The CCL is initially set to the PCL and successively updated by new PCLs from
periodic sensing. The update is essential for the following two reasons: 1) new PU-
occupied channels that no longer exist in the PCL should be removed from the CCL.
2) newly available channels should be added to the CCL for neighbor notification.
Thus, a CCL after the update reflects the most up-to-date channel conditions.
Mathematically, given a CCL LC and a PCL LP , the removal of PU-occupied
channels is given by:
LC ← LC \ {Cj|Cj ∈ LC and Cj /∈ LP}. (4.5)
On the other hand, the addition of newly available channels is given by:
LC ← LC ∪ {Cj|Cj ∈ LP , Cj /∈ LC , and Wj = 0}. (4.6)
Notice that the weight Wj associated with the newly added channel Cj is initialized
to zero. The channel order of the updated LC follows the channel order rules.
Figure 4.1(a) illustrates an example of the CCL update with a PCL. In the figure,
channel 3 in LC before the update is removed because it is unavailable in LP . Fur-
thermore, channel 8 in LP is added to the CCL because it is a newly available channel
that may also be available to neighbors. However, the weight associated with this
channel is set to 0. This is represented by the box in white (no shade) that contains
channel 8. Finally, channels in the CCL are sorted according to the preference in LP .
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Figure 4.1: Examples of Common Channel List Update (a) CCL Update with PCL
(b) CCL Update with Neighbor’s CCL.
4.3.2.2 CCL Update with Neighbor’s Information
In addition to updating their CCL with sensing information, CR users update their
CCL when they receive a CCL from a neighbor. The update is required for the
following two purposes: (i) the update determines a list of common channels shared
with neighbors. (ii) the information of neighbors’ common channel preference can be
collected and combined by each CR user for dissemination. Thus, the updated CCL
reflects new preference of common channels in the neighborhood.
When a CR user i updates its CCL LC with its broadcast CCL LCi and neighbor
k’s CCL LCk, the CR user first generates a list of common channels from LCi and
LCk as follows:
LCC ← LCi ∩ LCk . (4.7)
For each Cj in LCC , the corresponding weight in LC is set for the neighbor k.
LC ← {Cj|Wj : wjm = 1 for Cj ∈ LCC} (4.8)
where Wj =
∑K
k=1wjk and K is the number of neighbors sharing the channel Cj in
their CCL. As in previous case, the order of LC follows the channel order rules.
Figure 4.1(b) illustrates the CCL update with a CCL from neighbor 2. As shown
in the figure, the common channels of two CCLs are channel 1, 2, and 6. The weights
associated with neighbor 2 are set accordingly. Since channel 3 and 7 are unavailable
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to neighbor 2, their weight remains 0. Thus, the resulting channel order reflects the
new weights in the CCL.
The common channel list update is listed in Algorithm 2. Line 2 to 4 show the
addition or the removal of channels for updates with sensing information (PCL). On
the other hand, line 7 to 11 outline the updates with neighbor’s information (CCL).
Algorithm 4.2 : Common Channel List Update
1: Update with CR user i’s Preferred Channel List LP :
2: LP ← LocalSensing(γpu)
3: LC ← LC \ {Cj|Cj ∈ LC and Cj /∈ LP}
4: LC ← LC ∪ {Cj|Cj ∈ LP , Cj /∈ LC , and Wj = 0}
5:
6: Update with Neighbor k’s Common Channel List LCk:
7: if ReceiveBeacon(k, LCk) from neighbor k then
8: LCC ← LCi ∩ LCk
9: LC ← {Cj|Wj : wjk = 1 for Cj ∈ LCC}
10: LC ← OrderChannel(LCi, LCC , γj)
11: end if
4.3.3 Efficient PU Activity Recovery
In this section, we discuss the efficient recovery from the return of a PU to a common
control channel. The recovery consists of three steps: new CCC allocation from
the common channel list, neighbor list update for lost neighbors, and control radio
adaptation for recovering neighbors.
4.3.3.1 Control Channel Allocation
Owing to their dynamic behavior, PUs are highly likely to occupy those established
CCCs. Thus, the primary goal is to utilize common channel lists for efficient recovery
when PUs are present in the CCCs. When a PU occupies a CCC, CR users tuned to
this control channel can immediately detect the change. Without sending any message
that may cause interference, CR users choose the best channel in their CCL as the
new CCC after the PU-occupied CCC is removed from the list. That is, for Cj ∈ LC ,
Chk ← minj Cj with wjk = 1. Since CR users can reach all or most neighbors by
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the new CCC, most neighbors that detect the change in the neighborhood will switch
to the new CCC and locate each other by beacon broadcasts. With the exchange
of CCLs, most neighbors can be recovered in the new CCC to maintain the network
connectivity to the maximum degree.
4.3.3.2 Neighbor List Update
The CCC links associated with each neighbor in the neighbor list show the status
of this recovery. If a neighbor k is not yet recovered, the associated CCC Chk is a
channel no longer available in the CCL. By using this criteria: Chk /∈ LC , we can
adaptively change the operating channel of the control radio to recover neighbors in
other common channels. In addition, some existing neighbors may be unable to reach
any available channel due to PU activities. In this case, those neighbors should be
removed from the neighbor list after having no CCL arrival for a certain period of
time.
4.3.3.3 Control Radio Adaptation
A control radio list, denoted by LR, is a list of channels to which the control radio
will be tuned based on the probability of channel selections. If the CCL or neighbor
list updates approach a steady state, LR only includes the allocated CCCs to reduce
the switching overhead. In other words, LR is simply the union of all channels in
Chk, a small subset of LC with the best case of single channel, as follows:
LR ← ∪Kk=1{Chk} (4.9)
where K is the number of neighbors. For efficient recovery, the radio list is set to the
common channel list when the allocated CCCs no longer exist in the list as follows:
LR ← LC for some Chk /∈ LC . (4.10)
Similar to the neighbor discovery process, the probability of selecting the channel
from LR is given in (4.1). Thus, the control radio is tuned to the CCC that reaches
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most neighbors with highest probability.
The efficient PU activity recovery is listed in Algorithm 4.3. Line 4 and 5 are new
CCC allocations and control radio update in response to PU activities when neighbors
can be recovered by the new CCL. Line 8 to 11 show the neighbor list update and
control radio adaptation when neighbors cannot be completely recovered by the new
CCC. In this case, a neighbor recovery procedure similar to Algorithm 4.1 is required
to locate lost neighbors or new ones.
Algorithm 4.3 : Efficient PU Activity Recovery
1: LP ← LocalSensing(γpu)
2: LC ← UpdateCCL(LP )
3: For neighbor k recovered by new CCL:
4: Chk ← minj Cj ∈ LC with wjk = 1
5: LR ← ∪Kk=1{Chk}
6:
7: For neighbor k not recovered by new CCL:
8: if Chk /∈ LC then
9: LNB ← LNB \ {k}
10: LR ← LC
11: end if
12: Cj ← SelectChannel(LR)
13: SwitchChannelTo(Cj)
14: Neighbor discovery as Algorithm 4.1
4.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed scheme by utilizing a
mathematical model for delay, throughput, and interference analysis. Moreover, we
provide the overhead analysis by comparing our solution with existing grouping and
clustering methods, and cosite interference analysis to address the interference issue
between the collocated control and data radios.
4.4.1 Analytical Model
To facilitate the performance analysis, we model the CCC recovery and allocation














Figure 4.2: (a) Semi-Markov Chain and (b) Alternating Renewal Process for ERCC
Performance Analysis.
state diagram of the semi-Markov chain with two states: Recovery and Allocation.
The Recovery state, denoted by R, is the state when CR users are locating neighbors
in initial neighbor discovery phase or recovering from the lost of CCC upon PU’s
return. The Allocation state, denoted by C, is the state when a CCC is allocated to
the link between the neighbor pair. The sojourn time in state R, called CCC recovery
time and denoted by TR, is a random variable with the distribution fR(tR), tR > 0.
Similarly, the CCC allocation time TC is defined as the sojourn time in state C
with distribution fC(tC), tC > 0. The transition probabilities p(C|R) and p(R|C) are
unity in this model. As Figure 4.2(b) shows, by alternatingly staying in each of the
two states, the resulting process is essentially an alternating renewal process. For
simplicity, we assume that the initial neighbor discovery has the same distribution as
other recovery periods.
The average expected recovery time E[TR] is of great importance because it is the
delay of recovering the lost CCC and the indicator of CCC recovery efficiency. To find
E[TR], one needs to determine fR(tR). The closed-form expression for fR(tR), given
in Proposition 4.1, is related to parameters such as PU activities, PU and neighbor
locations, PU interference, channel conditions, and number of channels. Here we
assume that the CR user u and its neighbor CR user k detect PU correctly and
simultaneously when PU changes from inactive to active in channel Ci. We further
assume that after Ci is removed from their CCLs, Cj is the only channel in common.
If both CR users have more than one channel in common, the probability of meeting
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each other on a common channel is higher and the recovery time is smaller. Thus,
our assumption is the worst-case scenario.
When the CCLs of the neighbor pair have an identical best channel, say Cj,
the recovery is instant. Otherwise, the neighbor pair follows the neighbor discovery
procedure and requires the recovery time to meet in Cj. If the probabilities of choosing
Ci for CR users u and k are p1 and p2, respectively, the probability of CR users
meeting on Ci is given by p = p1p2. The probabilities p1 and p2 can be obtained from
(4.1). They are, in general, not identical because LC or LR of the neighbor pair is
of different length and order. Assume that the success of meeting each other at the
mth channel switch is a discrete random variable and denoted by M . If the neighbor
pair experiences m− 1 failures for previous m − 1 channel switches and succeeds at
the mth switch, the probability of successful rendezvous on channel Ci after the m
th
channel hopping is given by:
P (M = m) = (1− p)m−1p. (4.11)
This is the PMF of random variable M , which is geometric-distributed. Based on
these observations, we obtain the distribution of TR in Proposition 4.1. Based on the
Proposition, one can obtain the average recovery time numerically.
Proposition 4.1 (CCC Recovery Time). If the CCC recovery time TR is the sum
of M identically, independently, and exponentially distributed random variables with
parameter λ, the distribution of CCC recovery time TR, denoted by fR(tR) is given
by:







)P (M = m) (4.12)
where Γ(tR;m,µ) is the gamma distribution with shape parameter m and scale pa-
rameter µ, and M is a geometric-distributed random variable with the PMF given by
(4.11).
52
Proof. Consider that the CCC recovery time TR is divided into M intervals, Ti, 1 ≤
i ≤ M , where M is a discrete variable with the PMF given by (4.11) and denotes
the number of channel switches required for the neighbor pair to successfully meet
each other on one common channel. Assume that the duration of each interval is
exponentially distributed with parameter λ, denoted by Ti ∼ Exp(λ). As a result, TR
is the sum of M exponentially distributed intervals given by TR =
∑M
i Ti. For each
value ofM = m, TR given M = m is gamma-distributed with parameters m and 1/λ,
denoted by TR(M = m) ∼ fR(tR|M = m) = Γ(m, 1/λ). Therefore, by calculating
the joint distribution fR(tR,M) = fR(tR|M = m)P (M = m) = Γ(m, 1/λ)P (M = m)
and summing up all m’s, we obtain the marginal distribution (4.12).
In practice, the number of channel switches M = m will not be infinite. For large
m, the probability P (M = m) is negligible. Thus, the summation in (4.12) starts from
1 to the maximum number of channel switches Nm and
∑Nm
m=1 P (M = m)
∼= 1. The
resulting distribution is the linear combination of gamma distributions with different
parameters m.
For the allocation time TC , it is mainly determined by PU activities, especially
the PUs’ arrival rates. This is because once a new CCC is allocated, the allocation
will remain mostly unchanged until PU’s return to the channel. Even when a CR user
decides to change the CCC, the allocation time continues on the new CCC and thus
has no state change in this case. Thus, we obtain the distribution of TC in Proposition
4.2. Based on the Proposition, one can easily calculate the average allocation time
as 1/(Npβ).
Proposition 4.2 (CCC Allocation Time). Given Np PUs with the rate of changing
from inactive to active β, the distribution of CCC allocation time TC , denoted by
fC(tC) is given by:
TC ∼ fC(tC) = Exp(Npβ). (4.13)
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Proof. Given Np inactive PUs on channel Cj, the CR user selects Cj as the CCC and
enters the Allocation state. Since each PU arrival follows Poisson distribution with
rate β (becoming active with rate β), the arrival rate of Np PUs is Poisson distributed
with NPβ. As a result, the interarrival time between two PU arrivals is exponentially
distributed with parameter Npβ. Based on the assumption that Cj is available, all
active PUs must become inactive before the CR user switches to Cj . Moreover, due to
the memoryless property of exponential distribution, the PU inactive time before the
CR user switches to Cj is irrelevant. Thus, we obtain the distribution of allocation
time, fC(tC), as in (4.13).
4.4.2 Delay, Throughput, and Interference
To find the delay and control throughput, we assume that CR user i transmits control
data to a neighbor k on CCC Cj. The maximum achievable rate for the control
transmission is given by:






where B is channel bandwidth, Psu is CR user transmit power, hik is the channel gain
of the link between CR users i and k, N0/2 is the power spectral density of additive
white Gaussian noise, and γkj is the accumulated interference power of PU transmit
signals observed by CR user k on Cj. If the CR user has Nk neighbors within its
transmission range Rs and all neighbors are tuned to Cj , we refer to the area covered
by Rs as a control capacity region. Since the achievable throughput is limited by
the rate of the weakest link, where the interference power γkj is the largest and the
channel gain hik is the smallest, the maximum achievable throughput in the capacity
region is given by Rj = min{Rkj , k = 1, . . . , Nk}. If the control packet is of length L
bits, the transmission delay is L/Rj .
Now if Ns CR users are uniformly deployed in the area A, there are approximately
Nr = A/(πR
2
s) control capacity regions. The CCC may be the same in each region
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while the PU interference levels and the channel conditions are different. Thus, the
maximum control throughput of the CR ad hoc network, called the sum-rate capacity,







Rj(q), Cj ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}. (4.15)
ERCC intelligently selects the CCC Cj in each region such that the sum-rate capacity
(4.15) is achieved.
If a PU is active on channel Cj and the area covered by PU’s transmission range
Rp is called the protected region, the interference with PUs only results from those





s) possible control capacity regions and one transmitting CR user in each
region, the maximum accumulated interference from those CR users observed by the











, dpi > Rp, ∀i, (4.16)
where K is an antenna-related constant, Psu is the CR user transmit power, d0 is the
reference distance, dpi is the distance between the PU and the CR user i, and δ is the
path loss exponent.
4.4.3 Overhead
The overhead of the ERCC algorithm is dominated by regular broadcasts of main-
tained CCLs. The frequency of the broadcasts determines the accuracy of channel
conditions in the CCLs and the overhead incurred by ERCC. Thus, the choice of the
broadcast rate is essential for reducing the unnecessary overhead.
The CCL updates and broadcasts are related to PU activities and the broadcast
rate of neighbors, since CCLs are updated with i) the PCL from the sensing results
and ii) the CCL received from neighbors. Assume that a CR user has Nk neighbors
and neighbor k, k = 1, . . . , Nk, broadcasts its CCL with the rate rk. The death
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and birth rates of PU model are α and β, respectively. Since the periodic sensing
frequency rs must be no less than the PU activity change rate and CR users need
to broadcast CCLs with new channel conditions, we assume that rs = max{α, β}
where α, β ≤ rk, ∀k. Thus, the rule of thumb for choosing the broadcast rate ri is
formulated as follows:
rs = max{α, β} ≤ ri ≤ min{r1, . . . rNk}. (4.17)
By adaptively selecting the broadcast rate based on (4.17), the CR user and its neigh-
bors broadcast CCLs with the rates gradually approaching the PU activity change
rate α or β, whichever is the largest, to minimize the unnecessary broadcasts.
4.4.4 Cosite Interference
As described in Section 4.2, each CR user is equipped with two radios dedicated to
control and data channels, respectively. Owing to their collocation in each CR user,
the out-of-band (OOB) emission [105] from a transmitting radio (control or data)
can block the transmission or corrupt the reception at the other radio operating in
a different channel within the same band [41]. This phenomena, called cosite inter-
ference, results in degraded performance: an unreliable CCC and data transmissions
with compromised data rate.
Contrary to the setting in [41] where all radios are used for data transmission,
ERCC utilizes separate radios for control and data. The key differences in ERCC are
twofold: i) to ensure the reliability of the CR ad hoc network, any operation in a CCC
has higher priority than those in data channels, and ii) since all channels have the
same bandwidth, CCC transmission is short compared to data transmissions. Thus,
medium access control (MAC) techniques [105] such as prioritized time sharing, power
control, and dynamic channel allocation can be utilized to ensure the reliability of
CCC and mitigate the cosite interference while the throughput of the data channel
is not considerably compromised.
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4.4.4.1 Prioritized Time Sharing
When both control and data radios are transmitting, only one radio is active at a given
time [41]. Owing to its high priority, the control radio temporarily refrains the data
radio from transmitting in data channels whenever the control radio transmits. The
throughput of data transmission is only slightly for short control traffic. Similarly, the
data radio temporarily ceases transmitting whenever the control radio starts receiving
control data. If the control radio transmits when the data radio receives data from
others, the control radio notifies the transmitting neighbor to temporarily stop the
data transmission. Moreover, the CR users can broadcast their regular control traffic
schedule to neighbors so that their schedulers automatically cease data transmission
during the scheduled control traffic period.
4.4.4.2 Power Control and Rate Adaptation
To reduce the power leakage from the receive data channel to the control channel,
the control radio notifies the transmitting neighbor to perform transmission power
control and adjust the transmission rate in the data channel for cosite interference
mitigation.
4.4.4.3 Dynamic Channel Allocation
The data channel can be dynamically reallocated to the one far separated from the
CCC, if possible, to further reduce the cosite interference. The control channel can
also be dynamically changed if the CCC quality degrades.
4.5 Performance Metrics
The performance of CCC establishment can be evaluated in a variety of ways. For the
convenience of performance evaluation, we define four metrics in this section: CCC
link indicator, CCC coverage indicator, best channel indicator, and PU interference
as follows:
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4.5.1 CCC Link Indicator
A link is said to be available between two CR users if they are located within their
transmission range and observe at least one channel in common, but have not located
each other in any channel. When neighboring nodes operate and exchange information
in a common channel, a CCC link is established. Thus, we define a CCC link indicator






where Ndisc is the number of current established CCC links and Ntot is the number
of total available links. Since topology and neighbors change as PU activity changes,
the CLI also indicates how fast CR users establish links with new neighbors and
recover links with old neighbors. Moreover, the CLI value achieves unity when all
neighbors are discovered and CCC links are established. Therefore, this indicator is
an alternative way of evaluating neighbor discovery rate and the responsiveness to
PU activities.
4.5.2 CCC Coverage Indicator
The coverage of a CCC refers to an area covered by links allocated to a control chan-
nel. Since obtaining an exact footprint of those links is nontrivial, a CCC coverage
indicator (CCI) is used as an alternative to evaluate the coverage of CCC distribution
in the network. The CCC distribution refers to the number of CCC links distributed





where STD(pdist) is the standard deviation (STD) of current CCC distribution over
all licensed channels and STD(pbest) is the STD of the CCC distribution in the best
case. If pi is the number of CCC links in channel Ci, p is the average number of
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all pi’s, and Nc is the number of licensed channels, the standard deviation of CCC





k=1(pi − p)2. For different number
of licensed channels or available links, standard deviation of the distribution can
vary significantly. Thus, for easy comparison of different test cases, STD(p) can be
normalized by the STD of CCC distribution in the best scenario. The best case can
be achieved when all CR users use a single CCC. That is, pi = Ntot and pj = 0 for
i ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nc and i 6= j. Evidently, the STD of CCC distribution in
the best scenario is the maximum for a given number of channels Nc. Therefore, the
CCI indicates how close current CCC distribution to the distribution in the best case
and the CCI value achieves unity when all CCC links in the network are established
in the same channel.
4.5.3 Best Channel Indicator
The best channel indicator (BCI) indicates the percentage of CCC links to which the






where Nbest is the number of CCC links to which the best quality channel in the PCL
is allocated and Ntot is the number of total available links. The BCI value achieves
unity when all the CCC links are of the highest observed channel quality.
4.5.4 PU Interference Indicator
The PU interference (PUI) indicates the average accumulated PU transmit signal
power observed on channel Cj at each CR user when Cj is used for control transmis-







, Cj ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}, (4.21)
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where Ns is the number of CR users, Nc is the number of channels, and γ
j
i is the
accumulated interference power on the control channel Cj at CR user i. Since higher
PU interference level implies a higher possibility of PUs in the surrounding area, this
metric indicates the average level of interference with PUs per CR user during control
transmission. Moreover, due to the interference at the CR user, this metric can also
be used to evaluate the level of achievable control throughput. In general, the higher
the PUI level, the lower the control throughput.
In the next section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed method with
the metrics defined in this section.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the simulation setups and evaluate the performance of our
proposed ERCC method in several test scenarios. We first introduce our simulation
environment, compare the analytical model with the simulation model, and then
describe seven test cases for performance evaluation.
4.6.1 Simulation Environment
In our simulation environment, we assume that a number of CR users are randomly
deployed in a square area 500m×500m sharing a set of licensed channels with PUs in
the 5.2GHz frequency band. Both PU and CR user transmit powers are set to 0.1W.
The PU and CR user interference thresholds are set to γpu and γsu. These settings
correspond to PU and CR user transmission ranges Rp and Rs, respectively. For
example, for γpu = −72.7 dBm, γsu = −66.7 dBm and wavelength λ = 0.058, the PU
and CR user transmission ranges are approximately 200m and 100m, respectively.
The noise floor is set at −101 dBm. For correlated shadowing, the decaying coefficient
a in the exponential correlation model is set to 0.002 for suburban settings [32].
This corresponds to the decorrelation distance of approximately 346m where the
correlation drops to 0.5 and ensures that the observations of neighbors are highly
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correlated (ρij > 0.8). For convenience, the number of PUs, CR users, and licensed
channels are denoted by Np, Ns, and Nc, respectively. In addition, the PU density, PU
ON/OFF period, PU transmission range, CR user transmission range, and log-normal
shadowing dB spread are denoted by Dp, tp, Rp, Rs, and σdB , respectively.
For performance comparison, we select a group-based CCC design approach from
[18], denoted by GRP, and a sequence-based approach from [23], denoted by SEQ, as
references. These two selected reference approaches are summarized as follows:
• GRP: CR users exchange quantized channel quality information by sending
Hello messages to neighbors. Based on the channel quality values received from
neighbors, CR users adaptively update a probability list for control channel
selection. The probability for a channel is higher if more neighbors select that
channel as the control channel. The channel with the highest probability is
selected as the common control channel. Thus, control channels are selected
according to the decisions of the majority of neighbors. The settings used in
GRP are: A = 0.1, B = 1.5, and C = 4 for probability list update. The number
of quantized receive power levels for determining quality values is 128.
• SEQ: Each CR user constructs a channel hopping sequence by using permuta-
tions of available channels. A neighboring CR user pair establishes a control
link after both CR users hop to the same channel and exchange information. To
establish other control links, both CR users hop to other channels based on their
own sequence. If the channel is occupied by a PU, the channel is removed from
the hopping sequence. New sequence is generated for new channel availability
obtained from local sensing information.
PU activities follow the two-state birth-death process with the birth rate 0.3 and
the death rate 0.2. In this case, PUs fix their location and operating channels, but
may be active or inactive based on the state of the process. When a PU is inactive,
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the PU-occupied channel is considered free until the PU is active. The degree of PU
activities is determined by the ON/OFF period tp.
The observation time for each topology is set for 10 minutes. For neighbor dis-
covery and message exchange, each CR user is tuned to a channel for 200ms. During
the time interval, CR users perform local spectrum sensing, broadcast channel and
neighbor information, determine new common channel lists, and allocate available
channels to CCCs accordingly. The metrics are collected every 200ms after SEQ
changes its hopping channel. All results are averaged over the observation time and
10 random network topologies, in which PUs and CR users are uniformly distributed
in the deployment area. Although the synchronization of CR users is not required,
all nodes are simultaneously activated in the test cases.
4.6.2 Comparison of Analytical and Simulation Models
To compare the analytical model introduced in Section 4.4.1 with the simulation
model, we focus on a neighboring CR user pair and their average CCC recovery
time. In the analytical model, the average recovery time is obtained by calculating
the expected recovery time numerically using the distribution from (4.12) with the
maximum channel switches Nm set to 50. In the simulation model, the recovery time
of a neighboring pair is averaged over all occurrences of CCC recovery during the
entire observation time and the random network topologies under testing.
Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of the average recovery time from the analytical
model and the simulation model under various degrees of PU activity characterized
by the probability of PU ON state, Pon. In general, the CCC recovery time is linearly
increased with the number of available channels. This is because the CR user may
choose other available channels not common to the neighbor of interest, which results
in the increase of the average recovery time, even though the probability of choosing
62



















































Figure 4.3: Comparison of Average CCC Recovery Time in Analytical and Simula-
tion Models.
the common channel in the CCL is the largest. In addition, given a number of avail-
able channels, the average recovery time does not vary significantly under different
levels of PU activities. Although PU activity affects the channel availability and the
probability of channel selections, the recovery time is dominated by the number of
channel switches once the available channels are determined in the CCL. Thus, the
probability of selecting the common channel (p in (4.11)) for recovery remains con-
stant if there is no CCL update due to PU activities. More importantly, the figure
shows that the empirical values from the simulation model closely follow the analyti-
cal values as the number of channels varies. Therefore, the analytical model provides
the first-order analysis and prediction of the average CCC recovery time.
4.6.3 Test Cases
To evaluate the performance, we test our proposed ERCC solution in the following test
cases: (i) neighbor discovery, (ii) PU ON/OFF period, (iii) PU transmission range,
(iv) PU density as the number of PUs per channel, (v) CR user transmission range,
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(vi) the scalability or the density of CR user population, and (vii) shadow fading for
a range of dB spread. These test cases will show how our solution performs under the
impacts of PU activity, network topology changes, and channel impairments. The
configuration used in each test case for cross reference is Np = 10, Ns = 60, Nc = 10,
Dp = 1, tp = 4 s, Rp = 200m, Rs = 100m, and σdB = 0dB. In each test case, we
evaluate the performance of all three methods by varying one of the parameters and
illustrate the average and standard deviation of metric values versus the parameter
of interest. In the figures of this section, the top left, top right, bottom left, and
bottom right sub-figures show the CCC links, CCC coverage, best channel, and PU
interference metric values, respectively.
4.6.4 Neighbor Discovery
We first demonstrate the performance of ERCC neighbor discovery algorithm and the
network topology achieved by neighbor discovery. Figure 4.4(a) shows an example
of initial deployment of a CR ad hoc network overlaid with a primary network. The
primary network consists of 10 PUs, represented by red triangles. Each of which
occupies one of 10 licensed channels. The numbers near each triangle are PU’s ID
followed by its operating channel. The CR ad hoc network, represented by blue
circles, consists of 60 CR users. The number next to a circle is a CR user ID. The
available links, not shown in this figure, depend on the channel availability of each
neighboring pair. After the CR users in the network start the neighbor discovery
and CCC allocation, the network topology can be established in a short period of
time. Figure 4.4(b) illustrates the network connectivity with full neighbor discovery
at time unit 37. Each colored line between two CR users represents an established
link between a neighboring pair. The number in the middle of each line shows the




Figure 4.4: (a) Initial Deployment at t = 0 and (b) Network Topology with Full
Neighbor Discovery at t = 37 (Np = 10, Ns = 60, Nc = 10).
the bottom use channel 1 as the CCC because the PU occupies channel 1 in the up-
right corner. The rest of the links share three other control channels in the network
due to different observed channel availability. One global CCC is infeasible in this
case because each PU occupies one licensed channel.
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4.6.4.1 Primary User ON/OFF Period
PU ON/OFF period is the smallest duration of a PU being active or inactive. Based
on the state in the birth-death process, a PU may be consecutively active or inactive
for several periods. During these periods, PU activities can be considered stationary.
Thus, increasing the period reduces the frequency of dynamic changes in PU activity.
Figure 4.5 shows the four expected metric values of three methods under testing in the
range of PU ON/OFF period from 0.2 to 8 seconds. As shown in the figure, ERCC
steadily improves the connectivity with neighbors, increases the CCC coverage, and
selects more channels of the best quality while maintaining the lowest interference with
PUs among all three methods, as PU activities appear to be less dynamic on average.
This proves its capability of efficient recovery from high PU activities. Specifically,
ERCC maintains at least 80% of CCC links when PU activities are most dynamic and
also improves its connectivity to almost 100% when the activity is less intense while
GRP can only achieve at most 80% of connectivity. Even though GRP has better CCC
coverage than ERCC under highly dynamic PU activities, it is achieved at the expense
of causing more interference. Moreover, SEQ appears to be less susceptible to PU
active periods. However, it achieves low indicator values and causes more interference
than ERCC because SEQ selects channels for CCC links based on hopping sequences
constructed with no consideration of channel quality and neighbor information. Thus,
ERCC makes better tradeoffs between increasing coverage and choosing a channel of
best quality for minimizing the interference.
4.6.4.2 Primary User Transmission Range
The PU transmission range is determined by the path loss model with specified PU
transmit power and the receive PU signal threshold. We can change transmit power
to obtain different transmission ranges. Alternatively, with the fixed transmit power,
we assume that CR users change the thresholds for different levels of tolerable PU
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Figure 4.5: Expected Metric Values vs. PU ON/OFF Period tp.
interference and PU transmission range. The larger the PU transmission range is,
the more homogeneous the spectrum availability is in a neighborhood. Figure 4.6
shows the expected metrics from the PU transmission range 100 to 500m. These
ranges correspond to PU threshold γpu values from −92.72 to −110.70 dB. As shown
in the figure, ERCC utilizes the local spectrum homogeneity to improve all metrics as
the PU transmission range increases. For the same reason, SEQ slightly improves its
performance. As the range increases, the hopping sequences chosen by neighbors in
SEQ are more similar for better chances of rendezvous. Conversely, the performance
of GRP drops significantly as the range increases. This is because as the range of the
PU on each channel increases, the probabilities for selecting control channels in GRP
appear to be more comparable. As a result, CR users using GRP in a neighborhood
cannot easily agree upon their control channel selection. This test case shows that
ERCC is more consistent and reliable than the other two methods as PU adapts its
transmit power and range.
67











































































Figure 4.6: Expected Metric Values vs. PU Transmission Range Rp.
4.6.4.3 Primary User Density
In this test case, we increase the PU density by increasing the number of PUs per
licensed channel within the testing area. This will increase the observed PU inter-
ference level and reduce observed channel quality if more than one PU is active.
Figure 4.7 shows expected metric values versus one, two, and three PUs occupying
each licensed channel. As expected, the interference level increases for all methods as
the density of PUs increases. Even though channel quality deteriorates, ERCC main-
tains high percentage of links with neighbors and best channel selections partially
based on the ordering of the channel quality. On the contrary, the performance of
GRP is considerably affected by the reduced channel quality, since it updates channel
selection probabilities with channel quality values. As in previous cases, SEQ does
not achieve high coverage and connectivity as the other two methods, even though it
is insensitive to PU parameter changes. Therefore, these results show that ERCC is











































































Figure 4.7: Expected Metric Values vs. Number of PUs per Channel Dp.
4.6.4.4 Secondary User Transmission Range
Similar to the PU transmission range test case, we vary the CR user transmission
range by changing the CR user sensing threshold γsu. As the range increases, more
neighbors are covered, resulting in increased number of neighbors. Figure 4.8 shows
expected metrics versus CR user transmission ranges from 50 to 250m. In general, the
performance of both ERCC and GRP slightly decreases as the CR user transmission
range increases. Since more neighbors away from the neighborhood contribute to
the message exchange, the channel list may not reflect the real channel conditions in
the surrounding area. Interestingly, the performance of GRP also degrades when the
range is small. Since CCC allocation in GRP relies on the updates from the majority
of neighbors in the neighborhood, small CR user range covers only a few neighbors
that may not represent the real majority of neighbors for correct channel selection.
This test case shows that few benefits can be obtained from increasing CR user range
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Figure 4.8: Expected Metric Values vs. CR User Transmission Range Rs.
to a large value, not to mention the waste of transmit power and higher interference
incurred. However, proper transmission range is still essential to methods such as
GRP for achieving good performance.
4.6.4.5 Scalability of CR user deployment
The scalability of CR user deployment is evaluated by varying the number of CR users
in the testing area. This also changes the density of CR user population in the fixed
area. Similar to the CR user transmission range test case, the change of CR user
density affects the number of neighbors in the neighborhood. Figure 4.9 illustrates
the expected metric values versus the number of CR users ranging from 30 to 150. As
shown in the figure, the performance of ERCC and SEQ is consistent and thus scalable
in the range under testing. GRP, in general, is also scalable. However, too many or
too few neighbors degrades its performance. Thus, GRP is more sensitive to CR user
parameters and neighbor updates while ERCC and SEQ exhibit the scalability for a












































































Figure 4.9: Expected Metric Values vs. Number of CR Users in Deployment Ns.
4.6.4.6 Shadow Fading
Unlike all previous test cases that PU signal quality is deteriorated only by path loss
model, this test case evaluates the performance of CCC solutions with the addition of
independent and correlated shadow fading to reflect more realistic channel conditions.
With the increase of the log-normal shadowing dB spread σdB in the channels, the
received PU signal power varies so greatly that the CR users are more susceptible
to incorrect detection of PUs and channel availability. In this test case, we assume
that all packets for message exchange between neighbors are protected by upper layer
error control schemes and received correctly.
Figure 4.10 shows the expected metrics versus the dB spread values in both inde-
pendent and correlated shadow fading. ERCC outperforms GRP and SEQ in terms
of all the metrics. However, the performance of ERCC and GRP gradually degrades
in independent shadowing as σdB increases. Unlike ERCC and GRP, SEQ is less
susceptible to σdB changes. Interestingly, ERCC maintains better CCC links and
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Figure 4.10: Expected Metric Values in Shadow Fading σdB .
coverage in correlated shadowing than those in the independent case. This is because
when the neighbors’ observations are correlated, their CCLs tend to be similar even
with large dB-spreads, which facilitates the CCC allocation and improves the CCC
coverage in a deep shadow. However, due to inaccurate received PU power levels, it is
possible to incur the interference with PUs in this case. Thus, any cooperative spec-
trum sensing scheme [13, 32] can be incorporated into ERCC to mitigate the effects
of channel impairment. By using the established CCC links among neighbors, neigh-
boring CR users in ERCC can exchange spectrum sensing information to improve the
detection of PUs and obtain fading-independent CCLs for robust CCC establishment
and better CCC coverage.
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CHAPTER V
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR COOPERATIVE
SENSING GAIN
5.1 Motivation
In Chapter 3, we discuss cooperative gain and cooperation overhead in cooperative
sensing. We know that, regardless of the benefits of cooperative sensing, cooperation
incurs overhead such as (i) shadowing correlation, (ii) control message overhead, (iii)
synchronization and reporting delay, and (iv) user and data reliability that limits the
cooperative gain. First, it is known that shadowing correlation degrades the per-
formance of cooperative sensing [32]. This is because CR users, spatially located in
proximity and blocked by the same obstacle, may experience correlated shadowing
and have poor observations of PU signals. As a result, cooperative gain is limited by
shadowing correlation. Second, cooperation requires extra control message exchange
among CR users for reporting sensing data on a CCC [54,57]. Such control transmis-
sion is also limited by the available CCC bandwidth. Third, synchronizing CR users
in CR ad hoc networks for sensing cooperation is not a trivial task. Since CR users
have different transmission and sensing schedules, the local sensing results from coop-
erating CR users may not simultaneously arrive at the FC. Moreover, control packet
collision and re-transmission in control channel result in extra reporting delay. Thus,
asynchronous reporting and delay overhead should be considered in cooperative sens-
ing. Finally, the reported sensing results may be unreliable due to the malfunctioning
of CR users, or manipulation of malicious CR users, known as the Byzantine failure




















Figure 5.1: Cooperative Sensing and Possible Cooperation Overhead that Limits
Cooperative Gain.
further complicate the reliability issue. Therefore, cooperative sensing needs a mech-
anism that excludes unreliable cooperating users as well as their sensing results from
cooperation. Figure 5.1 illustrates an example of cooperative sensing and possibly
incurred cooperative overhead in a CR ad hoc network.
Existing cooperative sensing solutions are mainly based on the model of parallel
fusion network in distributed detection [90], where all cooperating CR users generate
local decisions and report them simultaneously to FC for making global decisions by
data fusion. To mitigate correlated shadowing, [89] takes into account user correlation
in the linear-quadratic fusion method to improve detection performance in correlated
environment. In addition, [78] proposes user selection algorithms based on location in-
formation to find uncorrelated users for cooperative sensing. However, these solutions
may not be able to adapt to dynamic environmental changes in a timely fashion. To
reduce control messages overhead, [59,91,92,104] report quantized and binary sensing
data for soft and hard decision combining, respectively. Alternatively, [84] reduces the
average number of reporting bits by restraining unreliable sensing results from being
reported. For synchronization and delay issues, recent studies [82, 100, 104] consider
the asynchronous case where cooperating CR users report local results at different
times. However, conventional schemes based on the parallel fusion model [17, 89, 92]
typically assume that observations among CR users are conditional independent, and
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CR users are perfectly synchronized with instant reporting on an error-free CCC.
Moreover, existing cooperative sensing methods seldom address all aforementioned
cooperation overheads in response to dynamic environmental changes. Thus, it is
clear that a new model for cooperative sensing with the capability of interacting with
and learning from the environment is required to tackle all these problems in CR ad
hoc networks.
In this Chapter, we introduce a novel reinforcement learning-based cooperative
sensing (RLCS) method to address incurred cooperation overheads and improve detec-
tion performance in multipath and correlated shadow fading. Reinforcement learning
(RL) [85] is an adaptive method for a decision-making agent learning to choose opti-
mal actions and maximize received rewards by interacting with its environment. In
RLCS, the CR user acting as the FC is the decision-making agent interacting with the
environment that consists of its cooperating neighbors and their observations of PU
activities. By requesting sensing results from its neighbors, the FC learns the behav-
iors of cooperating CR users and takes actions to select users for cooperation through
periodic cooperative sensing. Among a variety of RL algorithms, temporal-difference
(TD) learning [85] is utilized in this work to address cooperation overhead issues in
cooperative sensing. It is suitable for mitigating cooperation overheads due to its
capability of evaluating the correlation between successive CR user selections, adjust-
ing subsequent selection predictions based on the experiences accumulated over time,
and selecting an optimal set of cooperating CR users. More importantly, TD learning
enables CR users to learn from and adapt to dynamic environmental changes, such as
the changes in PU activities, user movement, user reliability, and channel conditions,
while maintaining satisfactory sensing performance without requiring a model or a
priori knowledge about PU activities and CR users’ behavior. Obviously, these ben-
efits of TD learning cannot be obtained by pre-selection of CR users or cooperation
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of all CR users with no learning. Although RL algorithms have been applied to dy-
namic channel access [7,24], user selections [93], and multi-band sensing policy [66,67]
in CR networks, to the best of our knowledge, RLCS is the first work applying the
RL techniques to address both the cooperation overhead problems and the detection
performance of cooperative sensing. Therefore, in Section 5.2, we present our RLCS
system model and assumptions. In Section 5.3, we introduce the RLCS scheme in-
cluding cooperative sensing decision process and RLCS algorithm. In Section 5.4,
we discuss RLCS performance analysis including optimal solution and convergence of
RLCS algorithm, optimal stopping time for fast response, and the impact of fading
control channels. In Section 5.5, we evaluate RLCS detection performance and its
adaptability to environmental change by test scenarios and numerical results. The
variables and notations used in this Chapter are tabulated in Table A.3 and A.4 of
Appendix A for reference. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose the novel RLCS model and algorithm for CR users to learn the
optimal user selection policy for finding uncorrelated and reliable cooperating
neighbors to improve cooperative gain and mitigate cooperation overhead in
cooperative sensing.
• We show that the optimal solution obtained by RLCS approach greatly im-
proves the detection performance under correlated shadowing while minimiz-
ing control channel bandwidth requirement by using binary local decisions and
hard-combining strategy.
• We demonstrate that RLCS converges asymptotically with the option of optimal
stopping for fast response in dynamic environment, mitigates the impact of con-
trol channel fading, improves the reliability of user and sensing data selection,
and adapts to PU activity change and the movement of CR users.
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5.2 RLCS System Model
We consider a group of CR users forming a CR ad hoc network overlaid with a
primary network to opportunistically share a set of NC licensed channels. Each
licensed channel is assumed to be occupied by one primary transmitter (the PU)
and potential primary receivers in its transmission range. In order to protect these
primary receivers from interference, the range of PU transmission RP plus the range
of CR user transmission RS, RP ≫ RS , forms the protected region [89]. The PU
activity on channel m is modeled as a two-state birth-death process with the birth
rate rmb and the death rate r
m
d [49]. In this PU model, the transition follows a Poisson
process with exponentially distributed inter-arrival time. Thus, the long-term average
probabilities of PU active (Pmon) and inactive (P
m











respectively. The PU activity is unknown to CR users a priori. To balance the traffic
load and power consumption, the CR users in the CR ad hoc network may either
take turns to serve as the FC to cooperatively sense one licensed channel each time,
or act as FCs simultaneously to sense multiple channels at the same time. However,
there is only one CR user acting as the the decision-making FC (learning agent) on
each channel. Without loss of generality, we focus on RLCS with one FC and its
cooperating neighbors on one channel and the channel index m will be omitted from
the notation thereafter unless otherwise specified. How to determine which channel
to sense is beyond the scope of this work.
Let C be the set of the neighbors of the FC where the FC is denoted by CR user
0 and |C| = L. Let yi be the average SNR in dBm of the received PU signal ob-
served at cooperating CR user i. yi are Gaussian distributed since the received signal
power in shadowing is assumed to be log-normally distributed [89]. The observations
yi, i = 1, . . . , L, may be correlated depending on the location of the CR users. The
collection of these observations is the Gaussian distributed vector Y = {yi}L1 under
the null hypothesis H0, which indicates the absence of the PU transmit signal, and
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N (0, σ20I), H0
N (µ1, σ21Σ), H1
, (5.1)
where 0 is the zero vector, µ1 is the mean SNR that depends on the path loss from
the location of the PU, σ20 is the Gaussian noise variance under H0, σ
2
1 is the variance
of noise in correlated shadowing under H1, I is the identity matrix, and Σ is the
normalized covariance with elements ρij . We assume that the correlation follows the
exponential correlation model [35]. In this model, the correlation coefficients can be
expressed as
ρij = e
−dij/Dc = e−a·dij , (5.2)
where dij is the distance between CR users i and j, Dc is the de-correlation distance,
and a = 1/Dc is the exponential decaying coefficient set to 0.1204 and 0.002 for
urban and suburban settings, respectively [32]. Thus, two CR users are correlated if
the distance between them is smaller than Dc, and uncorrelated otherwise.
Depending on the distance between the PU and the CR user, and the degree of
fading, the SNR observed at CR users may vary significantly. Due to these variations,
CR users may take different number of observations to satisfy detection requirements
and report their local decisions on the CCC asynchronously that causes different
reporting delays. We assume that a narrowband CCC is shared by the FC for message
broadcast and by cooperating CR users for reporting local sensing data. The time-
varying wireless channel between each CR user and the FC, known as the reporting
channel, is susceptible to independent Rayleigh fading, which is modeled by the finite-
state Markov channel (FSMC) model [95]. Since the received SNR γb varies with time
and ranges from 0 to infinity, the entire SNR range is divided into J regions in which
the jth region is defined as Γj = [Aj , Aj+1) = {γb : Aj ≤ γb < Aj+1} where {Aj} are
region boundaries with A0 = 0 and AJ =∞. For transmitting binary local decisions,
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we assume BPSK modulation at reporting CR user and the coherent demodulation
at the FC. In this case, the error probability can be expressed in terms of the received
SNR as Pe(γb) = Q(
√






2/2du is the tail probability of
standard normal distribution. The reported local decision in each channel state xj
follows a binary symmetric channel (BSC) where the local decisions are received in
errors at the FC with crossover probability εj.
Based on the proposed RLCS model and algorithm discussed in Section 5.3, the
FC selects and combines these local results, and makes a cooperative decision on the
presence of the PU. In general, the data fusion of selected K ≤ L local sensing results













where f(·) is the local decision process, wi is the weighting factor for local sensing
data ui ∈ {0, 1} from cooperating CR user i and λ0 is the cooperative decision
threshold at the FC. For hard combinations with the majority rule, wi = 1, ∀i and
λ0 = ⌈K/2⌉. The majority rule is chosen over AND and OR rules for the balance
of false alarms and miss detection. The cooperative decision u0 ∈ {0, 1} is then
broadcast to all neighbors. This cooperative sensing process is periodically repeated
for infinite iterations, called episodes.
5.3 Reinforcement Learning-Based Cooperative Sensing
In this section, we present the proposed RLCS model and algorithm for coopera-
tive sensing. We formulate the problem as a cooperative sensing decision process


























Figure 5.2: Model of Cooperative Sensing with Reinforcement Learning.
5.3.1 Cooperative Sensing Decision Process
In RLCS, the interactions between the FC and cooperative CR users are modeled as
a CSDP. CSDP is a decision process with non-Markovian rewards for FC’s sequential
decisions on selecting cooperating neighbors. Figure 5.2 illustrates the RLCS model
with the inherent CSDP and the environment with which the agent inside the FC
interacts. In the figure, the FC interacts with L cooperating neighboring nodes that
observe PU signals in the environment and obtain Gaussian distributed and possibly
correlated observations Y = {yi}L1 as in (5.1). In each state sk, where k is the time
step or stage index, the FC selects neighbor i by choosing action ak = i and receives
local decision ui determined from observed yi with reporting delay tdi as reward rk+1
along with state change to sk+1. By exploring the unknown states and accumulating
the knowledge of receiving rewards from known states, the FC learns the sequence of
optimal decision rules, the optimal policy that gives rise to the maximum reward.
The CSDP is represented by a quadruple 〈S,A, fp, fR〉 in which S = {0, 1, . . . , L}
is a finite set of all states, A = ∪j∈SAj = {0, 1, . . . , L} is a finite set of actions, where
Aj ⊆ A is the set of actions available in state j, fp is the state transition probability
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function, and fR is the reward function. Each component is described as follows:
States : A state of the CSDP is the status of user selection and reporting in the
environment that includes cooperating CR users and their observations of the PU
signal. In each episode n, the states of the environment sk, which take on values from
S = {0, 1, . . . , L}, are defined as
snk = i · I{ank−1 = i ∈ Aj, snk−1 = j ∈ S, i 6= j, k 6= 0}, (5.4)
where I{x} is the indicator function and equals one if x is true and zero otherwise,
and ank−1 is the action selected in s
n
k−1. The process starts with the FC state (CR
user 0 state) sn0 = 0 when the FC initiates the process of cooperative sensing at
time tn0 . In each state s
n
k = j ∈ S, the FC requests local decision ui from CR user
i and awaits a response from the environment by choosing action ank = i ∈ Aj, or
terminates the cooperative sensing by choosing action ank = 0 to return to the FC
state. The state changes from snk = j to s
n
k+1 = i when the FC obtains reported ui
and the corresponding reward rnk+1 as the response at time t
n
k+1. The FC state is both
the start state and the terminal state in each episode.
Actions : An action is the FC’s decision on selecting a CR user (including the FC










k) be the history of
state-action sequence from sn0 to s
n
k in episode n. The decision rule µ
n
k is the function
mapping hnk into a probability distribution ∆µnk (Asnk ) on the set of actions Asnk in
state snk of episode n. Let also Dnk−1 be the set of selected CR users from sn0 to snk−1
of episode n given by Dnk−1 = {an0 , . . . , ank−1} and Dn−1 = ∅. Thus, the actions of the
FC ank in state s
n


























k = i) for reporting in s
n
k . Specifically, the FC requests cooperating CR user i
to report local decision ui by sending a
n
k = i, or informs all cooperating CR users the
cooperative decision u0 by sending a
n
k = 0 along with u0. In the latter, action a
n
k = 0
also terminates one round of cooperative sensing. Nevertheless, how to choose the
actions depends on the action selection strategy defined in Section 5.3.2.
Transition Probability Function: The transition probability function, fp : H×A×
S → [0, 1] where H = S × A × S × · · · × S, maps the state-action-state transitions
to a probability of changing from the current state to the next state by choosing the
action. The transition probability from state snk = j to s
n
k+1 = i by choosing action
ank = i in s
n
k is denoted by pji = P (i|j, µnk(hnk)) and is generally not known a priori.
Since a chosen action implies the transition to a particular state in our model, the
probability of choosing an action ank = i in state s
n
k = j can be considered as the
state transition probability from snk = j to s
n
k+1 = i. As a result, the FC gradually
learns the state transitions from the action selection probabilities, even though the
transition probabilities are not required by TD learning algorithms.
Reward Function: The reward function, fR : H × A × S → R, maps the state-
action-state transitions to a real-valued reward. The reward is used by the FC to
evaluate action selections for choosing uncorrelated CR users with small reporting
delay for cooperative sensing. The FC receives a reward rnk+1 upon the arrival of the
local sensing data ui from CR user i with reporting delay t
n
di
as the result of action
ank = i in state s
n
k = j. The reward r
n
k+1 corresponding to the action a
n
k in state s
n
k of













I{Cnρk+1 = 0}, k = 0, . . . , K
n−1, (5.6)
where rnρk+1 = −Cnρk+1 and rndk+1 = 1−Cndk+1 are the rewards attributed to correlation
cost Cnρk+1 in (5.7) and delay cost C
n
dk+1
in (5.8), respectively, and Kn ≤ L is the
number of selected cooperating CR users in episode n. Note that rnk+1 = 0 for
Kn ≤ k ≤ L. (5.6) states that rnk+1 is determined by the delay cost if the selected CR
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user is uncorrelated with previously selected CR users, and by the correlation cost if
the selected CR user incurs correlation. rnk+1 is positive only when selected CR users
are uncorrelated and their cumulative reporting delay is within the delay constraint.
The correlation between CR users’ observations in correlated shadowing is cap-
tured by the covariance matrix Σ in (5.1). The elements of Σ, correlation coefficients
ρij , are estimated by using location information and (5.2). These correlation coeffi-
cients affect the correlation cost (5.7) and the reward (5.6) obtained in each state.
Given a different CR user j, j 6= i selected in state sl, l = 0, . . . , k− 1 and Σ = {ρij},








|ρij(sℓ, aℓ = j)|
]
I{k > 0}, j 6= i. (5.7)
Thus, the correlation cost is simply the average of correlation coefficients between the
newly selected CR user i and each selected CR user in previous k states.
The delay cost Cndk+1 , on the other hand, is attributed to reporting delays. The







k = i), is the interval between the
time of the FC requesting CR user i’s cooperation with the action ank = i and the

















, i ∈ Ask , j ∈ Asℓ , i 6= j (5.8)
where Tlim = min{Tcmax, Tdavg} is the total reporting delay constraint, Tcmax is the
maximum allowed cooperative sensing time, and Tdavg =
∑L
j=1 t̄d,j is the total average
reporting delay of all CR users. It is simply the cumulative reporting time up to the
start of next state snk+1 normalized by the factor of maximum cooperative sensing time
or total average reporting delay, whichever is smaller. This means that the reward
attributed to the delay cost rndk+1 is lower for CR users to be selected in the later
stage than the earlier stage, which enforces the CR user with large average reporting
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Figure 5.3: Example of One RL-Based Cooperative Sensing Episode with the CSDP.
delay to be less attractive for participation, especially in the later stage when the
cooperative decision needs to be determined within the limit Tcmax .
From (5.7), (5.8) and the definition of rnk+1 in (5.6), we know that negative rewards
are obtained when the selected CR users are correlated or their cumulative reporting
delays exceed the maximum tolerable cooperative sensing time. Such selections are
learned and will be depreciated from future selections. Positive rewards are possible
only when all selected CR users are uncorrelated. Thus, large positive rewards are
more likely attributed to selecting more uncorrelated CR users with small reporting
delays within the time constraint Tcmax .
Figure 5.3 gives an example of the CSDP. The FC initially starts in state s0. After
choosing the first action a0 = 2, it waits for the first reward r1. SU2 responds to the
request with its decision u2. Upon the receipt of reward r1 calculated from u2, the
state changes to the next state s1 = 2. This cycle continues from state s1 to state
s4. In s4, the agent chooses the action a4 = 0 to terminate the cooperative sensing
process. Note that SU4 is not selected in this case.
5.3.2 RL-Based Cooperative Sensing Algorithm
Based on the CSDP model, the RLCS algorithm learns the environment by itera-
tively choosing actions, receiving rewards, and evaluating action selections with the
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objectives of maximizing received rewards and improving cooperative gain. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss action selection strategy, expected cumulated reward for optimal
policy, state-action value updates for action evaluation, and user selection for reliable
cooperation.
5.3.2.1 Action Selection Strategy
The action selection strategy affects how the FC interacts with the environment. In
RLCS, the softmax approach based on Boltzmann distribution is utilized for action
selections. In this action strategy, the probability of selecting action ank = i in state
snk is given by:
p(snk , a
n















, i ∈ Asn
k
(5.9)
where Q(snk , a
n
k) is the state-action value (Q-value) function that evaluates the quality
of choosing action ank in state s
n
k , and τ
n is an episode-varying parameter called tem-
perature that controls the degree of exploration versus exploitation. For large values
of τn, all actions are equally probable. In this case, the FC explores the opportunities
of more uncorrelated cooperating CR users to achieve potentially higher detection
probability in the future with large τn. For small τn, on the other hand, the action
with maximum Q(s, a) is favored. Hence, the agent exploits the current knowledge of
best selections of cooperating CR users to achieve the potentially highest detection
probability with small τn. As a result, τn remains a large value for exploration in a
highly dynamic environment while τn is decreased to a small value for exploitation
in a static environment where the convergence can be assured [80]. To achieve the
convergence in a certain number of episodes, we use a linear function to decrease the
value of τn over episodes as follows:
τn = −(τ 0 − τN) · n/N + τ 0, n ≤ N (5.10)
where N is the number of episodes to reach the convergence, τ 0 and τN are the initial
and the last value, respectively, of the temperature in N episodes. Note that τn 6= 0,
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∀n and τn = τN ≈ 0 for n ≥ N until any environmental change.
5.3.2.2 Expected Cumulative Reward
The expected cumulative reward Rn of episode n is defined as


















k+1 is the cumulative reward of episode n. If there are K
n CR






k+1 = 0 for k = K
n, . . . , L. The
objective of TD learning in RLCS is to find the optimal policy π∗ = {µ∗0, . . . , µ∗K∗},
where K∗ ≤ L is the optimal number of selected cooperating CR users, to achieve
the maximum cumulative reward Rπ∗ , which leads to higher detection performance
in cooperative sensing.
5.3.2.3 State-Action Value Updates
To evaluate the quality of action selections, a table known as Q-table of size |S|× |A|
is used to store the Q-values for all state-action pairs. In each state snk with the









to be updated according to the received reward rnk+1 and future state-action value
estimates Q(snk+1, a
n
k+1). The general form of the Q-value update in TD learning can
be expressed as













k is the learning rate, γ is the discount factor for future
state-action value estimates Qnk+1, and f(Q
n
k+1) is the function of future estimates
Qnk+1, and the function depends on the TD learning algorithms used. For example,






k+1 are future estimate functions for Q-
learning [97] and Sarsa [85], respectively. The discount factor γ determines the weight
of the future Q-value estimates compared to the current Q-value for the (snk , a
n
k) pair.




k) pair is explored
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more often. However, αnk should remain constant or sufficiently large to take into
account the latest changes in the highly dynamic environment that may be caused
by, for example, the movement of CR users.
5.3.2.4 User Selection for Reliable Cooperation
The selection of cooperating users ensures that reliable users can be constantly se-
lected to participate in cooperative sensing and contribute correct local decisions to
improve detection performance while the unreliable ones are excluded. Let p(ui) be
the distribution of local decisions reported from CR user i and p(u0) be the distribu-
tion of cooperative decisions at the FC. These are CR users’ and FC’s estimates of
PU activity Pon and Poff. After receiving CR user i’s report ui and having the coop-
erative decision u0, the FC will update p(ui) and p(u0), respectively. Based on the
assumption that cooperative decisions are statistically more accurate than local deci-
sions, we use the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance, D(p(u0)‖p(ui)), to measure how far
the distribution of local decisions p(ui) diverges from the distribution of cooperative
decisions p(u0) at the FC. Since D(p(u0)‖p(ui)) ≥ 0 and is zero when p(u0) = p(ui)),
larger DL distance indicates that the degree of the divergence is higher and implies
that CR user i is more unreliable. To determine the user reliability, we compare the
KL distance with a threshold δDL and claim that CR user i is considered unreliable








and reliable otherwise. The threshold δDL is set to µδ + cσδ, where µδ and σδ are
the mean and the standard deviation, respectively, of the DL distances of all reliable
cooperating CR users, and c is a constant. Let U ⊆ C be the set of uncorrelated CR
users selected from the first user selection step. The set of CR users selected for data
fusion D is the subset of U given by
D = U ∩ {∪i{i | D(p(ui)‖p(uf)) ≤ δDL, ∀i}}. (5.14)
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Thus, a previously unreliable CR user will be included in D for cooperation when it
becomes reliable and satisfies the condition in (5.14).
5.3.2.5 RLCS Algorithm
The RLCS algorithm is listed in Algorithm 5.1. The algorithm takes the array of
all state-action values (Q(|S|, |A|)) as the input and initializes the array entries to
zero. The output is the optimal solution: optimal number of cooperating CR users
(K∗ = |P|∗), optimal reporting sequence (π∗), and total reporting delay (T ∗d ). In the
algorithm, RLCS is performed repeatedly (line 3 to 19) unless the optimal stopping
criterion is met. In each episode, there are Kn ≤ L CR users selected for sensing and
reporting based on the action strategy. In each state of an episode (line 6-14), the
FC sends the request to the selected CR user, receives the local decision, calculates
the reward, and updates the Q-value using (5.12). At the end of the episode, the FC
terminates the episode with ank = 0, determines the reliable set of CR users and the
cooperative sensing decision, and broadcasts it to all neighbors (line 16-18).
5.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed RLCS scheme by first
showing the optimal solution of RLCS, proving its convergence, and evaluating the
rate of convergence. We then provide the optimal stopping alternative for performance
improvement in expected cumulative rewards. Lastly, we discuss the impact of control
channel fading on reporting errors and detection performance.
5.4.1 Optimal Solution of RLCS Algorithm
The RLCS algorithm is capable of learning the changes in a dynamic environment
to reach the optimal solution. The optimal solution of RLCS is the optimal set of
spatially uncorrelated CR users, P∗ ⊆ C, selected for cooperation in sequence by
optimal policy π∗ = (µ0, . . . , µK∗) that achieves maximum cumulative reward Rπ∗ ,
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Algorithm 5.1 : RL-based Cooperative Sensing (RLCS)
1: Input: Q(|S|, |A|), L,N
2: Output: π∗ ← π, P∗ ← Dn, K∗ ← |P∗|, T ∗d ← Td
3: repeat
4: Initialize: Dn = Un = ∅, Kn = 0, Td = 0
5: for k ← 0 to (L+ 1) do
6: ank ← ActionStrategy(µnk , snk , Q, τn)




9: rnk+1 ←WaitForReward(ui; tnd(sk, ak = i))












16: Dn = Un ∩ {∪i{i | D(p(ui)‖p(uf )) ≤ δDL, ∀i}}
17: u0 ← CoopSensingDecision(ui, k, L, ∀i ∈ Dn)
18: BroadcastCoopDecision(u0; ak = 0)
19: until Y n ≥ Ỹ ∗
where K∗ = |P∗| is the optimal number of selected CR users. In the following,
we present the necessary conditions of achieving the optimal solution in a static
environment, where CR user locations and their reporting delays are known, as two
lemmas followed by the corresponding theorem.
Lemma 5.1 (Optimal Number of Selected Users). Given the set of L cooperating CR
users, C, with their locations, the optimal number of selected CR users, K ≤ L, is the
maximum number of spatially uncorrelated CR users that maximize RρL =
∑L−1
k=0 rρk+1
with maximum value RρK = 0.
Proof. Let Pk be the set of selected CR users from s0 to sk and CR user j, j ∈
{C \ Pk−1}, be the CR user selected in sk. From (5.6) and (5.7), rρk+1 = −Cρk+1
and Cρk+1 ≥ 0. The maximum value of rρk+1 is 0 and can be obtained if and only if




ℓ=0 |ρij(sℓ, aℓ = i)| = 0, ∀i ∈ Pk−1. All selected CR
users in Pk must be spatially uncorrelated to maximize rρk+1 . If CR user j is spatially
correlated to any CR user in Pk−1, rρk+1 < 0. Thus, rρk+1 = 0 for k = 0, . . . , K−1 for
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selecting up to maximumK ≤ L spatially uncorrelated CR users in C to maximize RρL
with maximum value RρK = 0 as rρk+1 < 0, k = K, . . . , L− 1, such that Rρk < RρK ,
k = K + 1, . . . , L.
Lemma 5.2 (Optimal User Selection Sequence). Given the set of K selected CR
users, P, with their reporting delays tdi, i ∈ P, there exists an optimal user selection
sequence π∗K∗ = (a
∗
0, . . . , a
∗
K∗−1) that maximizes RdK =
∑K−1
k=0 rdk+1,
where a∗k = argminak∈Ask td(sk, ak) and K
∗ ≤ K is the maximum number of selected





Proof. Let dk,i = tdi(sk, ak), i ∈ Ask , be the reporting delay of CR uesr i selected in
sk. From (5.6) and (5.8),



















ℓ=0 dℓ,i ≤ Tlim, we have 0 < Cdk+1 ≤ 1 and rdk+1 ≥ 0. Since dk,i, Tlim >
0 and Tlim is constant, maximizing rdk+1 is equivalent to minimizing dk,i given rdk
obtained in the previous state. As a result, the optimal user selection that maximizes
rdk+1 in state sk is a
∗
k = argmini∈Ask dk,i, k = 0, . . . , K
∗−1. Since K∗ is the maximum
number of CR users that satisfy TdK∗ ≤ Tlim, we have Tdk+1 > Tlim and rdk+1 < 0
for k = K∗, . . . , K − 1, due to Cdk+1 > 1 from (5.8). Thus, there exists an optimal
user selection sequence π∗K∗ = (a
∗




k = argmini∈Ask dk,i, that
maximizes RdK and achieves maximum value RdK∗ =
∑K∗−1
k=0 rdk+1.
Theorem 5.1 (Optimal Solution of RLCS Algorithm). The optimal solution of RLCS
is a 3-tuple 〈K∗,P∗, T ∗d 〉 obtained by the optimal policy π∗ = {µ∗0, . . . , µ∗K∗−1} that





∗ − k) · td(sk, µ∗k)
Tlim
(5.16)





where µ∗k = argminak∈Ask td(sk, ak).
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Proof. In (5.11), rk+1 received in sk can be negative if Cρk+1 > 0 in (5.7) or Cdk+1 > 1
in (5.8). That is, the CR user selected in sk either causes spatial correlation with
any previously selected CR users or incurs reporting delay that does not satisfy the
total reporting delay constraint Tlim. To avoid negative rewards, Cρk+1 = 0 and
0 < Cdk+1 ≤ 1 are required. Using Lemma 5.1, we obtain maximum K spatially
uncorrelated CR users to ensure rρk+1 = Cρk+1 = 0. By plugging (5.6) into (5.11) and
setting Cρk+1 = 0, Rπ is reduced to Rπ =
∑K−1
k=0 rdk+1 = RdK . Using Lemma 5.2, we
obtain optimal user selection sequence π∗K∗ to maximize Rπ and ensure 0 < Cdk+1 ≤ 1
with maximum K∗ selected CR users that satisfy TdK∗ < Tlim. Since the decision rules




k = argminak∈Ask td(sk, ak) in π




























After some algebraic manipulation, (5.16) follows.
5.4.2 Convergence of RLCS Algorithm
The optimal solution is achieved when the RLCS algorithm converges with sufficient
exploration of state-action pairs. In the case of insufficient exploration, a suboptimal
solution may be obtained upon convergence. To prove the convergence, we first
show that the sequence of expected cumulative rewards {Rn} is a submartingale
in Lemma 5.3, and the result follows the Martingale convergence theorem given in
Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.3 (Sequence of Expected Cumulative Rewards). The sequence of expected
cumulative rewards Rn, n = 1, 2, . . . is a submartingale that satisfies E|Rn| <∞ and
E[Rn+1|Ri] ≥ Rn, ∀i ≤ n.
Proof. From (5.11), we can easily show that E|Rn| < ∞, n = 1, 2, . . . since L and
rnk+1 are finite. Next, we show E[R































































k+1|sn+1k , an+1k ) (5.21)
where Rn+1π in (5.18) is the expected cumulative reward obtained by π, pr in (5.20)
is reward distribution for π, and pπ in (5.21) is the transition probability for π in
episode n + 1 given Ri, equivalently, all Q-value updates with r
i
k+1, k = 0, . . . , L,
i ≤ n, in previous n episodes. Since, as indicated in Section 5.3, the state transition













, y ∈ Ax. (5.22)






xy for a policy π. For simplicity, we
first assume no future estimates (γ = 0). Since the Q-value for each (x, y) is updated
no more than once in each episode, Qn+1 before the update in episode n + 1 equals
Qn after the update (5.12) in episode n. Hence, (5.12) is simplified to
Qn+1k = (1− α)Qnk + αrnk+1 = Qnk + α(rnk+1 −Qnk). (5.23)
If the delays and locations of CR users are fixed, the reward of the same state-action
pair (x, y) in a policy π is the same for different episodes: rn+1k+1(x, y) = r
n
k+1(x, y).
Moreover, pn+1xy is the function of
Qn+1
τn+1
and we know from (5.10) that τn+1 < τn. As
a result, depending on how Q-values change from episode n to n + 1, we have the
following six cases:
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(ii) Qn+1 ≥ 0 ≥ Qn: As in case (i), pn+1xy > pnxy. Using (5.23) and Qnk ≤ 0, we obtain
rn+1k+1 = r
n
k+1 ≥ (1− 1α)Qnk ≥ 0. Thus, rn+1k+1pn+1xy ≥ rnk+1pnxy.
(iii) 0 ≥ Qn+1 ≥ Qn: Similarly, pn+1xy > pnxy. In this case, rnk+1 ∈ [Qnk , (1 − 1α)Qnk ].
Thus, Pr(rn+1k+1p
n+1
xy ≥ rnk+1pnxy) < Pr(rn+1k+1pn+1xy < rnk+1pnxy).





, we have pn+1xy < p
n
xy.




(v) Qn+1 ≤ 0 ≤ Qn: Similar to (iv), pn+1xy < pnxy. Using (5.12) and Qnk ≥ 0, we obtain
rn+1k+1 = r
n
k+1 ≤ (1− 1α)Qnk ≤ 0. Thus, rn+1k+1pn+1xy ≥ rnk+1pnxy.
(vi) 0 ≤ Qn+1 ≤ Qn: Similarly, we obtain pn+1xy < pnxy and rnk+1 ∈ [(1 − 1α)Qnk , Qnk ].












k+1) and the analysis above
still applies to variations of future estimates. Since cases (i)-(vi) are applicable to all























= E[Rn|Ri] = Rn, ∀i ≤ n, (5.26)
and {Rn} is a submartingale.
We now present the Martingale Convergence Theorem (Theorem 5.14 in [11])
without proof. Its proof can be found in [11], and is omitted here due to limited
space.
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Lemma 5.4 (Martingale Convergence Theorem). Let R1, R2, . . . be a submartingale
such that supE|Rn| < ∞, then there exists a random variable (r.v.) R such that
Rn → R almost surely (a.s.) and E|R| <∞.
Based on Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4, we present the convergence theorem of
RLCS.
Theorem 5.2 (Convergence of RLCS Algorithm). The sequence of expected cumu-
lative rewards Rn, n = 1, 2, . . . converges to a value R almost surely (a.s.).
Proof. Since {Rn} is a submartingale (Lemma 5.3), by following Lemma 5.4, there
exists an r.v. R such that Rn → R a.s. and E|R| < ∞ due to E|Rn| < ∞. The
convergence of RLCS follows.





aj , we obtain that
∂pi
∂ai
= pi − p2i and ∂
2pi
∂a2i
= (pi − p2i )(1 − 2pi). pi is
convex if pi ∈ [0, 0.5] and concave if pi ∈ [0.5, 1]. As a result, when τn is large at
the beginning of learning where exploration takes place, all possible actions i in that
state are equally likely and pi ∈ [0, 0.5]. Rn is convex in this region. On the opposite,
when τn is close to zero at the end of learning where exploitation takes effect, pi = 1
for the best action i in all states. Rn in this region is concave. The region in between
where the transition from exploration to exploitation occurs is, thus, linear. Based
on this observation, we show the rate of convergence in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 (Rate of Convergence). The sequence of expected cumulative rewards
Rn in RLCS converges sublinearly.
Proof. Let R1 be the initial Rn and Rn = R∗ in episode n = N . The increasing rate
of Rn in the linear region between exploration and exploitation can be approximated
as R
∗−R1
N−1 . From R
n = R
∗−R1
N−1 (n − 1) + R1, we obtain Rn+1 − R∗ = n−N+1N−1 (R∗ − R1)
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and Rn − R∗ = n−N
N−1 (R
∗ − R1). Using the rate of convergence K̂ defined in [73], we
have
K̂ = lim sup
n→∞
‖Rn+1 −R∗‖
‖Rn −R∗‖ζ = lim supn→∞
‖n−N + 1‖
‖n−N‖ = 1 (5.27)
where ζ is the order of convergence and ζ = 1 indicates the convergence of the first
order. The same result can be obtained by using (5.16). Since R∗ is upper bounded
by K∗ in (5.16) and N ≫ K∗ for sufficiently large N , ∆R = Rn+1 − Rn = R∗−R1
N−1 ≤
K∗−R1
N−1 ≈ 0. Thus, K̂ = 1 is obtained in (5.27) with Rn+1 ≈ Rn. {Rn} is said to
converge sublinearly.
5.4.3 Optimal Stopping Time
In Section 5.3, the RLCS algorithm is introduced to find the optimal solution. How-
ever, the number of episodes needed to reach the optimal solution may be large due
to the exploration of all state-action pairs in state and action spaces. In this section,
we aim to find the optimal stopping time T ∗ to reduce the total learning time by
formulating the problem as Markov optimal stopping with finite horizon N .
Let Fn, n = 1, . . . , N be a nondecreasing sequence of sub-σ-algebras of event class
F called a filtration. Consider a set of stopping times T Nn = {T ∈ T |n ≤ T ≤
N}, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , where T is the set of all stopping time. Thus, with cumulative
reward sequence {Y n}, the optimal stopping problem is to find the stopping time T
such that the expected cumulative reward is maximized:
sup
T∈T
E[Y T ] (5.28)
According to the optimal stopping theory [72, 79], the solution to (5.28) can be ob-
tained by backward induction as defined by a sequence of random variables:
SNn = max{Y n, E[SNn+1|Fn]}, n = N − 1, . . . , 1 (5.29)
with SNN = Y
N . Thus, we stop at n = T if Y T ≥ E[SNT+1|FT ] and continue otherwise.
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The stopping time is given by
TNn = inf{n ≤ T ≤ N |SNT = Y T}, 1 ≤ n ≤ N. (5.30)
However, unlike Y n, E[SNn+1|Fn] is difficult to obtain in each episode n. This is
because the probability distributions of the r.v.’s in sequence SNn+1 are unknown in
episode n and may be significantly changed owing to the action selections in future
episodes n+1, . . . , N . Thus, we use the optimal reward estimate Ỹ ∗ as the alternative
to E[SNn+1|Fn]. Ỹ ∗ is the best-known cumulative reward estimate in episode n based
on the optimal set of uncorrelated CR users, K̃∗, obtained from the sequence of
average reporting delays, T nd = {t̄ndi}, in an ascending order. By using (5.16), we
obtain the following:





, i ∈ K̃∗ (5.31)
where K̃∗ = |K∗| and t̄ndi(k) ∈ T nd is indexed for the kth uncorrelated CR user in K̃∗.
Thus, (5.29) is reduced to SNn = max{Y n, Ỹ ∗} and the optimal stopping time T ∗ in
the RLCS algorithm is the smallest episode number n = T ∗ whose cumulative reward
Y n is greater than or equal to the optimal reward estimate Ỹ ∗:
T ∗ = inf{n ≤ N | Yn ≥ Ỹ ∗}. (5.32)
In other words, the optimal stopping occurs if the cumulative reward of episode n, Y n,
is greater than or equal to the current best known reward estimate, Ỹ ∗. Otherwise,
the RLCS algorithm continues to find the optimal solution.
5.4.4 Fading Control Channel
As indicated in Section 5.2, FSMC [95] is used to model Rayleigh fading in the
control channel for reporting local sensing decisions. In Rayleigh fading, the received
SNR γ is exponentially distributed with distribution fΓ(γ) =
1
γ̄
e−γ/γ̄ , where γ̄ is
the average received SNR. The probability of received SNR γ that stays in SNR
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γ̄ . Since the bit error rate of BPSK modulation
in additive white Gaussian noise is Q(
√
2γ), the crossover probability of the BSC











































where the second equality is obtained by canceling intermediate γj terms and the last
equality is obtained by using A0 = 0 and A∞ =∞.
Let Dn be the set of selected CR users for data fusion in episode n and Kn = |Dn|.
Let the false alarm probability of CR user i be P if , the detection probability P
i
d, and
the average CCC reporting error probability P ie in (5.34). For CR user i to report
a false alarm in CCC fading, there are two possibilities: 1) a false alarm (ui = 1)
is reported and received at FC with no error, and 2) correct local decision ui = 0 is
reported and received at FC in error (ui = 1) due to CCC fading. The false alarm
probability for local decisions reported by CR user i via fading CCC and perceived
by FC is then P if(1− P ie) + (1− P if)P ie . Similarly, we can find the probability of CR
user i with correct local decisions under H0 received at FC as (1−P if )(1−P ie)+P ifP ie .


























where P lfe = P
l
f(1 − P le) + (1 − P lf)P le and Pmfe = (1 − Pmf )(1 − Pme ) + Pmf Pme are
the probability of CR user l’s error reporting and CR user m’s correct reporting,
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respectively, perceived at the FC, Li is the set of the ℓ selected CR users with received





combinations, andMi = {D\Li} is the set of the rest of Kn − ℓ CR users with
correctly received local decisions under H0 from the ith combination. For the majority
decision rule, ℓ ranges from ⌈Kn/2⌉ to Kn. Similarly, the detection probability for






























where P lde = P
l
d(1− P le) + (1− P ld)P le and Pmde = (1− Pmd )(1− Pme ) + Pmd Pme .
5.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed RLCS scheme by showing
the convergence the RLCS algorithm, the improvement of detection probability, and
the adaptability to environmental changes.
5.5.1 Simulation Environment
We consider a CR user (the FC) and its 9 neighbors deployed in a 600m × 600m
square area placed in the first quadrant of the Cartesian coordinate system. A PU
with rb = 0.3 and rd = 0.2 at 900MHz is located at (0, 0). The FC is located at
(500, 500) and its neighbors are located within 40 meters of the FC’s location. For
channel model and sensing parameters, we set γpl = 3.1 for path loss, noise uncertainty
σ0 = 6dB and lognormal dB-spread σ1 = 6dB in (5.1), decaying coefficient a = 0.1204
in (5.2) for urban settings, and local detection threshold λth = 0.2 dB for all CR
users. The FSMC model for independent Rayleigh fading CCC consists of 1024 SNR
regions in which the range of each SNR region is 0.1 dB. We set the CR user transmit
power to 20mW with path loss exponent γpl = 4.1. For data fusion at the FC, hard
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combinations of local decisions with the majority rule are used. With these settings,
the CR users are approximately located at the boundary of the protected region of
the PU. At this border location, the received power is close to the noise floor set
to −101 dBm. Thus, cooperative sensing is essential for CR users to improve their
detection performance.
Table 5.1 lists one of random deployments of an agent (ID 0) and 9 cooperating
CR users. The cooperating CR users are randomly deployed around the agent. The
PU not shown in the Table is located at the origin (0, 0). From their coordinates,
one can find that CR users 1, 7, and 8 are strongly correlated. CR users 6 and 9 are
correlated as well as CR users 3 and 5. In addition, each cooperating CR user has
different sensing report delay and sensing schedule, and may change its location over
time. For illustration purpose, the location, sensing report delay, and schedule priority
of these CR users are assumed to be fixed in this scenario. From the table, the order
of CR user sensing report delay is {3, 6, 8, 7, 2, 1, 5, 4, 9} while the schedule priority is
{6, 4, 5, 3, 9, 8, 2, 1, 7}. For example, CR user 3 has the smallest sensing delay among
all cooperating CR users and CR user 6, if selected, is the first CR user to report
local decisions. By using RLCS, we can obtain the optimal solution including the
optimal set of cooperating CR users in the sensing report order: {6, 4, 3, 8, 2} with
the total sensing report delay 29.58ms. Compared to the full cooperation by all 9
neighbors, which requires total delay 79.35ms, a 63% saving of cooperative sensing
time is obtained in this case. It is also more energy-efficient (up to 44% saving) since
only selected neighbors (optimal 5 < total 9 CR users) are required to perform local
sensing and report their results for each round of cooperation. Thus, the detection
performance, sensing delay, and energy efficiency of RL-based cooperative sensing
are all considerably improved from the cooperation by all neighbors under correlated
shadowing.
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Table 5.1: Location, Reporting Delay, and Schedule Priority of CR Users
ID x-coord y-coord Delay (ms) Priority
0 500 500 - -
1 485 514 11.38 8
2 502 494 4.67 7
3 504 512 2.72 4
4 489 486 14.81 2
5 506 514 12.80 3
6 501 532 3.15 1
7 486 515 4.60 9
8 487 513 4.24 6
9 503 534 20.99 5
5.5.2 Convergence of RLCS Algorithm
Figure 5.4 shows the expected cumulative rewards with N = 1000, τ0 = 1, and
τN = 0.01, for Q-learning, Sarsa, and Action-Critic TD learning strategies over 1000
runs. Interested readers may refer to Appendix B for an introduction to these TD
learning algorithms. The sublinear convergence of RLCS (both with and without
optimal stopping) is evident. The maximum value R∗ is obtained by (5.16). For
both cases, Q-learning converges to the optimal value while the other two settle for a
suboptimal value due to more exploitation than exploration in early stages (n < 500).
All three methods show significant improvement in Rn with optimal stopping.
5.5.3 Detection Performance
Figure 5.5 shows the improvement of detection performance (both Qd and Qf ) under
Poisson and bursty PU traffic during the RLCS process. Qd and Qf are averaged over
the most recent 500 cooperative decisions at the FC. The detection performance of
full cooperation case (FCS) is approximately the same for all episodes. It is evident
that Qd of RLCS is gradually improved and reaches above 0.9 after 3000 episodes,
significant improvement over FCS. The initial large Qf of RLCS is attributed to
non-optimal CR user selections at the beginning of learning during the exploration
phase. However, Qf is constantly decreasing and considerably reduced to 0.025 to be
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Figure 5.4: Expected Cumulative Rewards of RL-Based Cooperative Sensing.
comparable to Qf of FCS at the end. Thus, with RLCS, the detection performance
improves as soon as the learning from the environment takes effect. Figure 5.6 shows
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of FCS and RLCS in correlated
shadowing and possible user movement and CCC fading. We see that the cooperative
gain achieved by FCS in independent shadowing is compromised by correlated shad-
owing with Qd dropping from 0.97 to 0.85 at Qf = 0.1. The detection performance
of full cooperation in independent shadowing is attainable only when all cooperating
CR users are uncorrelated. However, with RLCS, Qd is increased to 0.91. Hence,
RLCS scheme is effective in combating correlated shadowing.
5.5.4 Adaptability to Environmental Change
With the learning capability, the RLCS algorithm is able to adapt to changes in the
environment. In this subsection, we evaluate the adaptability of RLCS based on the
changes of PU activity, user location, user reliability, and fading control channel.
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Figure 5.5: Improvement of Qd/Qf during RLCS and Adaptability to Random and
Bursty PU Traffic.















FCS (Corr. Shadowing, Movement)
RLCS (Corr. Shadowing, Movement)
RLCS (Corr. Shadowing, CCC Fading)
Figure 5.6: ROC of FCS and RLCS in Correlated Shadowing with Possible User
Movement and Control Channel Fading.
5.5.4.1 PU Activity Changes
Figure 5.5 shows adaptability to PU activity changes for different PU traffic types in
addition to constant improvement in detection performance. To manifest the effect
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of PU activity changes on detection performance, we generate bursty PU traffic by
staying in either PU state with high probability for a period that spans a random
number of episodes, and toggling the ON/OFF states with low probability. As seen
in the figure, Qd is improved mostly during the period of active PU while the Qf is
primarily improved during the period of no PU activity. For this reason, Qf = 0 dur-
ing the first 500 episodes. Thus, RLCS is adaptable to PU activities and consistently
improves detection performance in arbitrary PU traffic patterns.
5.5.4.2 User Movement
In this test scenario, a CR user with independent observations at original location
moves to a new location (distance 33.12m) at the pedestrian speed 1.25m/s. Since
it takes 26.5 s to reach the destination, the movement spans 133 RLCS episodes for
cooperative sensing period of 200ms. Since this movement incurs correlation with
other CR users, the optimal solution is changed accordingly when the algorithm con-
verges. Figure 5.6 shows the ROC curve before and after the movement for both
FCS and RLCS. For Qf = 0.1, Qd of FCS drops from 0.85 to below 0.8 after the
movement while Qd of RLCS is slightly improved due to the selection of all uncorre-
lated CR users. This shows the capability of RLCS adapting to user movement while
maintaining detection performance.
5.5.4.3 User Reliability
Figure 5.7 shows the KL distance curve of an unreliable CR user, the average KL
distance values of all reliable users, and the detection threshold δKL = µδ + 2σδ over
5000 episodes. The low KL values before episode 1000 indicate that the CR user is
normally a reliable user. Its KL value is dramatically increased after the user becomes
unreliable in episode 1000. It is detected and removed from the set of cooperation
in episode 1391 when its KL value exceeds the threshold δKL. When the CR user
becomes reliable again, its KL distance is gradually reduced. After its KL distance
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Figure 5.7: Average and User KL Distance Values for Detection of Unreliable Users.






























Figure 5.8: Theoretical and Empirical Detection Performance (Qd/Qf) versus Aver-
age Error Probability (Pe) on Fading Control Channel.
meets the threshold in episode 4016, the user may be selected by the FC again for
cooperation.
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5.5.4.4 Fading Control Channel
We first compare the detection performance obtained by simulations with that ob-
tained by using (5.35) and (5.36). Local Pd and Pf are set to 0.7633 and 0.1466,
respectively, for all CR users. This corresponds to Qd = 0.91 and Qf = 0.025, re-
spectively, with Pe = 0. The results are obtained in episode 5000 when the optimal
solution is reached, and are averaged over 10 runs. Figure 5.8 shows the theoreti-
cal and empirical detection performance versus Pe ranging from 0 to 0.5 on fading
control channel. The simulation results follow the theoretical curves closely for both
Qd and Qf . Figure 5.6 also shows the ROC curve of RLCS with fading CCC versus
perfect CCC. The detection performance of the fading CCC is similar to that of the
perfect CCC case with slight degradation (Qf = 0.0255, Qd = 0.9027). Thus, RLCS




JAMMING-RESILIENT CONTROL CHANNELS FOR
INTRUSION DEFENSE
6.1 Motivation
In the previous two chapters, we introduce ERCC and RLCS to address issues of the
responsiveness to PU activities and the robustness to channel impairments, respec-
tively. In this chapter, we aim to address the issue of resilience to jamming attacks.
As in any wireless network, security attack can cause severe damage to CR ad hoc
networks. Among all types of security attacks, control channel jamming is known to
be an efficient and effective way for intelligent attackers to result in DoS. Regardless
of the challenges of CCC establishment and recovery in licensed bands, control chan-
nel jamming poses additional challenges to control channel reliability and security in
CR ad hoc networks.
Common approaches to combating control channel jamming in wireless networks
are duplicate control messages on multiple control channels [15,86], random key distri-
bution to hide CCC locations [15,86,87], and channel hopping [47]. To reduce control
overhead, the duplicate control channel allocations should be minimized. Moreover,
as pointed out in [94], channel hopping should adapt to attackers’ jamming strategies
because a fixed channel hopping sequence may be easily deciphered by intelligent
attackers. Thus, in response to attacker’s intelligence, CR users must be equipped
with learning capability to develop their own defense strategies [51].
The interactions between CR users and attackers are commonly modeled as a
stochastic zero-sum game [50, 94, 106] since CR users and attackers generally have
opposite goals. In these approaches, PU activities govern states of the game and
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state transitions, and sensing errors are generally ignored for simplicity. In [50],
the Nash equilibrium strategy is obtained for the one-stage game, while the optimal
attacking strategy is obtained for the multi-stage case. The latter is achieved by fixing
CR user’s strategy and converting the problem to the framework of the single-player
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). [106] shows that CR users
can combat jamming by increasing the number of unoccupied channels that can be
observed. However, this capability is limited by PU activity and channel availability.
In [94], minimax-Q learning is used by CR users to find the optimal anti-jamming
channel selection policy. Although CR users’ actions consist of separate selections of
control and data channels, attackers in this work, like those in [50] and [106], do not
exclusively target at jamming control channels and consider the impact of spectrum
sensing errors on CR users and attackers.
To address these challenges, we model the interactions of intelligent attackers and
CR users in their jamming regions under the impact of PU activities as a stochastic
general-sum game, called jamming-resilient control channel (JRCC) game, and select
the optimal control channel allocation strategies by using an enhanced multiagent
reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm, called JRCC algorithm. The objective
of the game is to find the optimal control channel allocation strategy for CR users
to combat jamming attacks by using JRCC algorithm. The optimal control channel
allocation policy is obtained by enabling the communications among CR users to
facilitate CCC allocations and the adaptation to PU activity to achieve the Nash
equilibrium in the game.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the JRCC game with a PU and a CR ad hoc network at-
tacked by spatially distributed attackers. The circle centered at each attacker is
its effective jamming region. It is for attackers’ benefits such as energy saving to
minimize the overlapping areas of the jamming regions. As a result, we focus on one
jamming region where one attacker jams the control channels established between CR
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users inside its jamming region in this work. We demonstrate that the effectiveness
of jamming-resilient CCC allocations can be improved by the proposed cooperative
intrusion defense strategies that utilize the cooperation of CR users such as action
strategy coordination with variable learning rates, best-effort cooperative sensing,
and scalable CR user deployment. Our enhanced JRCC algorithm combats jamming
under a wide range of PU activities and spectrum sensing errors by exploiting the
advantages of both Policy Hill-Climbing (PHC) and PHC-Win-or-Learn-Fast (PHC-
WoLF) multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms [10], and outperforms
these original MARL algorithms.
In Section 6.2, we discuss the JRCC system model and assumptions. In Sec-
tion 6.3, we describe the JRCC game, its gradient dynamics, the convergence of the
game, and the proposed JRCC algorithm. In Section 6.4, we analyze the impact of PU
activity and spectrum sensing errors on jamming resilience of CR users and jamming
strength of the attacker. In Section 6.5, we present and analyze the proposed coop-
erative intrusion defense strategies for improving jamming resilience. In Section 6.6,
we evaluate the performance of jamming resilience of CR users and jamming strength
of the attacker in the JRCC game. In Appendix A, we tabulate the variables and
notations used in this Chapter in Table A.5 and A.6 for reference. Our contributions
of this study are summarized as follows:
• We model the interactions among CR users and the attacker under the impact
of PU activities and spectrum sensing errors as a stochastic general-sum game,
analyze its gradient dynamics, and show Nash equilibriums and the convergence
of the game.
• We propose the JRCC algorithm with cooperative intrusion defense strategies
as optimal strategies to significantly enhance jamming resilience of CR users by





Figure 6.1: Jamming-Resilient Control Channel Game.
• We analyze the impact of PU activities and the effect of spectrum sensing
errors on CR users and attackers, and the effectiveness of intrusion defense
strategies including action coordination, best-effort cooperative sensing, and
CR user deployment density and scalability.
6.2 JRCC System Model
The JRCC system model consists of a primary network model, a CR ad hoc network
model, and a jamming attack model. The interactions among these users are modeled
as a general-sum stochastic game. Interested readers may refer to Appendix C for
a summary of stochastic game. The JRCC system model is described in detail as
follows.
Primary Network Model : The primary network P consists of Np PUs and a set
of Np licensed channels, Np. These channels are available for opportunistic access
by CR users in an area larger than the jamming region A. Each licensed channel
i ∈ Np is occupied by one PU, Pi, whose activity follows the two-state birth-death
process with birth rate rbi and death rate rdi . The departures and the arrivals of a
PU on channel i follow a Poisson process with exponentially distributed inter-arrival
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time. Thus, each channel i has two states, PU active (ON) state and PU inactive
(OFF) state, with transition probabilities: rbi (OFF to ON) and rdi (ON to OFF).







, respectively. PU transmissions are assumed to be time-slotted.
Thus, the players of the game including CR users and attackers need to periodically
sense licensed channels according to the schedule of the primary network. Since the
sensing operations are subject to errors, we assume that CR users and attackers are
required to satisfy the detection requirements in terms of probability of false alarm
Pf and probability of miss detection Pm to limit the interference with PUs under a
tolerable level.
CR Ad Hoc Network Model : A group of K CR users, K, are uniformly deployed
with density DK in the jamming region A and opportunistically access Np licensed
channels with the objective to establish valid control channels for rendezvous. We
assume that CR users are able to observe all the channel states by wideband spectrum
sensing. However, CR users may choose a subset of channels for transmission due
to energy-saving consideration. As a result, after observing the channel states by
spectrum sensing, CR user Ki ∈ K selects Nk available channels as control channels
for control transmission. Limited by hardware capability, CR users can only sense
or transmit on Ns ≤ Np licensed channels each time, and select a subset of available
channels, Nk ⊆ Np, as control channels, and transmit the same control messages on
those selected channels, where Nk = |Nk| ≤ Ns. We assume that all control messages
are encrypted and are unable to be deciphered by eavesdropping attackers during the
period of the game. After the rendezvous and control message exchange on these
CCCs, the CR user pair can use the in-band CCCs for channel negotiation or data
transmission.
Jamming Attack Model : A group of J intelligent attackers, J , equipped with
similar hardware capability as CR users are uniformly deployed with density DK in
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A. The main objective of attackers is to disrupt CR control transmission. Similar to
CR users, attackers can only sense or transmit on Ns ≤ Np licensed channels each
time. Each attacker j ∈ J selects a subset of channels, Nj ⊆ Np and Nj = |Nj| ≤ Ns,
and transmits jamming signals on those selected channels. We assume that attackers
will make efforts to avoid interfering with PUs to save their energy and avoid being
exposed to PUs unless the interference is caused by the limitation of sensing hardware.
To achieve this, attackers are also required to satisfy the requirements of Pf and Pm
such that they appear to PUs as CR users. Moreover, we assume that attackers do
not behave like PUs to occupy the channels because CR users can easily detect these
attackers with spectrum sensing and select other channels for control transmission.
We further assume that attackers are unable to effectively launch control channel
jamming attacks after CCCs are established because such attacks require the prior
knowledge about CR users and the in-band CCCs are also used for data transmission.
For these reasons, security attacks such as PU emulation attacks [17] and node capture
attacks [87] are beyond the scope of this work.
6.3 Multiagent Jamming-Resilient Control Channel Game
In this section, we discuss the JRCC game that models the interactions among play-
ers. We first introduce the definitions of CCCs, control links, jamming resilience,
and jamming strength. We then present the elements of the JRCC game, gradient
dynamics analysis, and the proposed JRCC algorithm.
6.3.1 Jamming Resilience and Jamming Strength
We first define valid CCCs and jammed CCCs in JRCC game. Let Pi and Pj be the
transmission power of CR user i and attacker j, respectively. If CR user i ∈ K sends
control messages to CR user k ∈ K, i 6= k, in a PU-free channel subject to jamming
attacks from attacker j. The signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) γk at CR
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where hik and hjk are the channel gain between CR users i and k, and between
attacker j and CR user k, respectively, and σ2 is the noise power. Thus, we have the
following definitions of valid and jammed CCCs:
Definition 6.1. (Valid Common Control Channel) A valid CCC cv is a control
channel established between two CR users i, k ∈ K that satisfies (i) cv /∈ Dp, (ii)
cv ∈ (Ni ∩Nk), and (iii) γi, γk ≥ γth where Dp is the set of channels occupied by PUs
and γth is the SINR threshold for decoding control messages.
Based on this definition, we can define a selected CCC cs between two CR users
as a control channel that satisfies condition (ii), but may not satisfy conditions (i)
and (iii). In the perfect spectrum sensing cases with no spectrum sensing errors, a
selected CCC also satisfies condition (i) in Definition 6.1.
Definition 6.2. (Jammed Common Control Channel) A jammed CCC cj is a control
channel selected by CR users i, k ∈ K and jammed by attacker j ∈ J that satisfies
(i) cj /∈ Dp, (ii) cj ∈ {Ni ∩ Nj ∩ Nk}, and (iii) γi < γth or γk < γth.
Let Uc, Nc, Pc, and Jc be the number of valid CCCs, selected CCCs, PU-occupied
selected CCC, and jammed CCCs, respectively, between two CR users. We can find







Nc − Pc − Jc, if Nc > Pc + Jc,
0, if Nc = 0 or Nc = Pc + Jc.
(6.2)
We can now define valid, invalid, and jammed control links as follows.
Definition 6.3. (Control Link) A control link between two CR users i, k ∈ K is (i)
valid if Uc > 0, (ii) invalid if Uc = 0 and Jc = 0, and (iii) jammed if Uc = 0 and
Jc > 0.
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To evaluate the performance of CR users and attackers, we are interested in know-
ing how many valid and jammed CCC links in the jamming region in each stage and
in the long run. Thus, we define the jamming resilience of a CR ad hoc network and
the jamming strength of an attacker as follows.
Definition 6.4 (Jamming Resilience). The jamming resilience of CR users in CR ad
hoc network K is defined as the long-term average ratio of the number of established
control links to the number of all possible control links in jamming region A given by










where CtK is the number of valid CCC links established in stage t and L
t
K is the
number of possible CCC links for establishment in the jamming region of the attacker
j in stage t.







if K CR users are located in the jamming region and
within the transmission rage of each other.
Definition 6.5 (Jamming Strength). The jamming strength of attackers is defined
as the long-term average ratio of the number of jammed control links to the number
of all possible control links in jamming region A given by










where DtK is the number of jammed CCC links in stage t.
Note that CtK is generally not equal to L
t
K −DtK because an invalid CCC link can
be caused by something other than jamming such as spectrum sensing errors or two
neighboring CR users choosing different sets of channels. Thus, ψ(A) 6= 1− ζ(A).
6.3.2 Elements of JRCC Game
The JRCC game Γ is a general-sum stochastic game with N players including K CR
users and J attackers (in our case, N = K+J where J = 1), which can be represented
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by the 4-tuples Γ = 〈S,A, fp, fR〉 where S is the state space, A is the action space, fp
is the transition probability function, and fR is the reward function vector as follows.
States : The states of the JRCC game are the channel states ofNp licensed channels
determined by the PU activity of primary network P. The state space is then S =
×iSi where Si = {0, 1} is the set of channel states of channel i, i = 1, . . . , Np. If
the state of channel i in stage t is denoted by sti, the state of the game at stage t is
st = {st1, . . . , stNp}. Here sti = 1 if channel i is occupied by PU Pi at stage t and sti = 0
if channel i is available. Thus, there are total 2Np states in the game.
Actions : The action space A is the set of joint action spaces of all states given by
A = {A(1), . . . ,A(2Np)} where A(s) is the joint action space of all players in state
s. A(s) is then given by A(s) = ×nAn(s) where An(s) is the set of actions available
to player n in state s. An action is a subset of all available channels selected by a
player for transmission. Each player n selects an action atn in each stage t according
to a mixed strategy πtn(s) ∈ ∆(An(s)), where ∆(x) is the probability distribution of
x, after observing state s by spectrum sensing. The number of actions available in







, where C(s) is the number of available
channels in state s and L(s) is the minimum number of C(s) and Ns.
Transition Probabilities : The transition probability function is defined as fp :
S × A → ∆(S). Since the state transitions are governed by PU activity and all




i = j | sti = k), j, k ∈ {0, 1} where P(st+1i | sti) is the probability of state
transitions from state sti to s
t+1
i on channel i, which are P(s
t+1
i = 1 | sti = 0) = rbi ,
P(st+1i = 0 | sti = 0) = 1 − rbi, P(st+1i = 0 | sti = 1) = rdi, and P(st+1i = 1 | sti = 1) =
1− rdi, depending on the PU ON/OFF status of the given state.
Rewards : The reward function vector is defined as fR = {fRn}N1 where fRn =
S × A → R is the reward function of player n. In each stage t, player n receives
reward rtn for the selected action a
t
n in state s. The reward is the result of the joint
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action (at1, . . . , a
t
N) selected by the joint strategy (π
t
1, . . . , π
t
N). Thus, the objective of
the game for each player n is to find the optimal strategy π∗n to maximize its average
reward Rπn given by

































where Rtn is the expected reward in stage t and r
t
n is player n’s immediate reward
received in stage t. Since CR users are rewarded for establishing valid CCC links
while attackers are rewarded for successfully jamming selected CCCs, the immediate







I{Ck,i > 0}, (6.7)
where Bk is the number of CR user k’s neighbors, I{x} is the indicator function that
equals 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise, and Ck,j is the number of valid CCCs allocated







I{Dj,i > 0 and Ck,i = 0}, (6.8)
where LK is the number of CR links subject to jamming in the jamming region of
attacker j, and Dj,i is the number of jammed CCCs in the i-th control link.
6.3.3 Gradient Dynamics Analysis
In the JRCC game, the interactions among all players can be modeled as a nonlinear
dynamical system in which the dynamics lies in the gradient of the joint strategy.
Similar to [10, 80], we examine the dynamics of the JRCC game using the gradi-
ent ascent and show that the players’ strategies or expected payoffs will converge.
Unlike [10, 80], we focus on the dynamics of an N -player JRCC game with K CR
users and one attacker. For simplicity, we assume perfect spectrum senisng and full
observations of PU states with no state change.
115
In stage t of the game, each player n, n = 1, . . . , N , chooses action atn,m ∈ An(s),
m = 1, . . . ,M in state s where M = |An(s)|. This indicates that player n selects the
m-th subset of PU-free channels for CCC allocation if the player is a CR user or for




n,m = 1} be player n’s
action selection strategy in stage t where πtn,m is the probability of choosing action
atn,m. According to the joint strategy (π
t
1, . . . , π
t
N), the immediate reward of player n




1, . . . , π
t
N ). Thus, the expected reward R
t
n of
player n can be expressed as
Rn(π
t










1, . . . , π
t
N ). (6.9)
The gradient ascent algorithm provides the mechanism for a player to achieve the
optimal solution by iteratively adjusting its strategy with a sufficiently small step
size. In the gradient ascent using variable learning rates [10], the changes in expected











, n = 1, . . . , N (6.10)
where xtn = [π
t
n,1, . . . , π
t
n,M−1]






n > 0 are the learning
rates, and (αtδtn) are the step sizes for updating strategy x
t




the changes in player n’s expected reward in response to the changes in the strategy
xtn in the direction of the gradient. They are obtained by taking the partial derivatives
of each player’s expected reward with respect to its strategy. When the step sizes
are sufficiently small, the dynamics of the strategy changes can be formulated as a
constrained nonlinear affine dynamical system with differential equations defined as
ẋ = ∆(Ax+ b+ c(x)) (6.11)
subject to the unit-hypercube constraints:
x ∈ [0, 1]N(M−1), (6.12)
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where x = [x1, . . . ,xN ]
T, ∆ = [δ1, . . . , δN ]IN(M−1), AN(M−1)×N(M−1) and bN(M−1)×1
are matrices whose elements are the functions of rewards rtn,m, and c(x)N(M−1)×1 are
the remainder functions of x that contains higher-order products of x1, . . . ,xN . The
constraints limit the strategies inside the unit hypercube because every strategy in the
N -tuples is a probability distribution represented by a point in the (M − 1)-simplex.
The system can be linearized at a fixed point x∗ if it has a solution x∗ [4]. If we
let r = ‖x − x∗‖2, c(x)/r approach 0 faster than r as r → 0. Combined with the
change of variable y = x− x∗, we obtain the homogeneous linear system:
ẏ = ∆Jy (6.13)
subject to the unit-hypercube constraints:
y ∈ [0, 1]N(M−1), (6.14)
where J = JF|x=(x∗1,...,x∗N ), and JF is the partial derivative (Jacobian matrix) of F(x) =
[F1, . . . ,FN(M−1)]


























The phase portraits of the non-linear system and its linearized system are considered
qualitatively equivalent in the neighborhood of x∗. Based on the analysis of gradient
dynamics, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 (Convergence Theorem of JRCC Game). For the N-player general-
sum JRCC game, if the players follow the gradient ascent algorithm with variable
learning rates and a sufficiently small step size, the strategy N-tuples (x1, . . . ,xN) will
converge to a Nash equilibrium or the expected rewards of the players will converge to
the expected rewards of a Nash equilibrium in the limit.
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Proof. We examine the coefficient matrix J of the linear dynamical system (6.13)
with the constraints (6.14), and show that the strategies will either converge to the
fixed points of the system inside the unit hypercube or the expected rewards of the
strategies will converge to those of a Nash point on the boundary of the hypercube.
Since the variable learning rates in ∆ have no effect on the direction of the gradient,
we focus on the eigenanalysis of J in the following two cases.
1) J is singular: In this case, the system is neutrally stable and the trajectories
in the phase portrait exhibit periodic patterns and the strategy N -tuples are periodic
functions of time. Thus, there exists a periodic point x∗ such that
Pt(x∗) = x∗, ∀t ∈ Z+, (6.15)
where P is the first recurrence map known as Poincaré map. Since this periodicity
in the strategies is predictable and not desired by either CR users or the attacker
in the JRCC game, CR users and the attacker will enforce the system to stay away
from neutrally stable states in order to make their strategies unpredictable. Players
in these situations may reset their strategies to the initial or uniform distribution in
order to avoid the periodicity and maximize the uncertainty of the strategies.
2) J is nonsingular: In this case, J is invertible and all the eigenvalues of J have
nonzero real part. The system has hyperbolic fixed points: the phase portraits of the
non-linear system and its linearization are qualitatively equivalent in the neighbor-
hood of the fixed points. Let nu and ns be the number of eigenvalues with positive
and negative real parts, respectively. These eigenvalues are associated with the cor-
responding unstable eigenspaces V u ∈ Rnu and stable eigenspaces V s ∈ Rns of eJt,
respectively. Trajectories in the phase portrait are moving away from the fixed point
in V u and approaching the fixed point in V s as t increases. Since nu+ns = N(M−1),
we have the following subcases: nu = 0, . . . , N(M − 1). For nu = 0, the fixed point
is an attracting node and the strategy converges to this Nash point. For nu > 0 and
nu < N(M−1), trajectories are saddle points pointing inwards with a focus in V s and
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outwards along V u. For nu = N(M − 1), the fixed point is an N(M − 1)-dimensional
star node pointing outwards.
Due to the constraints (6.12), points on the trajectories away from the fixed point
will initially reach a point on the boundary of the unit hypercube. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the point is on one of the n-faces, n ≤ N(M − 1). If the
projection of the gradient is zero at that point, the trajectory will stay on the point.
It is a Nash point of the game since no user can improve its payoffs by changing the
strategy unilaterally. If the projected gradient is nonzero, the trajectory moves toward
one of the (n − 1)-faces of the hypercube in the direction depending on the sign of
the projected gradient and reaches a point on the (n−1)-faces. The process will stop
at any point where the projected gradient is zero or continue to move toward lower
dimensional faces until the trajectory reaches one of the vertices of the hypercube
(n = 1). Thus, (x1, . . . ,xN) converges to a Nash equilibrium or its expected rewards
converge to the expected rewards of a Nash point.
6.3.4 JRCC Algorithm
The gradient ascent algorithm in Section 6.3.3 requires the knowledge of rewards
for all combinations of joint actions and the distributions of other players’ actions
available to each player. However, obtaining such knowledge in the JRCC game is
infeasible. Due to the limitation of transmission capability, players’ actions are only
partially observable by other players. As a result, not all rewards can be obtained for
all joint actions. More importantly, CR users and the attacker will not reveal their
own action selection strategies. For these reasons, we propose the JRCC algorithm
capable of selecting actions based on limited observations, updating strategy similar
to gradient ascent, and obtaining the best response for each CR user individually.
The JRCC algorithm enables the cooperation between CR users with low control
message overhead to facilitate CCC allocations, and adapts to PU activities and
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jamming in extremely hostile environment by using the variable learning rates based
on PHC and the WoLF principle [10]. When PU activity is low, the JRCC algorithm
behaves like a rational hill-climbing algorithm that converges to a greedy strategy
to maximize the payoffs. The performance is further improved by action strategy
coordination between CR users with the exchange of a few system parameters on the
established CCCs to facilitate the establishment of CCCs in future stages since their
strategies for CCC selections become similar. When PU activity is high, the available
CCCs under jamming attacks can be very limited, which makes the cooperation less
effective. In this case, the WoLF principle can adjust the learning rates such that
the players learn slowly to delay the strategy change of the opponent (“winning”) or
learn fast when they are outperformed by the opponent (“losing”). In addition, CR
users can share local sensing decisions with neighbors to combat spectrum sensing
errors and improve jamming resilience by best-effort cooperative sensing. They can
also enhance jamming resilience of the network by increasing the density of CR users
in the jamming area since JRCC algorithm is distributed and scalable.
The JRCC algorithm is listed in Algorithm 6.1. In each stage, each CR user
selects an action that maps to a set of selected channels as CCCs for transmission,
and obtains its own reward by observing the conditions of selected CCCs. (line 3–
5). For action strategy coordination, each CR user broadcasts the control message
with the parameters recorded in previous stage, and updates its strategy with the
parameters received from neighbors (line 6–10). After the PU changes the state of
the game, CR users observe the next state s′ by sensing the channels (line 11). If
any CCC exists, CR users exchange local sensing decisions with neighbors and make
cooperative decisions individually by best-effort cooperative sensing (line 12–16). CR
users then update their Q values of current state s and action ai (line 11-17). By
selecting the proper learning rate δ (line 18–22), CR users update their own strategy
(line 23). The value of δ is set to the maximum for greedy strategy and a variable
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Algorithm 6.1 : JRCC Algorithm for CR user i ∈ K
1: Initialize: α, γ, ǫ, δi ∈ (0, 1], Q(s, a)← 0, π(s, a)← 1|Ai|
2: for each stage t do
3: Select ai ∈ Ai in state s per π(s) with w.p. 1− ǫ
4: Transmit on channels: {Ch : ai 7→ Ni}
5: Observe Uc, Nc, Pc, Jc and calculate reward ri
6: if (Uc > 0 and ∃ãi) then
7: BroadcastToNeighbors(s̃, ãi, δ̃i)
8: ReceiveFromNeighbors(s̃, ãm, δm, m ∈ K, m 6= i)
9: StrategyUpdate(π(s̃, a), ãm, δ̃m)
10: end if
11: Observe next state s′ ← SensingChannels(Ns,i)
12: if (Uc > 0) then
13: BroadcastToNeighbors(s′)
14: ReceiveFromNeighbors(s′m, m ∈ K, m 6= i)
15: s′ ← BestEffortCoopSensing(s′, s′m)
16: end if





18: if ri ≥ rth then
19: δi = δmax
20: else
21: δi = WoLF(C(s), π(s, a), π̄(s, a), Q(s, a))
22: end if
23: StrategyUpdate(π(s, a), a′ = argmaxbQ(s, b), δi)
24: if (Uc > 0) then s̃← s, ãi ← a′, δ̃i ← δi end if
25: UpdateParameters(α, γ, δi), s← s′
26: end for
value from the WoLF principle. The parameters s̃, ãi, and δ̃i for the current greedy
strategy are recorded to be broadcast in the next stage (line 24).
The strategy update and WoLF procedures are listed in Algorithm 6.2. For PHC
strategy updates, the probability of the best action is increased while the probabilities
of other actions are evenly decreased (line 1-9). For variable learning rates, the slow
learning rate δw is selected for the “winning” case if the average Q value of the best
action a′ based on current policy π is larger than that based on average policy π̄, and
the fast learning rate δl is selected otherwise (line 10-18).
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Algorithm 6.2 : Strategy Update and WoLF Procedures for JRCC Algorithm
1: procedure StrategyUpdate(π(s, a), a′, δ)




3: if a 6= a′ then






8: π(s, a)← π(s, a) + ∆sa
9: end procedure
10: procedure WoLF (C(s), π(s, a), π̄(s, a), Q(s, a))
11: C(s)← C(s) + 1
12: π̄(s, a)← π̄(s, a) + 1
C(s)
(
π(s, a)− π̄(s, a)
)








14: δi = δwi
15: else




In this section, we investigate JRCC performance and corresponding defense strategies
under the impact of PU activities, spectrum sensing errors, CR user cooperation, and
CR user deployment.
6.4.1 Effects of Primary User Activities
PU activities play the crucial role in the JRCC game as they determine the states of
the game and affect the availability of the licensed channels for CR users to establish
control channels. If players have the perfect observations of PU activities, both CR
users and the attacker will select channels from a smaller subset of available chan-
nels as PU activities increase. As a result, the selected control channels are more
susceptible to jamming attacks, as shown in Proposition 6.1. Although the attacker
may initially benefit from increasing PU activities, its jamming strength is eventually
constricted by high PU activities and an extremely limited number of CCCs available
for jamming, as shown in Proposition 6.2.
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Proposition 6.1. Given the full and perfect observations of channel states by all
players, jamming resilience ψ of CR ad hoc network K decreases as P
on
increases.
Proof. Let CK be the number of established control links. It is a binomial distributed
random variable with distribution function








pic(1− pc)Np−iu(c− i), (6.16)
where u(c) is the unit step function, and pc = P (Uc > 0) is the probability of successful
establishment of a control link given that all control links are independent. Now
we consider any control link between two CR users to be susceptible to jamming
by an attacker. For simplicity, we assume that all players observe the true state
s with no spectrum sensing error, and the selections of all PU-free channels are
equiprobable. Let Cp be the number of PU-free channels in state s, and Cp ≤ Ns for
PU activity-limited scenarios, and recall that Uc, Nc, and Jc are the number of valid
control channels, the selected common channels, and the jammed common channels,





P (Nc=m)P (Jc≤m− 1|Nc=m), (6.17)
where P (Nc = m) is the probability of CR users selecting m common channels for

























and P (Jc ≤ m− 1|Nc = m) is the probability of the attacker jamming at most m− 1


























in the numerator of (6.18) is the number of choices







combinations of selecting i channels out of the rest of Cp −m channels for the same






of the other CR user’s choices of selecting j channels from the remaining Cp −m− i
channels not selected by the first CR user in addition to those m common channels.





in the numerator of (6.19) says which i out of those





is the number of attacker’s
choices of selecting j out of the rest of Cp−m channels in addition to those i jammed
channels. Since the average number of available channels is E[Cp] =
∑Np
i=1(1−P ion) =
(1− Pon)Np, as Pon increases, the average number of Cp decreases. Thus, from (6.2)
to (6.19), we know that pc decreases as Pon increases. From (6.16), we have decreasing
FCK(c) as pc decreases given c and Np. Thus, E[CK] = Nppc decreases accordingly
and, by using (6.3) with fixed LK, the result follows.
Proposition 6.2. Given the full and perfect observations of channel states by all
players, jamming strength ζ of the attacker increases for P
on
≤ pζ and decreases for
P
on
> pζ, pζ ∈ (0, 1) as Pon increases.
Proof. Based on the same assumptions in the proof of Proposition 6.1, let DK be a
binomial distributed random variable counting the number of jammed control links
with distribution function








pij(1− pj)Np−iu(d− i), (6.20)
where u(c) is the unit step function, and pj is the probability of successfully jamming





P (Jc = m|Nc = m)P (Nc = m), (6.21)
where P (Nc = m) is from (6.18) and P (Jc = m|Nc = m) is given by




















is simply the number of attacker’s choices of selecting
j out of the rest of Cp−m channels in addition to m jammed channels. We know that
P (Jc = m|Nc = m) in (6.22) increases as m decreases. As Cp decreases initially due
to increasing Pon, the combinations of channel selections are reduced such that the
probability of successful jamming pj in (6.21) increases. When Cp is small due to high
Pon that limits P (Nc = m) in (6.18) and jamming opportunities P (Jc = m|Nc = m)
in (6.22), pj decreases. Pon = pζ is the point where pj reaches the maximum value.
Thus, pj increases for low and moderate values of Pon, reaches its maximum value
when Pon = pζ, and reduces to zero as Pon approaches one. From E[DK] = Nppj
and (6.4) with fixed LK, the result follows.
6.4.2 Effects of Spectrum Sensing Errors
In addition to the effects of PU activities, spectrum sensing errors can have signif-
icant impact on control channel allocation under jamming attacks. This is because
spectrum sensing determines whether or not the true state of PU activities or channel
availability is observed. Spectrum sensing determines the presence of PUs based on
binary hypothesis testing: the null hypothesis H0 for the absence of PUs and the
alternative hypothesis H1 for the presence of PUs. Its performance is evaluated in
terms of probability of false alarm Pf in H0 and probability of miss detection Pm in
H1. The effects of these two types of sensing errors are discussed as follows.
6.4.2.1 Impact of False Alarms
A false alarm is a type I error that CR users or attackers falsely detect the presence
of PUs when the channel is vacant (determining H1 given H0). In this case, CR
users are mistakenly forced to select CCCs from a much smaller subset of available
channels for allocations, which incurs a higher risk of jamming. In the extreme cases,
they may select channels from exclusive subsets of channels failing to establish any
control link. Moreover, CR user cooperation can be considerably compromised by
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false alarm errors because a single CR user making a false alarm error can result
in different states observed by two CR users and the failure to establish the control
link. Therefore, the impact of false alarm errors on jamming resilience can be quite
significant even if Pf is small. This is shown in Proposition 6.3.
Proposition 6.3. Given Pm = 0 and fixed Pon, the jamming resilience ψ of CR ad
hoc network K decreases as Pf increases.
Proof. We consider the control link between two CR users under the jamming of an
attacker in state s. Let S0 and Sc0 be the set of channels unoccupied and occupied by
PUs, respectively, in true state s, and S0 ∪ Sc0 = Np. Let Nn and N cn be the set of
channels observed by player n to be unoccupied and occupied by PUs, respectively, as
the result of making false alarm errors with probability Pf in each channel. Note that
N cn includes PU-free channels due to false alarm errors, and Nn = S0−Fn, where Fn
is the set of PU-free channels with false alarm errors made by player n. Here player
n is either CR user k, k ∈ {1, 2}, or attacker j.
Let Ns,n be the set of channels selected by player n and Uc be the set of valid
CCCs. If we consider any PU-free channel c ∈ S0, the probability of c being a valid
CCC cv ∈ Uc is





P (c ∈ Ns,k)
]





P (c ∈ Nk)
]





P (c ∈ {S0 − Fk})
]
P (c /∈ {S0 −Fj}) (6.26)
= P
(
c ∈ {S0 − {∪kFk}}
)
P (c ∈ Fj) (6.27)
=
(
1− P (c ∈ {∪kFk})
)
P (c ∈ Fj) (6.28)
The equality in (6.24) follows that cv is a channel selected by both CR users but
not selected by the attacker. Note that the channels in Ns,k do not have false alarm
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errors because CR users consider channels with false alarm errors occupied by PUs.
The equality in (6.25) follows Ns,n ⊆ Nn and the assumption that all players select
all available channels for maximizing the probability of establishing or jamming the
control link. When Pf increases, P (c ∈ Fn) also increases. As a result, P (c ∈
{∪kFk}) decreases while P (c ∈ Fj) increases in (6.28). However, the decrease in
P (c ∈ {∪kFk}) caused by false alarms of at least one CR user is greater than the
increase in P (c ∈ Fj) caused by false alarms of the attacker. Thus, we have P (c ∈ Uc)
decreases as Pf increases, indicating that the probability of establishing this control
link pc decreases as Pf increases. Since this result can be applied to any state s
and any link between two CR users, we conclude from (6.16) and (6.28) that the
average number of successful control links E[CK] = Nppc decreases as Pf increases.
Using (6.3) with fixed LK, the result follows.
6.4.2.2 Impact of Miss Detection
Miss detection is a type II error that CR users or attackers mistakenly detect no pres-
ence of PUs when the PU occupies the channel (determining H0 given H1). Unlike
false alarms, miss detection affects only those PU-occupied channels that are unavail-
able for CR users to establish control links. Thus, the effect of miss detection on CCC
establishment is relatively minor compared to those of false alarms. However, miss
detection still causes performance degradation because channel selections based on
the observed states may include PU-occupied channels that cannot be used for CCCs.
For the attacker, the effect of miss detection is more severe than those of false alarms.
This is because, with limited transmission capability and miss detection errors, the
attacker is more likely to select PU occupied channels to jam. Therefore, jamming is
less effective for higher Pm. This is shown in Proposition 6.4.
Proposition 6.4. Given Pf = 0 and fixed Pon, jamming strength ζ of the attacker
decreases as Pm increases.
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Proof. We consider the control link between two CR users under the jamming of an
attacker in state s. S0 and Sc0 are defined as before. Let Nn and N cn be the set of
channels observed by player n to be unoccupied and occupied by PUs, respectively,
as the result of making miss detection errors with probability Pm in each channel.
Note that Nn includes PU-occupied channels due to miss detection errors, and Nn =
S0 +Mn, where Mn is the set of PU-occupied channels with miss detection errors
made by player n. Here player n is either CR user k, k ∈ {1, 2}, or attacker j.
Let Ns,n be the set of channels selected by player n, and Jc be the set of jammed
CCCs. For successful jamming, a channel cn selected by player n cannot be the one
with the miss detection error. Since player n independently selects channels observed
to be PU-free in Nn, the probability of successfully jamming the control link is








P (cn ∈ Jc)





P (cn ∈ Jc)





P (cn ∈ Jc)
P (cn ∈ S0) + P (cn ∈Mn)
(6.33)
As Pm increases, the denominator of (6.33) increases due to the increase in P (cn ∈
Mn). Moreover, P (cn ∈ Jc) in the numerator of (6.33) decreases as Pm increases.
This is because miss detection errors of any player reduce the number of valid CCCs
established by CR users and jammed by the attacker. Thus, from (6.33), pj decreases
as Pm increases. The analysis can be applied to any state and any control link between
two CR users in the jamming region. From (6.20) and (6.33), we conclude that the
average number of jammed control links E[DK] = Nppj decreases as Pm increases.
Using (6.4) with fixed LK, the result follows.
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6.5 Intrusion Defense Strategies
In this section, we analyze proposed intrusion defense strategies against intelligent
jamming attacks. These countermeasures are action strategy coordination, best-effort
cooperative sensing, and CR user deployment density and scalability as follows.
6.5.1 Action Strategy Coordination
Action strategy coordination (ASC) is a defense mechanism for neighboring CR users
to facilitate the establishment of control channels in future stages and enhance jam-
ming resilience by coordinating their action strategies on established control channels.
The coordination among users is achieved by the exchange of a short control message
that includes coordination parameters: current state s, selected action in this state
a(s), and learning rate δ. CR users update their action selection strategy with their
own coordination parameters and those received from their neighbors. Such strategy
updates increase the levels of similarity in action selection strategies of neighboring
CR users, which increases the probability of selecting commonly available channels
as control channels. We first define the similarity of two strategies in Definition 6.6
by extending the definition in [31] to comparing strategies of different sizes, and then
show that action strategy coordination increases the similarity of CR users’ strategies
in Theorem 6.2.
Definition 6.6 (Similarity of Action Strategies). The similarity of two action strate-
gies: π1(s1) of state s1 and π2(s2) of state s2, is defined as
ξ(π1, π2) = − ‖ f(π1)− f(π2) ‖2, (6.34)
where f : R|A(si)| → R|A(s0)| is a mapping function that maps action space A(si) to
A(s0), A(si) ⊆ A(s0), ∀i, by setting πi,m = 0 for ai,m ∈ A(s0) and ai,m /∈ A(si),
and s0 is the state with no PU activity in all licensed channels. As a special case,
ξ(π1, π2) = − ‖ π1 − π2 ‖2 if s1 = s2.
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Theorem 6.2 (Action Strategy Coordination). Let πi(s) = [xij ], j = 1, . . . , |Ai(s)|,
be the action strategy of CR user i, where xij is the probability of selecting action ai,j in
state s by following πi(s). Given coordination parameters ∆i = (s, ai, δi) for strategy
updates at CR user i, action strategy coordination of JRCC algorithm achieves higher
similarity ξ than strategy updates without coordination.
Proof. Given two strategies: πt1(s) = [x11, . . . , x1m] and π
t
2(s) = [x21, . . . , x2m] of stage









(x2j − x1j)2. (6.35)
Without loss of generality, we let a1 = a1k and a2 = a2n, k, n ∈ {1, . . . , |Ai(s)|}. With-
out strategy coordination, CR user i updates its strategy πti(s) with ∆i. According
to the strategy update procedure in Algorithm 6.1, we have updated strategies as
πt+11 (s) = [x11− δ1m−1 , . . . , x1k+ δ1, . . . , x1m− δ1m−1 ] and πt+12 (s) = [x21− δ2m−1 , . . . , x1n+



























Since the term δ1−δ2
m−1 , (δ1 +
δ2
m−1), and (δ2 +
δ1
m−1) in (6.37) are generally nonzero, we
have ξ(πt+11 , π
t+1




2). The strategies of two CR users become less similar
after strategy updates without coordination. If CR users coordinate strategy updates,
each CR user updates its strategy with both ∆1 and ∆2 in arbitrary order. We then
have updated strategies as πt+1i (s) = [xi1 − δ1+δ2m−1 , . . . , xik + δ1 − δ2m−1 , . . . , xin + δ2 −
δ1






2 ) = −
∑
j
(x2j − x1j)2 = ξ(πt1, πt2) = ξorig. (6.38)
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Therefore, we have ξindv < ξjrcc. That is, ASC maintains the same level of similarity
after the updates, which is higher than ξ values obtained by the updates without ASC.
The proof can be easily generalized to more than two CR users, which is omitted here
due to the lack of space.
In addition to achieving the similarity, ASC increases the probability of selecting
same actions, which generally leads to higher jamming resilience. In the proof of
Theorem 6.2, we know that, after strategy updates with no ASC, the probability of
selecting a1k and a2n is the largest in the strategy of CR user 1 and 2, respectively.
Thus, CR users with no ASC tend to choose different actions that may map to
completely different subsets of channels leading to no common channels for valid
CCC links. For updates with ASC, the probabilities of selecting aik and ain are the
largest among all actions and the probability of choosing either action by both CR
users is comparable. Thus, the probability of choosing the same actions is higher with
ASC, leading to higher probability of selecting common channels. This is shown in
Corollary 6.1:
Corollary 6.1. Let porig, pindv, pjrcc be the probability of selecting same actions before
strategy updates, after updates without ASC, and after updates with ASC, respectively.
Given πi(s) and ∆i = (s, ai, δi) of CR user i, i ∈ {1, 2}, for m = |A(s)| ≫ 1, ASC
achieves higher probability as
pjrcc = porig +
∑
i
(δ1xik + δ2xin + δ
2
i ) > porig (6.39)
= pindv + δ1(x1k + δ1) + δ2(x2n + δ2) > pindv (6.40)
where xik and xin are the probability of CR user i selecting action aik and ain, respec-
tively.
Proof. We continue from the proof of Theorem 6.2 and find the probability of selecting
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Using πt+1i (s) in the previous proof, we obtain the probability of choosing same actions






















































Since m ≫ 1 and 0 < δi ≤ 1, we can approximate (6.42) and (6.43) by remov-
ing δi
m−1 terms. After some algebra manipulation, we obtain (6.39) and (6.40) by
comparing (6.43) with (6.41) and (6.42), respectively.
6.5.2 Best-Effort Cooperative Sensing
In Section 6.4.2, we show the impact of spectrum sensing errors on jamming resilience.
To mitigate such an impact, especially the impact of false alarms, we propose best-
effort cooperative sensing (BCS) as the countermeasure to combat jamming attacks
and enhance jamming resilience by reducing sensing errors. BCS is a distributed
cooperative sensing scheme that CR users make the best efforts to share local sensing
data with neighbors by using control links established in the previous stage yet still
valid in the current stage, and individually make sensing decisions based on any
collected sensing data. Unlike conventional distributed sensing schemes, BCS does not
require the participation of all neighbors or an unanimous decision reached by multiple
iterations of message exchanges. This is because control links between neighbors are
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not guaranteed under PU activities and jamming. Therefore, the number of neighbors
participating in BCS is a random variable that determines the achievable cooperative
probabilities of false alarm Qf and miss detection Qm.
Let Bk be the number of CR users participating in BCS at CR user k. When
Bk = 1, BCS degenerates to local spectrum sensing at CR user k with Qf(1) = Pf
and Qm(1) = Pm. In conventional cooperative sensing, the most popular “K out of
N” data fusion rules for hard combinations of local sensing decisions are AND, OR,
and majority rules [3]. It is known that AND (OR) rule significantly reduces Qf (Qm)
at the cost of increasing Qm (Qf). The majority rule achieves balanced performance
in both Qf and Qm. Thus, we show that BCS with majority rule achieves better
Qf (Bk) performance with the cooperation of arbitrary number of neighbors than
local spectrum sensing in Proposition 6.5.
Proposition 6.5. For Pf , Pm < 0.5 and an odd integer Bk > 2, best-effort cooperative
sensing with the majority rule improves Qf (Bk) from Pf and Qm(Bk) from Pm by
satisfying Qf (Bk + 1), Qf(Bk + 2) < Qf (Bk) < Pf and Qm(Bk + 1), Qm(Bk + 2) <
Qm(Bk) < Pm, respectively.
Proof. We first focus on Qf . Using (5.35) with same Pf for all CR users and no











P ℓf (1− Pf )Bk−ℓ. (6.44)
Bk = 2 is the special case: Qf (2) = (Pf)
2 < Qf (1) = Pf . We prove this by math-
ematical induction in pairs of Bk for Bk > 2 due to the floor function for choos-
ing ℓ in (6.44). When Bk = 3, Qf (3) = 3(Pf)
2(1 − Pf) + (Pf )3. We can also find
Qf (4) = 4(Pf)
3(1−Pf)+(Pf)4 and Qf (5) = 10(Pf)3(1−Pf)2+5(Pf)4(1−Pf)+(Pf )5,
respectively. It is evident that Qf (4), Qf(5) < Qf(3) < Pf for Pf < 0.5. If
Qf (n − 1), Qf(n) < Qf(n − 2) < Pf is valid for an odd n, we want to show that
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Qf (n+ 1), Qf(n+ 2) < Qf (n) < Pf . Setting Bk = n+ 1 in (6.44), we obtain







































The second equality in (6.46) is obtained by change of variables (ℓ = ℓ+1). The third
equality in (6.47) is obtained by moving Pf inside the brackets as part of binomial









ℓ(1−Pf)n−k have the same



































The first inequality holds for ℓ′ ≥ n+1
2




and Pf < 0.5. Using Q(n) < Qf(n−2) < Pf , we conclude that Q(n+1) < Q(n) < Pf .
Similarly, by setting Bk = n + 2 in (6.44), we have








































The second equality in (6.51) is obtained by change of variables (ℓ = ℓ′ + 1) and
separating the last term (Pf)
n+2 from the summation. The approximation in (6.52)
is obtained by moving Pf(1 − Pf) inside the brackets and dropping the last term,
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which is very small (P n+2f ≈ 0). We again compare the coefficients of Qf (n+ 2) and







Pf(1− Pf)(n+ 2)(n+ 1)


























The first inequality holds for ℓ′ ≥ n+1
2




) < 1 for Pf(1− Pf) < 0.25. Therefore, by using Q(n) < Qf (n− 2) < Pf , we
conclude that Q(n + 1), Q(n+ 2) < Qf (n) < Pf .
To find Qm, we replace Qf and Pf with Qd and Pd, respectively, in (6.44), where
Qd = 1−Qm and Pd = 1−Pm are cooperative and individual probability of detection,
respectively. By using the same techniques, we can show that Qm(Bk + 1), Qm(Bk +
2) < Qm(Bk) < Pm for Pm < 0.5 and any odd integer Bk > 2.
Based on Proposition 6.5, we show in Theorem 6.3 that jamming resilience is
enhanced by BCS with hard combinations and the majority rule.
Theorem 6.3 (Best-Effort Cooperative Sensing). Best-effort cooperative sensing im-
proves jamming resilience ψ of CR ad hoc network K.
Proof. The result follows Proposition 6.5 that BCS decreases the probability of false
alarm Qf , and Proposition 6.3 that jamming resilience ψ of CR ad hoc network K
increases as Qf decreases.
6.5.3 Deployment Density and Scalability
The deployment of CR users in a given area, that is, deployment density, is a deciding
factor of the reliability and connectivity in CR ad hoc networks [54]. As a result,
increasing CR user density in the jamming region can be utilized as a defense strategy
to provide resilience to jamming. The main reason that jamming mitigation can
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be achieved is because, as deployment density DK increases, the average distance
between CR users decreases while the average distance between the attacker and
CR users remains the same. This results in better SINR and less effective jamming
perceived at CR users. This is shown in Theorem 6.4.
Theorem 6.4 (Deployment Density). Given the jamming region A, jamming re-
silience ψ increases as the density of uniformly distributed CR users DK increases in
A.
Proof. We look at the effects of the increase ofDK on the interference and signal power
observed at CR users. Let Rj be the radius of the jamming region A with the attacker
at the center of the circle and D be the distance between any uniformly distributed
CR user inside A and the attacker at the center of A. From [68], we know that the
distribution of D is fD(d) =
2d
R2j
. Hence, the average distance E[D] = D̄ = 2
3
Rj is
independent of DK or the number of CR users in A. Let D
+ and D− be the area
outside and inside, respectively, the circle of radius D̄ in A and D+∪D− = A. We can
find the number of CR users in D+ to be KD+ =
5
9
K. As K increases, the increase in
KD+ is more than that in KD− . As a result, the average received interference power
at CR users decreases as K increases.








we obtain dk =
kRj√
K
∝ K− 12 . The received signal power Pik at the CR user i from its
neighbor k is then Pik ∝ d−ηk ∝ K
η
2 for path loss exponent η ≥ 2. As K increases, CR
users receive higher signal power from neighbors. This results in higher SINR and
fewer CCC links being successfully jammed. Thus, jamming resilience ψ increases.
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6.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we validate the analysis in Section 6.4 and evaluate the performance
of the proposed JRCC algorithm. We first show the convergence of JRCC algorithm,
and then show how JRCC effectively establishes control channels and maintains net-
work connectivity under intelligent jamming attacks, and improves jamming resilience
by using the proposed intrusion defense countermeasures such as action strategy co-
ordination, distributed cooperative sensing, and increase of deployment density.
In the simulation environment, we set N = 4 (K = 3, J = 1), Np = 6, and
Ns = 3 unless otherwise specified. CR users are uniformly distributed in the jam-
ming region A, a circular area with the attacker at the center and radius 50m. PU
activities Pon/Poff are the same in every channel. For channel model parameters, we
set transmit power to 100mW, η = 3.3 for path loss, SINR threshold γth = 4dB,
channel bandwidth 100 kHz in 900MHz band. The noise floor is set to −101 dBm.
For multiagent reinforcement learning, we set αt = 1/(1 + t/500), δtw = 1/(1 + t/10)
where t is stage index, δl = 4δw, γ = 0.9, ǫ = 0.1, δmax = 1, and rth = 0.5. The
simulation results are averaged over 50 runs.
6.6.1 Convergence of JRCC Algorithm
Figure 6.2 plots the average rewards of 9 CR users and the attacker with Pon set to
0.3 and perfect spectrum sensing (Pf = Pm = 0) in an exemplary run. The figure
clearly shows the convergence of JRCC algorithm and validates Theorem 6.1 that the
rewards of players converge to the rewards of a Nash equilibrium.
6.6.2 Transmission Capability
Figure 6.3 shows jamming resilience ψ or jamming strength ζ of players for different
number of Ns given Np = 6 and Pon = 0 and 0.5. In capability-limited cases (no
PU activity), ψ increases as Ns increases from 1 to 4, but the increases in ψ are
monotonically decreasing and eventually turning into the decreases in ψ from 4 to 6.
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Figure 6.2: Convergence of JRCC Algorithm.
ζ , on the other hand, exhibits larger values when Ns is either small or large (Ns = 1
or 6 in this case). When Ns is small, the combinations of channel selections are small,
which makes the jamming easier for the attacker. When Ns is large, the possibility of
selecting more channels by CR users increases the percentage of jammed control links
because the attacker can match the transmission capability of CR users. Thus, the
optimal value of Ns for CR users is in the middle (Ns = 4 in this case). This shows
that transmitting on all channels is not necessarily the best strategy for CR users
in capability-limited cases if the attacker has the same capability. As Pon increases
from 0, the capability-limited cases gradually become activity-limited scenarios where
channel availability and selections are limited more by PU activities rather than by
transmission capability. For example, the differences between values of ψ or ζ for
large values of Ns (Ns > 3) are very small for Pon = 0.5 because the average number
of channels available for selection is around 3. Therefore, in this case, increasing Ns
beyond 3 does not improve ψ for CR users or ζ for the attacker.
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Figure 6.3: Jamming Resilience and Jamming Strength versus Transmission Capa-
bility Ns.
6.6.3 Action Strategy Coordination
PU activity is one of the major crucial factors of JRCC performance since it mainly
determines the available channels for CCC allocations. Figure 6.4 shows jamming
resilience ψ of CR users and jamming strength ζ of the attacker under different degrees
of PU activities. Note that, for avoiding the overlapping of curves and improving
clarity, inverted strength φ = 1 − ζ is shown for attacker’s jamming strength. In
the figure, JRCC is compared to Random, PHC, and WoLF-PHC algorithms. Here
“Random” is a scheme with random action selections with no learning. PHC is a
greedy algorithm that improves the policy by selecting actions according to maximum
Q values. WoLF-PHC is based on PHC with variable learning rates determined by
the WoLF principle [10]. Both CR users and the attacker use the same algorithm
in the game except that, in the case of JRCC, action strategy coordination is not
available for the single attacker.
We first observe that jamming resilience decreases as Pon for all methods. The
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Figure 6.4: Jamming Resilience and Jamming Strength vs. PU Activities (Pon) with
Perfect Sensing.
“Random” has both the lowest ψ and the lowest ζ among all methods because it max-
imizes the uncertainty of channel selections that appear to both CR users and the
attacker. Thus, it performs poorly for control channel establishment while effectively
combating jamming attacks. For CR users, PHC performs better than WoLF-PHC
with low to medium PU activities due to its greedy approach. However, WoLF-PHC
outperforms PHC under high PU activities due to the variable learning rates. The
proposed JRCC achieves the highest ψ values among all methods by combining the
advantages of PHC and WoLF-PHC. With low and medium PU activities, JRCC
further outperforms PHC with cooperative gain due to action strategy coordination
among CR users when valid control links are constantly available. For high PU activi-
ties where valid control channels are less likely to exist, JRCC’s variable learning rates
take into effect in increasing jamming resilience. For the attacker, all three MARL
methods exhibit increasing jamming strength ζ under high PU activities because only
a few channels are available in this case, which gives the attacker an edge to jam-
ming. PHC generally achieves the best jamming strength ζ under low and medium
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PU activities due to greediness. Jamming strength of the attacker in JRCC is smaller
because it is compromised by jamming resilience of CR users and no cooperation can
be performed by the attacker. For extremely high PU activities where valid CCCs
are very limited for jamming, jamming strength of the attacker also decreases and
approaches zero as PU becomes mostly active on all channels. This scenario shows
that JRCC effectively adapts to PU activities by combining action strategy coordi-
nation and variable learning rates to enhance jamming resilience of control links for
defending jamming attacks.
6.6.4 Best-Effort Cooperative Sensing
Besides the effects of PU activities, spectrum sensing errors such as false alarms and
miss detection can have a large impact on JRCC performance. We first show the
impact of spectrum sensing errors on jamming resilience of CR users and jamming
strength of the attacker, and then show how distributed cooperative sensing with
sensing decision fusion rules can mitigate the effects of false alarm and miss detection
errors, and improve jamming resilience.
6.6.4.1 Impact of Spectrum Sensing Errors
Figure 6.5 shows the effects of spectrum sensing errors (Pf = 0.1 and/or Pm = 0.1
on jamming resilience/strength (ψ/ζ) for different degrees of PU activities. Note
that inverted jamming strength (φ = 1 − ζ) is shown in the figure for clarity. For
CR users, both false alarms and miss detection cause jamming resilience degradation
under all levels of PU activities. Specifically, for low to medium PU activities where
PUs are less likely to occupy the channels, miss detection results in relatively minor
degradation while false alarms result in significant reduction in performance. When
both types of errors are considered, the degradation is clearly dominated by false
alarm errors. For high PU activities where PUs occupy channels more frequently,
miss detection degrades performance slightly more than false alarms. When both
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Figure 6.5: Effects of Spectrum Sensing Errors (Pf = 0.1 and/or Pm = 0.1) on
Jamming Resilience and Jamming Strength for Different Values of Pon.
are considered, the degradations from each type of errors are accumulated. Thus,
we observe that false alarms cause more damage to jamming resilience than miss
detection. For the attacker, jamming strength is also compromised by both types of
sensing errors under medium to high PU activities. Unlike CR users, the attacker’s
jamming strength suffers more from miss detection than from false alarms.
6.6.4.2 False Alarm Errors
Figure 6.6 shows jamming resilience/strength under different degrees of false alarm er-
rors when CR users employ cooperative sensing with AND, OR, and Majority (MAJ)
decision data fusion rules [3]. We include perfect and imperfect scenarios for com-
parison. The perfect scenarios refer to the cases where all control links are available
for sharing sensing decisions among CR users while the imperfect ones are scenar-
ios where only valid control channels from the previous stage that are not occupied
by PUs in the current stage will be available for reporting sensing results. We first
see that, without using cooperative sensing, jamming resilience decreases by 47% as
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Figure 6.6: Jamming Resilience and Jamming Strength under the Impact of False
Alarms (Pon = 0.1, Pm = 0).
Pf increases from 0 to 0.4. With cooperative sensing, performance degradation can
be effectively mitigated by OR rule, significantly improved by MAJ rule, and com-
pletely recovered by AND rule in perfect CCC scenarios. This shows the importance
of control channels for cooperative sensing whose performance improvement further
enhances jamming resilience of control links. Since the perfect scenarios generally do
not exist in hostile environment, we show that using MAJ rule can achieve similar
or slightly better performance in the imperfect scenarios compared to the OR rule
in the perfect scenarios. Therefore, distributed cooperative sensing can effectively
mitigate the impact of false alarms to improve jamming resilience of CR users. For
the attacker, the jamming strength is slightly affected by false alarms in this low PU
activity scenario.
6.6.4.3 Miss Detection Errors
Figure 6.7 shows jamming resilience/strength under different degrees of miss detection
errors when CR users employ cooperative sensing with AND, OR, and MAJ decision
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Figure 6.7: Jamming Resilience and Jamming Strength under the Impact of Miss
Detection (Pon = 0.7, Pf = 0).
data fusion rules. Evidently, miss detection has more impact on jamming strength of
the attacker than jamming resilience of CR users. The attacker’s jamming strength
is significantly reduced up to 65% as Pm increases from 0 to 0.4. Thus, the impact of
miss detection on jamming strength of the attacker is more severe than that of false
alarms. For CR users, all decision rules for cooperative sensing improve jamming
resilience with OR rule the most improved, AND rule the least improved, and MAJ
rule in between when control channels are perfectly available. Interestingly, using
OR rules can further increase ψ as Pm increases. This is due to perfect cooperative
detection by CR users and miss detection by the attacker that decreases ζ . We also
show that using MAJ rule in the imperfect scenarios can achieve similar or slightly
better performance compared to no cooperation case. Thus, combined with the results
in Figure 6.6, we obtain that MAJ rule achieves the best tradeoff in mitigating false
alarm and miss detection errors to improve jamming resilience in both perfect and
imperfect control link scenarios.
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Figure 6.8: Effects of Deployment Density and Scalability on Jamming Resilience
and Jamming Strength under Different Degrees of PU Activities.
6.6.5 Deployment Density and Scalability
In addition to action strategy coordination and distributed cooperative sensing, the
deployment density of CR users in the jamming region is an effective countermeasure
to defend jamming attacks. Figure 6.8 shows jamming resilience/strength under all
levels of PU activities with different CR user deployments (K = 3, 6, 9) in the jamming
region. We can see that jamming resilience (strength) increases (decreases) as the
number of deployed CR users increases. The gain from higher deployment density
is more evident under medium to high PU activities than low PU activities. Note
that the increase in ψ is diminishing as the deployment density increases because
it is getting more difficult for CR users to coordinate with all the neighbors with
dynamic channel selection strategies and limited transmission capability. This shows
the scalability of JRCC scheme in the jamming region and the effectiveness of using
deployment density as a countermeasure to enhance jamming resilience of CR users




Cognitive radio networks have been recognized as a promising paradigm to address
the spectrum under-utilization problem. To improve spectrum efficiency, many oper-
ations such as sharing data in cooperative spectrum sensing, broadcasting spectrum-
aware routing information, and coordinating spectrum access rely on control message
exchange on a common control channel. In this research, we propose a framework
for common control channel design and analysis to address common control channel
reliability issues and achieve seamless communication and spectral efficiency in CR
ad hoc networks. Specifically, we address common control channel reliability issues
by achieving the following three main objectives: (i) responsiveness to PU activities,
(ii) robustness to channel impairments, and (iii) resilience to jamming attacks.
In Chapter 2, we first introduce the origins, the problem, the definition, and the
classification of CCCs. We then discuss four major CCC design methods: sequence-
based, group-based, dedicated, and underlay CCC design, their advantages and dis-
advantages, and existing solutions. We also discuss control channel security issues
with the focus on control channel jamming. This chapter provides the fundamental
knowledge of CCC design and challenges in CR ad hoc networks. In Chapter 3, we fo-
cus on the importance of CCCs in cooperation and examine the roles that CCCs play
in cooperative spectrum sensing. We start with introducing cooperative spectrum
sensing, its elements and framework, and achievable cooperative gain and incurred
cooperation overhead. we are particularly interested in tackling CCC-related coop-
eration overhead issues such as reporting delay, channel impairments, and security.
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We then discuss cooperative sensing security issues with the emphasis on data falsifi-
cation attacks. These two chapters lay the foundation for more advanced topics and
in-depth discussions about our proposed methods in later chapters.
In Chapter 4, we propose an efficient recovery control channel (ERCC) method
to address the challenge of achieving responsiveness to PU activities and extending
control channel coverage for reducing control efforts. By constantly updating and pe-
riodically exchanging common channel lists among neighboring nodes, our proposed
method is capable of efficiently responding to primary user activity change with dy-
namic control channel allocation. It also balances the tradeoff between extending the
coverage of common control channels for reducing control signaling efforts and select-
ing channels of best quality for minimizing the interference with primary users. With
common channel lists constructed in each ad hoc node, the work can be extended to
consider the adaptation of control channel bandwidth for a variety of control traffic
loads. Furthermore, the optimal utilization of the common channel lists for both
control and data channel allocations can be developed for throughput and quality-of-
service analysis. Finally, cooperative spectrum sensing schemes can be incorporated
into ERCC for performance improvement in realistic channel conditions.
In Chapter 5, we propose a novel cooperative sensing scheme based on reinforce-
ment learning to improve the cooperative gain and mitigate the cooperation overhead
in correlated shadowing and dynamic environment. We show that the reinforcement
learning-based cooperative sensing (RLCS) method is capable of converging to an
optimal solution asymptotically and enhancing rewards by using optimal stopping.
The optimal solution achieved by an optimal user selection policy includes finding
the optimal set of cooperating neighbors with minimum control traffic, reducing the
overall reporting delay, selecting independent users for cooperation under correlated
shadowing, and excluding unreliable users and data from cooperation. The results
show that RLCS improves or maintains the comparable detection performance while
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adapting to environmental change, such as the change in PU traffic pattern, user
location, user reliability, and fading control channel condition, that may compromise
the cooperative gain in cooperative sensing. This work can be extended to consider
the cooperative wideband sensing scenario where multiple CR users act as fusion
centers in different frequency bands to jointly improve cooperative gain and mitigate
cooperation overhead with multiagent reinforcement learning.
In Chapter 6, we tackle the control channel jamming problem in CR ad hoc net-
works by proposing a jamming-resilient control channel (JRCC) scheme to enhance
the jamming resilience of CR users and counteract the jamming strength of intelligent
attackers. We model the interactions among CR users and the attacker under the
impact of PU activities as a stochastic general-sum game, and analyze the gradient
ascent dynamics and the convergence of the game. We also propose the JRCC al-
gorithm to adapt to PU activities with variable learning rates and defend jamming
attacks by using action strategy coordination, distributed cooperative sensing, and
higher deployment density to facilitate control channel establishment, mitigate the
impact of spectrum sensing errors, and counteract jamming strength of the attacker.
The results demonstrate that JRCC scheme effectively combats jamming under the
impact of primary user activities and spectrum sensing errors by utilizing action strat-
egy coordination, best-effort cooperative sensing, and higher deployment density as
intrusion defense countermeasures to intelligent jamming attacks. This work can be
extended to the large-scale jamming scenario where control channels in CR ad hoc
networks are attacked by multiple attackers whose cumulative effects on the jamming




In this appendix, we tabulate the notations frequently used in Chapter 4, 5, and 6.
Specifically, Table A.1 and A.2 list the notations used in Chapter 4, Table A.3 and A.4
list the notations used in Chapter 5, and Table A.5 and A.6 list the notations used
in Chapter 6.
Table A.1: Table of Notations (A-M) for Chapter 4.
Notation Description
A PU and CR user deployment area
a Decaying coefficient in the exponential correlation model
α Death rate of PU activity (ON to OFF)
B Channel bandwidth (control or data)
β Birth rate of PU activity (OFF to ON)
C CCC allocation state
Ci/Cj The i
th/jth licensed channel
Chk The CCC allocated to neighbor k
δDL Threshold for detecting unreliable CR users
dij Distance between CR user i and j
dpi Distance between the PU and CR user i
Dp Density of PU deployment
Ds Density of CR user deployment
γi Accumulated PU interference on channel Ci
γpu Sensing threshold for PU receive power
γsu Sensing threshold for CR user receive power
LCi Common channel list of CR user i
LNB List of neighbors with allocated CCCs
LP Preferred channel list from local sensing
LCC The intersection of two broadcast CCLs LCi and LCk
LR List of channels for control radio channel hopping
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Table A.2: Table of Notations (N-Z) for Chapter 4.
Notation Description
Nbest Number of CCC links with the best allocated CCC
Nc Number of licensed channels
Ndisc Number of established CCC links
Nr Number of control capacity regions
Nk Number of neighbors
Nm Maximum number of channel switches during recovery
Np Number of PUs
Ns Number of CR users
Ntot Number of total available CCC links
p Probability of selecting the common channel Ci
PI Interference power observed at a PU
Psu CR user transmit power
rk CCL broadcast rate of CR user k
R CCC recovery state
Rc Sum-rate capacity of all control channels
Rkj (q) Maximum control throughput on Cj at CR user k in region q
Rp PU transmission range
Rs CR user transmission range
rs Periodic spectrum sensing frequency
Sm The m
th channel in the channel hopping sequence
σdB Log-normal shadow fading dB-spread
tdisc Maximum duration for initial neighbor discovery
tp PU ON/OFF period
tC/TC CCC allocation time
tR/TR CCC recovery time
wij The weight for the CCC link between CR user i and j
Wi The weight of channel Ci for channel ordering
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Table A.3: Table of Notations (A-M) for Chapter 5.
Notation Description
a Decaying coefficient of exponential correlation model
Aj Set of actions available in state j
Aj The j-th boundary of SNR regions
ak Action selected in sk
α Learning rate
C Set of cooperating CR users
Cdk+1 Delay cost
Cρk+1 Correlation cost
D(p ‖ q) Kullback-Leibler distance between p and q
Dc De-correlation distance
dij Distance between CR user i and j
dk,i Reporting delay of CR user i in stage k
Dk Set of selected CR users from s0 to sk
γ Discount factor
γb Received SNR
γpl Path loss exponent
hk History of state-action sequence up to sk
k Stage or time index
K Number of selected neighbors for cooperation
K̂ Rate of convergence
L Number of cooperating neighbors
λ0 Cooperative decision threshold
λth Local decision threshold
µk Decision rule mapping hk to ak
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Table A.4: Table of Notations (N-Z) for Chapter 5.
Notation Description
N Number of episodes
P∗ Optimal set of selected CR users
Pd Local probability of detection
Pe Error probability of control channels
Pf Local probability of false alarm
π∗ Optimal policy or strategy
Q(s, a) State-action value for choosing action a in state s
Qf Probability of false alarm for cooperative decisions
Qm Probability of miss detection for cooperative decisions
Rn Expected cumulative reward of episode n
rk+1 Immediate reward
ρij Correlation coefficient between CR user i and j
rb Birth rate (OFF to ON) of PU activity
rd Death rate (ON to OFF) of PU activity
rdk+1 Reward attributed to delay cost
rρk+1 Reward attributed to correlation cost
σ1 Lognormal dB-spread
sk State of cooperative sensing decision process in stage k
T ∗ Optimal stopping time
Tlim Total reporting delay constraint
τn Temperature of softmax action strategy in episode n
tdi Reporting delay of CR user i
U Set of selected uncorrelated CR users
ui Local decision of CR user i
u0 Cooperative decision
Y Cumulative reward
yi Observation of CR user i
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Table A.5: Table of Notations (A-M) for Chapter 6.
Notation Description
A Area of jamming region
A Action space of JRCC game
An(s) Set of actions available to player n in state s
atn Action of player n in stage t
α Step size
Bk Number of neighbors of CR user k
Ck,j Number of valid CCCs between CR user k and j
cj Jammed common control channel
CK Number of establish control links in A
Cp Set of PU-free channels
cs Selected common control channel
cv Valid common control channel
D Distance between CR user and the attacker in A
∆ Learning rate matrix
δi Learning rate of CR user i
Dp Set of PU-occupied channels
∆(x) Probability distribution of x
Dj,i Number of jammed CCCs in i-th control link
DK Number of jammed control links in A
DK CR user deployment density in A
dk Distance from a CR user to its k-th nearest neighbor
ǫ Small probability for epsilon-greedy action selection
η Path loss exponent
Γ JRCC game
γ Discount factor of JRCC algorithm
γk SINR at CR user k
γth SINR threshold for decoding messages
hik Channel gain between player i and k
H1/H0 Alternative/null hypothesis
J Number of attackers
Jc Number of jammed CCCs
K Set of CR users or the entire CR ad hoc network
K Number of CR users in JRCC game
LK Number of possible control links in A
M Number of actions available in state s, |An(s)|
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Table A.6: Table of Notations (N-Z) for Chapter 6.
Notation Description
N Number of players in JRCC game
Np Number of licensed channels
Ns Maximum number of selected channels for transmission
ns Number of eigenvalues associated with stable eigenspaces
Ni Number of channels selected by player i for transmission
nu Number of eigenvalues associated with unstable eigenspaces
Jc Number of jammed CCCs
Nc Number of selected CCCs
P(x) First recurrence map or Poincaré map of point x
Pc Number of PU-occupied selected CCCs
Pf Probability of false alarm
Pi Transmission power of player i
Pm Probability of miss detection
Poff Probability of PU OFF state
Pon Probability of PU ON state
pζ Value of Pon where jamming strength reaches the maximum
φ Inverted jamming strength
πn Action selection strategy of player n
πtn,m Probability of player n selecting the m-th action in stage t
ψ Jamming resilience of CR users
Qf Probability of false alarm for cooperative decisions
Qm Probability of miss detection for cooperative decisions
Rπn Average reward of player n achieved by strategy πn
Rj Radius of jamming region A
Rtn Expected reward in stage t
rb Birth rate (OFF to ON) of PU activities
rd Death rate (ON to OFF) of PU activities
rn Immediate reward of player n
S State space of JRCC game
s State of JRCC game
σ2 Noise power
Uc Number of valid CCCs
V s Stable eigenspaces
V u Unstable eigenspaces
xn Strategy matrix of player n
xi Similarity of two strategies




The temporal-differnece (TD) methods in reinforcement learning facilitate the evalua-
tion of the quality of states and the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. In
Chapter 5, we utilize three TD methods: Q-learning, Sarsa, and Actor-Critic meth-
ods [85] for evaluating the performance of RLCS. These algorithms are summarized
as follows:
B.1 Q-Learning
Q-learning is an off-policy TD method that utilizes separate policies for evaluating
the quality of states and for making decisions. In each state sk, the agent chooses
an action ak (the next selected cooperating CR user) based on an action selection
strategy, such as ǫ-greedy and softmax approach, observes the reward rk+1 and the
next state sk+1, and updates the state-action value function, called Q-factors, for
current state sk as follows:







where α ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1] are the learning rate and the discount factor, re-
spectively. The state update, sk ← sk+1, follows. These steps of action selection,
observation, and Q(s, a) and state updates are repeated all over again in each state.
The state-action value for the terminal state is zero.
B.2 Sarsa
Sarsa is an on-policy TD method that utilizes the state-action pair for transitions.
Hence, the policy to be evaluated and improved is also used in making decisions.
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Similar to Q-learning, the agent initially chooses an action and observes the reward
and the next state. Unlike Q-learning, the agent takes the next-state action selected
in the previous state as the current action ak in state sk and observes the reward rk+1
and the next state sk+1. The agent selects next state action ak+1 for state sk+1 by
using the softmax approach in state sk and updates the state-action value function
for the current state sk as follows:
Q(sk, ak)← (1− α)Q(sk, ak) + α
[
rk+1 + γQ(sk+1, ak+1)
]
(B.2)
where α and γ are the learning rate and the discount factor, respectively. The update
of the state-action pair follows: sk ← sk+1 and ak ← ak+1. These steps of taking
actions, observation, next-state action selection, and Q(s, a) and state-action pair
updates are repeated in each state.
B.3 Actor-Critic
In the actor-critic method, the agent consists of an actor that chooses actions and
a critic that evaluates those actions and the value of states. In each state, the
actor chooses an action and observes the reward rk+1 and next state sk+1. The
critic estimates a temporal-difference (TD) error, δk, updates the value function, and
sends the TD error to criticize the actor’s action preference. Specifically, the critic
evaluates the TD error, δk, by using the immediate reward, rk+1, and the next-state
value function estimate, V (sk+1), in state sk as follows:
δk = rk+1 + γV (sk+1)− V (sk) (B.3)
where γ is the discount factor. On the other hand, the actor chooses an action based






, i = 1, . . . , Na (B.4)
where π(sk, ak) indicates the preference for action ak = xi in state sk. Both the critic
and the actor use the TD error for update. The critic updates the value function:
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V (sk)← V (sk) +αδk in which α is the learning rate. Similarly, the actor updates its




The stochastic game G with N players is the multi-player generalization of a single-
player Markov decision process (MDP) [12], which is a tuple: 〈S,A, fp, fR〉 where
S is the set of states, A = {A(1), . . . ,A(|S|)} is the set of action spaces in which
A(s), s ∈ S is the joint action space of all players’ action spaces in state s given by
A(s) = A1(s)×· · ·×AN (s), fp : S ×A×S → [0, 1] is the state transition probability
function, and fR = fR1 , . . . , fRN is the collection of reward functions of all N players
in which fRn : S × A × S → R is the reward function of player n. The game is
repeatedly played for infinite number of stages or for finite number of stages until the
attackers are removed.
At each stage of G, each player n observes the state changes based on state tran-
sition probabilities, selects an action according to its action selection strategy πn(s),
and receives a reward (also called payoff) Rn(s,A(s)) as the result of the state changes
and the joint actions from all players. Although each player may not be able to ob-
serve all the states and all the actions of other players, the objective of the game
is for each player n to find the optimal strategy π∗i to maximize its expected future

















where Rπnt is the player n’s reward received in stage t.
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